- BA, University of Toronto
- PhD, University of Pittsburgh
Prof. Sedivy received her Honours BA in Psychology from the University of Toronto and her PhD in Philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh. Her primary research and teaching interests are in the philosophy of mind, especially the philosophy of perception, in the philosophy of art and in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
She has just published Beauty and the End of Art: Wittgenstein, Plurality and Perception, which uses her approach to perception and her understanding of Wittgenstein to offer a new understanding of beauty and art while also addressing the question whether the tradition of Western art came to an end with the end of modernism.
For more information visit Prof. Sedivy’s personal website.
Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
- 2016. Beauty and the End of Art: Wittgenstein, Plurality, and Perception. London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- 2014. “Art from a Wittgensteinian Perspective: Constitutive Norms in Context” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 72(1):67-82.
- 2008. “Starting Afresh Disjunctively.” In Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, 348-375. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Starting Afresh Disjunctivism.pdf)
- 2006. “Nonconceptual Epicycles.” European Review of Philosophy 6: 33-66. (Nonconceptual Epicycles.pdf)
- 2004. “Wittgenstein’s Diagnosis of Empiricism’s Third Dogma: Why Perception is not an Amalgam of Sensations and Conceptualization.” Philosophical Investigations 27(1) 1-33.
- 2004. “Minds: Contents without Vehicles.” Philosophical Psychology 17(2): 149-179. (Minds Contents Without Vehicles.pdf)
- 2004. “Wittgenstein Against Interpretation: “the Meaning of a Text Does Not Stop Short of its Facts.” In John Gibson Wolfgang Hummer eds. The Literary Wittgenstein. Routledge 165-185.
- 1996. “Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-Conceptual Content?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26(3) 413-431.
For more on Prof. Sedivy’s publications visit PhilPapers.