Imogen Dickie

B.A. Hons. (Canterbury, New Zealand) B. Phil (Oxford) D. Phil (Oxford)

Associate Professor

Current research interests - reference, acquaintance, perception.

Office
Address: 170 St. George St., Room 525
Tel: 416-978-5308
Fax: 416-978-8703
imogen.dickie@utoronto.ca

Selected articles

My published and forthcoming work is up at

"Informative Identities in the *Begriffsschrift* and 'On Sense and Reference'", The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38(2). 2008.

This is about what motivates Frege's move from the 'metalinguistic' account of informative identities to the account in terms of difference in sense.

"'The Generality of Particular Thought'". Forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly.

This is about the claim that, necessarily, a subject who can think that a is F must also have the capacities to think that a is G, a is H, a is I, and so on (for some reasonable range of ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘I’,…), and that b is F, c is F, d is F, and so on (for some reasonable range of ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘d’,…). §1 sets out, and raises objections to, two arguments for a strong version of this claim (Gareth Evans’s ‘Generality Constraint’). §§2-3 present a new argument for a weaker version of the claim. §4 sketches some directions of inquiry that this new argument opens up.

"Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence". Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.

This discusses a recent defence against the intuitionist attack on classical negation, and the significance of this defence for the wider debate about anti-realism and classical logic.

"We Are Acquainted with Ordinary Things". Forthcoming in Robin Jeshion, New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford University Press.

This paper uses recent empirical results about the object-directedness of perceptual attention to build an account of acquaintance-based thought about ordinary material objects.