

Goodness, Unity, and Creation in the Platonic Tradition

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1.

By "the Platonic tradition" I mean to indicate certain fundamental principles shared by Plato and by all those who self-identified as his disciples. From the perspective of the *soi-disants* followers of Plato, he was not the first or the only revealer of the truth; he was, though, the most sublime. Since Platonists regularly appropriated Aristotelian distinctions and arguments for their articulation of Platonism on the grounds that he was himself at heart a Platonist, albeit a dissident one, I will not hesitate to call on the Stagirite as needed.¹

The Platonic tradition can fairly claim to be the *fons et origo* of reflection on the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" In this regard, Parmenides was thought to lead the way. For Parmenides argued that change, if it is to occur, must involve something coming out of nothing or something disappearing into nothing. But that something should, for example, be in the realm of nothingness, and then appear in the realm of being, is an unintelligible and even implicitly self-contradictory notion. It is worth trying to say exactly why this is so. It is unintelligible to us that something should

inhabit the realm of nothingness, for a claim that it does requires one to identify it as such, and therefore, of course, to recognize it as *being* something identifiable. So, the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" if interpreted to mean "why is something that was once nothing something now?" or "why is it that what is nothing now was once something?" is literally an unintelligible one. If, by contrast, we interpret our question as one regarding *relative* non-being, as in "why did this property appear here and now?," then we have a robust array of tools with which to answer it. We have, that is, an Aristotelian schema of explanation which, for the most part, Platonists were more than willing to employ. On the schema, the explanation for why there is something rather than nothing would properly focus on a *something* as *explanans*. Having arrived at an *explanans* that is both necessary and sufficient, there is literally nothing left to explain.

But between Parmenides and the Aristotelian articulation of a response to him in terms of relative non-being, Plato interposed a further challenge of his own. His challenge amounted to arguing that the answer to the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" could not be reduced to an explanation of how or why a change occurred. To explain a change was not to explain the being of anything possessing being, particularly the being of changeless things. Some philosophers—especially those in the Peripatetic and Stoic schools—rejected this challenge. They simply denied that there was anything to explain. On the other hand, Platonists fully accepted the legitimacy of the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" where "something" refers to anything that possesses being of any sort, not just changeable being.

The beginning of a response to Plato's challenge is to be found in the dialogues themselves. Plato argues in *Parmenides* that

If one is, is it possible for it to be and for it not to partake of *ousia* [essence]? —It is not possible—Therefore, the *ousia* of that which is one, since it is, is not identical with that which is one; otherwise, the *ousia* would not be one's *ousia*, nor would that which is one partake of *ousia*, but it would be the same thing to say "one is" and "one is one". However, the hypothesis is not "what follows if one is one," but "what follows if one is." Is this not so?—Of course—Then, the "is" signifies something different from the "one" (142B5-C5).

The principal point of this passage for our purposes is that Plato seems to have Parmenides offer an argument that being is composite: what has being must partake of *ousia* or essence. In that case, there will be a distinction between that which partakes and that which is partaken of.

It is reasonable to suppose that the *Parmenides* passage provides an analysis of the famous *Republic* passage where it is said that the Idea of the Good is that which provides being (*einai*) and *ousia* to that which is knowable.² The Idea of the Good is itself "beyond *ousia*." And so, it would seem, it is "beyond" the being that only comes from participating in *ousia*. And yet, as scholars have noted, this evidently does not mean that the Good is altogether beyond being in any sense. It is, we are informed, "the

brightest part of being" (518C9); "the most blessed part of being" (526E3-4); and "the best among beings" (532C5-6).

Three points are sufficiently clear. First, whatever has being partakes of *ousia*. Second, that which provides being to whatever has it is "beyond *ousia*." The compositeness of that which partakes of *ousia* consists in a non-identity between that which partakes in *ousia* and the *ousia* in which it partakes. Crucial to the entire Platonic enterprise is an explanation of this non-identity. In the case of Parmenides' One, we are told that the "is" of it signifies something different from the "one".³ Presumably, we are meant to be able to generalize from this argument because Parmenides' One is merely the example chosen to illustrate the distinctions required to rescue the theory of Forms. So, for any x that is f, the "is f" of it signifies something different from the "x."

On the one hand, it is difficult to resist the impression that the compositeness here is that of existence and essence. Nevertheless, there is no hint of how the components of the composite are supposed to be related. Certainly, we are not, for example, given to understand that the compositeness consists in a real minor distinction between the essence that is in potency to the existence that is its actualization. The fact, though, that in the above *Parmenides* passage the *ousia* of the One and the One itself are further divisible indefinitely makes it fairly evident that the compositeness is in fact *not* that of essence and existence. So, we are naturally led back to reflection on the claim that whatever is must be composite, that its *ousia* must be non-identical with it.

The puzzle increases in intensity when we realize that Aristotle argues for the *incompositeness* of primary *ousia*. Its identity with thinking, far from compelling him to conclude that the thinker is non-identical with its thinking or with that which it thinks,

leads him to argue that there is no non-identity within it.⁴ So, it seems that he is not prepared to adopt the argument that whatever has *ousia* is non-identical with the *ousia* it has. But the Platonist will surely reply that Aristotle's primary *ousia* does not *have ousia*; it *is ousia*. And so the dispute becomes not: is that which has *ousia* non-identical with its *ousia*, but rather: can primary *ousia* be a first principle of all. The Platonists seem to say no; Aristotle seems to say yes. Note that there is no dispute over whether it is necessary to postulate a first principle, but only over whether or not the first principle is *ousia* or beyond *ousia*.

The Platonic tradition's interpretation of Plato's contribution to the solution to this problem is consistent and clear: *ousia* implies limitedness and the first principle of all must be absolutely unlimited. If Aristotle replies that primary *ousia is* unlimited because it is incomposite, the Platonic tradition holds that an absolutely incomposite first principle is not alone able to account for that which a principle of *ousia* must account, namely, the diversity of essences in the world. Even supposing the total causal reach of the first principle—a function of its unlimitedness—it cannot be, precisely because of its unlimitedness, the sole principle of limitedness. This conclusion, though, seems to be at odds with the postulation of an absolutely first principle of being. Must not the first principle of all also be the principle of the being of the subordinate principle of limitedness?

This question has been variously understood within the Platonic tradition as: "how can the many arise from the one?" or "how can that which is composite arise from that which is incomposite?" where "arise from" is supposed to indicate a causal relation.⁵ Here is a problem about which a philosopher might say, "this obviously works in

practice, but it doesn't work in theory." If we are convinced of the need for an absolutely first principle of all, how are we supposed to understand its manifest effects?

2.

The answer that the Platonic tradition gives to this question originates, perhaps surprisingly, in an interpretation of Plato's *Symposium*. In Socrates' report of Diotima's lessons on the mysteries of love, he gives us her definition of love (*erōs*): "love is [desire for] the possession of the good forever (206A11-12)." And its "work" (*ergon*) is "birth in [the presence of] beauty in the body and the soul (206B3-8)." This birth in beauty or reproduction is "what mortals have in place of immortality (206E7-8)." It is the replacement for immortality (207Dff). Birth in beauty is of two sorts: bodily and spiritual or intellectual (208Eff). But it is clear that the latter is superior to the former (209C7-D1).

Sometimes, this passage is carelessly interpreted to mean that "birth in beauty" is here being taken to be a *means* to the achievement of immortality. Treating the birth in beauty as an instrument for satisfying the desire for immortality is psychologically lame, to say the least. It is not, in any case, a desire for immortality that motivates the lover, but a desire for the everlasting possession of the good. To the extent that one possesses an image of this good or supposes that one possesses it, one naturally produces. There is much more that needs to be said about this famous text, but the central point for our purposes is that "birth in beauty" is the natural functioning of one in possession of that which is good.

Plotinus stands out among Platonists as absorbed with understanding what Plato has to say about *erōs* in the light of Platonism. It is not merely that he wrote a treatise (III 5 [50]) devoted to the topic, but he endeavored to integrate the concept of *erōs* fully into Platonic metaphysics and psychology. Most remarkably, he employs Plato's concept of *erōs* in his characterization of the One or the Good, the first principle of all, as a "lover of itself."⁶ This is remarkable because, as we know, *erōs* in *Symposium* at any rate is a concept from which connotations of "lack" or "deficiency" are seemingly inseparable. Yet the absolutely first principle of all is without limitation or imperfection of any kind. How can this be? Why does Plotinus take from Plato the appropriateness of applying the concept of *erōs* to the One?

This claim is, in effect, an abductive inference or *quia* proof from the claim that goodness is essentially self-diffusive.⁷ And the proof that goodness is essentially self-diffusive relies upon the self-evident multiplicity of intelligible forms in the universe. That the knowledge of intelligible reality necessarily produces true virtue is one expression of the necessary production of intelligible form from the Good. The Good must love itself if in the achievement of its desire it necessarily produces. Since it necessarily produces, and since production is the *ergon* of love of the Good, the perfect self-possession of the Good that is present in the first principle of all must result from its self-love.

The self-love of the first principle is expressed by Plotinus as a sort of gloss on the fact that the first principle is "self-caused" (*aition heautou*).⁸ The extraordinary phrase "self-caused" which appears here for the first time in the history of philosophy so far as we know, is inferred to apply to the One owing to its absolute simplicity and hence, its

uniqueness. Therefore, anything other than the first principle is not self-caused.

Whatever has its causality outside of it is, then, the product or work of the self-love of the One. Since love is always for the Good, the products of the One's self love are not loved by it.⁹ But at the same time, production by the One insures that whatever is capable of desire, loves the One or the Good.

The self-causality of the One is also, remarkably, described as "[making] itself from nothing (*oudenos*)."¹⁰ Since there are no real distinctions whatsoever within the One, its being and its activity are indistinguishable. Its being is the activity of self-love. What, then, is the difference between the making that belongs to the One's "self-making" and the making that belongs to the One's products? Stated otherwise, how can the self-making of the absolutely simple first principle of all result in something *other than* that first principle? What is not the One is also not made from nothing; nor is it identical with the One. So, what does its causal dependence consist in?

The formally precise way in which Plotinus answers these questions is to say that the One is "virtually all things" (*dunamis pantōn*).¹¹ Scholars and exegetes who translate *dunamis* as "potency" or even as "power" really do get off on the wrong foot. It is obvious why there cannot be any potency attributable to the One; it is somewhat less obvious, though equally certain, that there can be no power in the One either, if by "power" we just mean *active* potency. What Plotinus wants to say about the One is that it is everything that exists, but in the way, roughly, that "white" light is all the colors of the spectrum or in the way that a function is virtually all of its substitution instances. And just as the dichotomy transcendent/immanent is inappropriate in explaining the

connection between white light and the spectrum, so it is inappropriate in explaining the causal connection between the One and everything else.

If the virtuality of the One were "static" as is the virtuality of a function in relation to its values, then to say that the One is virtually all things would hardly serve as an answer to the question of how a "many" is supposed to *arise* from the One. But the virtuality that the One is is an activity (*energeia*).¹² It is an activity that is "beyond," that is, logically and ontologically prior to the activity of primary *ousia* or Intellect.¹³ It is tempting from a later perspective to identify this activity as *ipsum esse*. Indeed, Plotinus does even say that the One "gives itself existence" (*hupostēsas hautō*), and that all things derive their existence from it.¹⁴ There are two grounds, however, for hesitation. First, if the One is virtually all things, then *ipsum esse* is virtually all things. Yet it is not insofar as the One is *esse* that it is virtually all things, but rather insofar as it is one. Second, if the One is *ipsum esse*, then its causal activity would consist in the endowment of all that is with existence. There can be no intermediaries or instrumentality in the endowment of existence. Yet all things depend on the One through intermediaries.¹⁵ Even Intellect depends on the transcendent activity of the One by the instrumentality of the One's "external" activity.¹⁶ If we choose to reserve the word "creation" for direct existential causal dependence, then the One is only a self-creator.¹⁷

Within such a metaphysical framework, the self-diffusion of the Good is the *only* possible answer to the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" The necessary self-diffusion of the One consists in its being "ungrudging" (*aphthonos*), which is only conceptually distinct from its self-love.¹⁸ But the claim that goodness is self-

diffusive is no answer to our question if goodness is not identified with an absolutely unique first principle of all, a first principle that explains the being of everything else.

3.

Although Plotinus alludes to many arguments for the existence of the One, his central argument for such a principle seems to be the one found in his treatise "How That Which is After the First Comes From the First, and on the One" (V 4 [7]).¹⁹ Here is the argument:

There must be something simple before everything, and this must be different from all things which are after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which come from it, and yet being able to be present to these things in a different way, being itself really one, and not with its being as different from its oneness. It is false even to say of it that it is one, and there is no *logos* or knowledge of it; it is in fact "beyond being"; for if it is not simple, outside of all coincidence and composition, and really one, it could not be a first principle. And it is the most self-sufficient, by being simple and by being the first of all. For that which is not the first needs that which is before it, and that which is not simple is in need of the simple [parts] in it in order that

it can come from them. Such a [first principle] must be one alone; for if there were another of the same kind, both would be one (V 4 [7] 1. 5-17).

Plotinus seems to be arguing here for two conclusions: (1) every composite must be accounted for by that which is incomposite or absolutely simple and (2) there can be only one absolutely simple thing. We can better understand the reasoning for (1) if we concentrate first on the reasoning for (2). Assume that there were more than one absolutely simple thing. Then, there would have to be something that each one had that made it at least numerically different from the other, say, for example, a unique position. But that which made it different would have to be really (not merely conceptually) distinct from that which made it to be the one thing it is. That which had the position would be really distinct from the position itself. But then something which had a position and so was distinct from it would not be absolutely simple. So, that which is absolutely simple must be absolutely unique. Only the first principle of all is unqualifiedly self-identical; the self-identity had by anything else is necessarily qualified. This argument suggests the meaning of "composite" that Plotinus has in mind when he argues for (1). A composite is anything that is distinct from any property it has. What we might call a "minimally composite individual" is one with one and only one property from which it is itself distinct. Compositeness is then equivalent to qualified self-identity.

The simplicity of the first principle is explicitly said to consist in the fact that there is no difference between its "being" (*on*) and its "oneness" (*hen*). From this it follows that the complexity possessed by everything else is at least a complexity

consisting of a distinction between being and oneness. The argument alludes to the passage in *Parmenides* mentioned in the first section of the paper where Plato distinguishes between that which is one and the *ousia* in which it must partake. The passage also makes explicit that the name "One" does not indicate that this principle is oneness; rather, it indicates that it is unique.

The minimal complexity of every being other than the One consists that being's partaking in *ousia*. To be is to be *something or other*. Being requires identity and identity requires distinguishability. For us even to conceive of something is for us to suppose that it has an *ousia* in virtue of which we can identify it and re-identify it. But if that which exists has an *ousia*, it cannot be identified *with* that *ousia*, even though it must be identified *by* it. To identify something with its *ousia* is to commit oneself to the false view that no two things can have that identical *ousia*. If it turns out that only an absolutely simple first principle can explain the being of anything which partakes of *ousia*, then the only viable option for one wanting to deny such a principle is to claim that there is nothing which is distinct from its *ousia* or, what amounts to the same thing, that no two things can partake in an identical *ousia*. This is the position of radical nominalism, and it is committed to maintaining that there cannot even be two things the same just insofar as they partake in the identical *ousia* oneness. Indeed, it is not even clear that radical nominalism is not reducible to hyper-radical nominalism, according to which the putative one and only one thing that exists is incapable of being identified owing to the fact that it is incapable of being re-identified. For to re-identify it over time is to pick out one or more features that are the same across time, features that this one thing possesses. In addition, if we pick out the features of our universe at a certain time,

the mere possibility that there should be another universe possessing these features depends on our distinguishing the *ousia* of our universe from it.

In any case, it is fair to say that Plotinus is not particularly seized with the nominalist challenge. So, he does assume that the relevant minimal complexity exists and he holds that it can only be explained by the absolutely simple. Plotinus criticizes Aristotle not for disagreeing with this point, but for concluding that thinking is absolutely simple. It is, once again, tempting to suppose that the relevant complexity is a composition of act and potency and that the reason the complex needs to be explained by the simple is that potency is always a function of act, but that the act of such a composite does not explain itself; it is always a received act. This, again, cannot be quite right, because the *ousia* in which the minimally complex partakes is not received from outside. This minimally complex, that is, Intellect, does indeed receive from the One that by which it "defines" itself, that is, that by which it produces *ousia*.²⁰ What Intellects receives is a *dunamis* for self-definition. I have already argued that when Plotinus says that the One is *dunamis pantōn*, a power is not being indicated, at least if "power" indicates any potency whatever. Here, however, no such restriction is necessary. Intellect, as the "external" activity of the One, really does have the "power" of self-definition and in the actualization of this power, it becomes the intelligible world.

For Plotinus, a proof of the existence of an absolutely simple first principle of all could in fact start anywhere with any complex entity, but if it does not start with Intellect, that proof must pass through Intellect. This is a direct consequence of the instrumentality of Intellect in the One's causal activity. To reach Intellect "from below" as it were, one must merely acknowledge that understanding is other than sense-perception. Within the

entire Platonic tradition, understanding is not something that sense-perception alone allows us to attain. The central Platonic text is *Timaeus* 51D3-52A4, where it is argued that if understanding (*noēsis*) exists, then Forms exist, because understanding is not of sensibles. What understanding is of is *ousia*; hence, if *ousia* is always partaken of, whatever has *ousia* is composite in the way that Plato and Plotinus argue. That *ousia* can be without being partaken of is denied. What possesses *ousia* and what is constituted by minimal complexity is Intellect. So, a proof for the existence of the One, more remote from the original proof, but clearer to us is available beginning with the premise that understanding is real and different from sense-perception.

Understanding is, roughly, the cognition of material identity or, more exactly, the cognition of two objects that are the same (and therefore numerically different) owing to their real or ultimate identity. Every equation in mathematics or in the sciences, other than expressions of formal identity, represents a claim of cognition of this type. Similarly, the cognition of instances of the application of a rule evinces understanding. When, in the series, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, . . . , we cognize the rule of which each successive number is an application, we manifest understanding. It should be added—though it is not our direct concern here—that the following of the rule, which a computer is perfectly capable of doing, is not equivalent to the cognition of the rule.

Understanding is not possible if *ousia* does not exist or if it has no being. But the being of *ousia* is irreducibly complex. For example, what we understand when we understand the *ousia* that makes all odd numbers the same is different from what we understand when we understand the *ousia* that makes all even numbers the same. The being of *ousia* is not equivalent to an instance of that *ousia*. Plotinus follows Aristotle

exactly in maintaining that the being of *ousia*—primary *ousia*, as Aristotle calls it—is the being of a separated Intellect. For Plotinus, if there were not such an Intellect, cognitively identical with the full array of intelligible entities, it would not, for example, be true that oddness and evenness are generically one. Intellect is virtually all that it thinks. But the identity of Intellect and that which is, however, leaves a residual complexity, as we have seen. Intellect and *ousia* are themselves expressions of or the same insofar as they manifest the first principle of all. This first principle, virtually Intellect and the intelligibles, cannot, of course, have the complexity of *ousia* or Intellect.

The identification of the first principle of all, the One, with the Good follows from the three claims that (1) everything seeks its own good and (2) something's good consists in the fulfillment of or achievement of its nature, that is, its *ousia* and (3) the One is virtually all *ousia*, and so, virtually the Good of everything that is. The self-diffusiveness of goodness is, then, the self-diffusiveness of the Good itself. Eventually, any question regarding the "cause of being" (*aition tou einai*) of anything needs to be referred to the self-causing first principle of all. But owing to the fact that this first principle is "beyond *ousia*," the "why" question about being is not to be answered by a direct causal link to the first principle; the causality must go through the instrumentality of Intellect and the intelligibles with which Intellect is identical.

It goes without saying, I think, that the Platonic tradition wants to insist both that this sort of explanation for the being of anything does not preclude or preempt causality within nature *and* that natural causality does not make the Platonic explanation otiose or redundant. Illustrative of this point, I would like now to turn in the last section of the

paper, to say a kind word about intelligent design, albeit not exactly the sort that is prominent in contemporary debates.

4.

Plato's Demiurge and, perhaps somewhat more contentiously, Aristotle's Prime Unmoved Mover, are postulates of Intelligent Design Theory. So is Plotinus' One-Good. Under the rubric "Intelligent Design Theory" I mean to include any theory that starts with the rejection of any other theory that holds that the cosmos and everything in it can be completely explained without the causality of Intellect. Evolutionary Theory is the leading anti intelligent design theory. The evolutionary theorist who grants that evolutionary explanations are incapable of explaining why there is something rather than nothing might justly insist that in this regard she is in no worse position than her opponent.

Contemporary intelligent design theorists seem to me to make the mistake of challenging evolutionary theorists having already accepted the assumption of their opponents that makes their challenge hollow. I mean the assumption that individual biological entities strive for survival by reproduction. If one grants this assumption, one needs only add the well-documented mechanisms of natural selection in order to complete the explanatory picture. We might think that Evolutionary Theory does not in fact provide a satisfactory explanation for complexity; but neither does Intelligent Design Theory. More to the point, reproduction as a survival mechanism is, to say the least, questionable. Indeed, it is easy to show that the survival of the individual is nowhere in

nature aided by reproduction. In reply, the evolutionist will surely want to say that it is not the survival of the individual but the survival of the species that is facilitated by reproduction. Why all the behavior of a living thing is geared towards individual survival except in this one respect is never explained. It is here, from the evolutionist's point of view, that the miracle occurs. Grant this miracle and no further intelligence is required.

The most sophisticated contemporary versions of Evolutionary Theory try to minimize the miraculous by locating the impetus for survival at the genetic level. According to this view, a gene is defined as any portion of chromosomal material that potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural selection. Animals, we are told, are just the survival mechanisms for genes. A gene is not just one portion of DNA; it is all the replicas of a portion of DNA everywhere. What do genes do? They try to become more numerous in the gene pool. That is, their survival is their reproduction.

The elision of survival with reproduction is the device for minimizing the miraculous. If survival is just some *x* striving to be what it is, there is no mystery in need of anything more than *ousia*. But I suspect that the elision of survival with reproduction is in fact an incoherent idea. For there to be survival, there must be living things who are aiming to survive. A gene is not a living thing. But even if we grant that it is a living thing, the survival of *that* living thing is not facilitated by its reproducing another living thing. If it is replied that what survives is not the individual living thing, but the genetic "blueprint," then it needs to be pointed out that it is not then the gene that is trying to survive. And it needs to be asked why the gene is trying to have its blueprint carry on.

It should by now be apparent that the Platonic answer to the question of why things reproduce is that goodness is self-diffusive. As goodness diffuses from the first

principle, it employs Intellect and its intelligible entities instrumentally to produce all that there is or can be. Because the Good is what all things are virtually, in fulfilling their natures they achieve the good each in its own way.²¹ In surviving, they strive to achieve the Good; in reproducing, they emulate the Good. As Plotinus argues, "there was certainly nothing that prevented anything whatever from having a share in the nature of that which is good, insofar as each thing is capable of participating in it."²² It is, says Plotinus, in every nature to have the capacity to produce that which "comes after it" and to unfold itself "as a seed." The production is the natural result of participating in the Good. This Good explains the being of as many things as there are; the instrumentality of Intellect and all the intelligibles with which it is identical explains the complex natures of these many things.

This is probably not the sort of Intelligent Design Theory that, say, the members of the Discovery Institute have in mind. For them, intelligent design of this type is here bought at too high a price. On the other hand, intelligent design of *any* sort is anathema to the theorists of evolution. Surely, in accounting for the fecundity of being, they would want to insist, like Mae West, that goodness has nothing to do with it. By contrast, the Platonic tradition maintains that goodness has everything to do with it.

Notes

¹ See my *Aristotle and Other Platonists* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), especially 24-46, for an sketch of how the Platonic tradition understood the fidelity of Aristotle to the philosophy of his master.

² 509B6-10.

³ Cf. *Sophist* 244B-245E.

⁴ Cf. *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072a31-3; 1072b14ff; 12.8.1073a30; 12.9.1075a4-10.

⁵ On the question of how a "many" arises from the One, see Plotinus, *Enneads* III 8 [30] 10. 14-15; III 9 [13] 4; V 1 [10] 6. 4-5; V 2 [11] 1. 3-4; V 3 [49] 15;

⁶ VI 8 [39] 15. 1-2. See the penetrating study of Agnès Pigler, *Plotin. Une métaphysique de l'amour. L'amour comme structure du monde intelligible*. (Paris: Vrin, 2002).

⁷ On the history of this idea see Klaus Kremer, "Bonum est diffusivum sui: Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum," in W. Haase and Temporini, H. (edd.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* (ANRW), Pt. II.36.1 (1987), 994-1032.

⁸ VI 8 [39] 14. 41.

⁹ V 5 [32] 12. 40-9.

¹⁰ VI 8 [39] 7. 54; cf. 15. 9.

¹¹ V 1 [10] 7. 9; V 3 [49] 15. 31; V 4 [7] 2. 38; VI 9 [9] 5. 36-7.

¹² VI 8 [39] 16. 16; VI 8 [39] 20. 15.

¹³ VI 7 [38] 17. 11.

¹⁴ VI 8 [39] 16, 15; cf. V 4 [7] 1. 38; cf. VI 9 [9] 1.1. The One is said to be the efficient cause of the being of everything else at cf. V 3 [49] 15.12-13; 28; 17. 10-14; VI 4 [22]10; VI 7 [38] 23. 22-4.

¹⁵ VI 7 [38] 42. 23; cf. VI 9 [9] 1. 23.

¹⁶ V 1 [10] 6. 30-9; IV 8 [6] 6. 8-12; V 4 [7] 1. 27-34; 2. 28-39; VI 8 [39] 18. 51-2.

¹⁷ See my "Plotinus' Metaphysics: Creation or Emanation?," *Review of Metaphysics* 46 (1993), 559-74 for further discussion.

¹⁸ V 4 [7] 1. 35-9.

¹⁹ See for other arguments or allusions too other arguments I 3 [20] 1. 4-5; II 9 [33] 1. 11-16; III 8 [30] 9. 19-32; 10. 31-5; 11. 8-11.

²⁰ V 1 [10] 7. 13-14.

²¹ Plotinus, VI 7 [38] 27.

²² IV 8 [6] 6. 16-18.