Jessica Wilson

Wilson's research is fairly evenly split between the metaphysics of science and foundational metaphysics (ontology).

 

Wilson's main projects in the metaphysics of science concern how best to characterize intertheoretic relations (e.g., emergence, realization, the determinable-determinate relation) and notions (e.g., the physical) relevant to formulating certain comprehensive metaphysical theses about natural reality (especially reductive and non-reductive physicalism, and emergentism). In 'Supervenience-based Formulations of Physicalism' (Nous 2005) she argues against supervenience-based approaches to (nothing) over and aboveness; in 'How Superduper does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?' (Philosophical Quarterly 1999) and 'Causal Powers, Forces, and Superdupervenience' (Grazer Philosophische Studien 2002), she offers alternative accounts of (nothing) over and aboveness based in powers and in fundamental forces/interactions, respectively; in 'On Characterizing the Physical' (Philosophical Studies 2006) she defends a physics-based 'no fundamental mentality' account of the physical; in 'Determination, Realization, and Mental Causation' (Philosophical Studies 2009) she argues that the determinable/determinate relation, properly understood, can provide a basis for understanding mental/physical realization; in 'Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong' (in progress) she provides a straightforward schematic metaphysical basis for accounts of emergent dependence and autonomy that are and are not compatible with physicalism, respectively.

 

In related work in the metaphysics of science Wilson advances an account of Newtonian forces as special science entities ('Newtonian Forces', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007), provides a distinctively causal argument against component forces (forthcoming in a Dialectica issue on the metaphysics of vectors), and argues that attention to elimination of degrees of freedom as characteristic of certain special science entities makes room for non-reductive physicalism ('Non-reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2009).

 

Wilson's main project in metaphysics proper involves assessing Hume's Dictum, the principle (roughly speaking) that there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct entities. In 'What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It?' (forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research) and 'From Constitutional Necessities to Causal Necessities' (forthcoming in Classifying Nature: The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, Helen Beebee, Nigel Leary, and Francis Longworth, eds.), she argues that Hume's Dictum is not directly justified as either analytic or synthetic a priori; in 'Hume's Dictum and Natural Modality: Counterfactuals' and 'Hume's Dictum and Natural Modality: Combinatorialism', she assesses whether Hume's Dictum is indirectly justified, as required by similarity-based accounts of counterfactuals or combinatorial accounts, respectively, of what is possible for natural (broadly scientific) entities.

 

In other projects in metaphysics Wilson defends the viability of singularist causation ('Resemblance-based Resources for Reductive Singularism', 2009 Monist issue on Singular Causation) and provides a new account of what it is for a substantial particular to contingently have a trope ('Trope Determination and Contingent Characterization', in progress).