Profile on Epistemology
Alumni Interviews:
Charles Mills and Deepak Ramachandran

In Memoriam:
Henry Pietersma, John (Jack) Canfield, Kenneth Schmitz
As always, it gives me great pleasure to present you with a new issue of Philosophy News, the annual magazine of the U of T Departments of Philosophy. Thanks to the relentless efforts of Jovana Jankovic, our Communications Officer, this latest issue presents you with another interesting spotlight on what is going on in our community. I hope you enjoy reading about our activities and some of the things that kept—and still keep—us busy during the current academic year.

Because the present issue follows right on the heels of our (delayed) 2016-17 edition, we decided to highlight two topics of which we are especially proud: our alumni and our research mission. These topics will also be the focus of future issues; we especially hope to learn more from our alumni!

In two interviews, Charles Mills and Deepak Ramachandran share impressions of their time at U of T and how it impacted their future careers. Deepak obtained his BA in philosophy and chemistry from U of T in 1991, where he was active in student government at the Department of Philosophy, before completing his BPhil at Oxford in 1994. Since then he has become an investor and entrepreneur in the areas of software, clean technology, and electronics. Charles obtained his MA in 1975 and his PhD in 1985. He is currently a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Before joining the Graduate Center, he taught at the University of Oklahoma, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Northwestern University. He has published important work in social and political philosophy, particularly around issues of class, race, and gender. Both interviews make for very compelling reading, as they also shine some light on the nature of our academic discipline.

Charles Mills currently serves as president of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association (APA). He will be succeeded this summer by our colleague Jennifer Nagel, who serves this year as the vice-president/president-elect of the Central Division of this largest and most important association of philosophers world-wide. And there is a further Toronto connection: both Charles and Jennifer follow Valerie Tiberius (BA 1990), who served as the Central APA’s president in 2016-17.

In the research section of this issue we focus on two areas: first, you can read about some of the exciting research happening in epistemology, where the department has a particular strength. The accounts of the various research projects undertaken by faculty, postdocs, and graduate students give an insight into the vibrancy of and diversity in this field. The second focus is on Arthur Ripstein’s project on the ethics of war. At present, Arthur is conducting this project with the help of a two-year Killam Research Fellowship. In 2019, Arthur will present some of the results of his research in his Tanner Lectures at the University of California, Berkeley. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values is one of the most prestigious lecture series in ethics and related fields.

As this magazine goes to press we enter the busiest phase of our winter term. As our senior undergraduates take their last courses before graduating and some of our graduate students are getting ready to defend their dissertations, the department is entering the “admissions season” for our graduate programs. On top of this, we are conducting searches for three faculty positions. This year we are trying to fill two junior positions, one in ancient philosophy on the UTSC campus and one in metaphysics and epistemology on the downtown campus. The third open position is the Senator Jerahmiel S. and Carole S. Grafstein Chair in Jewish Philosophy. We are all very much looking forward to the new colleagues joining our community in the not too distant future.

If you enjoy reading about our past activities, consider checking out our more current events and news on our department website and also on Twitter and Facebook. It would be a pleasure to welcome you at one of our upcoming department events. We would also be very happy to hear from you with feedback and suggestions.

Martin Pickavé
Chair, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts & Science
Chair, Graduate Department of Philosophy
The 2017-18 year has been as busy as ever. In our last issue I wrote that we had introduced some new courses in order to attract a broader range of students—in particular, PHL204: Philosophy in Everyday Life and PHL221: Philosophy at the Movies, both at the 200 level.

With an eye to our highly international student body, we also arranged to have our PHL235: Philosophy of Religion course taught this year on Buddhism. PHL204 was offered this fall to a class of 90 students and was well received; such provocative topics as abortion, religion, free will, and the nature of art inspired extremely lively and often exciting discussion. PHL221 will be offered this coming summer, and the religion course is being offered right now to a full class of 60.

I’m delighted to report also that we presented the inaugural Jacqueline Brunning Award in May 2017 to graduating student Theo Lindgreen. If you would like to make a donation to the Brunning Award fund, please visit uoft.me/donate-utm-phil and scroll down to the Brunning Award. To read more about Jackie, visit uoft.me/brunning.

Our faculty publications and awards continue to keep our department among the top departments at UTM. Roughly half of the faculty hold prestigious multi-year SSHRC grants, and both Jennifer Nagel and Andrew Sepielli have won significant awards. During 2018-19, Jennifer will be a fellow (the only UTM faculty member chosen this year!) of the Jackman Humanities Institute. The Institute’s theme for next year—“Reading Minds”—concerns what it means to “read” faces, texts, and minds, among other things. Jennifer, an epistemologist, will work on a project titled “Extracting Belief from Knowledge.” (She won’t live entirely in the ivory tower, though, as she will also begin her term as president of the Central Division of the APA.)

Andrew, who was promoted to associate professor with tenure in 2016, won the first UTM Annual Research Prize in the Humanities for “outstanding contribution to research and scholarship for the period up to and including two years post tenure.” Congratulations to Jennifer and Andrew! Next year fully half of the faculty will be either on research leave (sabbatical or fellowship) or occupied with full-time administrative assignments that take them away from the classroom.

This will present a big challenge to those of us who remain, but it will also provide a fine opportunity for some of our recent PhDs and postdocs who have not yet secured faculty positions elsewhere. We will need to replace at least 15 half courses!

I will keep you updated as to how things go.

Diana Raffman
Chair, Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto Mississauga
We are fortunate that growth and new initiatives are the order of the day—or rather year—in philosophy at UTSC. Our enrollments continue to grow as a result of a happy confluence of factors: student interest, new programs at the campus that draw on philosophy courses, and interesting new classes developed by our faculty such as Topics in Arabic and Jewish Philosophy. The small “portable” we have called home for four years is bursting at the seams, definitively outgrown.

As incoming chair, I can report that this year is anything but “business as usual.” Rather, we are hitting a critical mass where it is possible to make it my aim to push at old boundaries, to expand and improve and innovate.

We began the new academic year by adding an assistant professor (contractually limited) position in applied and biomedical ethics that reflects the tremendous student interest in biomedical ethics at UTSC and the growing program in Health Studies. Assistant Professor Joshua Brandt is the first to hold this position. Aside from teaching two sections of Biomedical Ethics (with over 800 students), he has designed courses in biomedical ethics from second to fourth year that will allow students to pursue this topic throughout their studies. With these courses in place, the next step will be to offer a minor in biomedical ethics. The second addition to our department—for whom a search is underway—will be an assistant professor (tenure-track) in ancient philosophy, who will design new course offerings in the foundations of Western philosophy.

As always, our faculty have been actively publishing and presenting their research at international conferences from New Orleans to London, Stockholm, Groningen, and the Esalen Center for Theory and Research. Professor Jessica Wilson served as president of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science and gave the presidential address, “On Characterizing the Fundamental,” at the annual conference at Fordham University in October, 2017.

In addition to our research and teaching commitments, we are all busy with new initiatives. We are working with the UTSC architectural team on designing a permanent new home for the department to which we will move in fall 2018. The curriculum committee is developing an experiential learning dimension for the final year of our program. This will be a capstone course that will give students the “hands-on” experience of leading tutorials and marking essays in first-year introductory classes while carrying out their own individual research projects with a faculty member. This venture is inspired by the successful Socrates Project at the St. George campus. We have also started an essay clinic and will be announcing the Howard Sobel Essay Prize. Our Association of Philosophy Students is very active this year as well, holding a number of informal events and organizing their annual conference on the theme of “Political Philosophy” with Professor Rahul Kumar (Queen’s University) as the keynote speaker on March 24, 2018.

Last but not least, there is also a more personal addition: congratulations to Assistant Professor Julia Nefsky on the arrival of her second child, Archie.

We look forward to another year of growth, new initiatives, and stellar research and teaching at UTSC.

Sonia Sedivy
Chair, Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto Scarborough
The Graduate Department was delighted to welcome its 2017-18 entering MA and PhD students last September. These students are enrolled in a wide variety of courses, and, at the time of writing, are hard at work on final papers for their first term. Despite their diverse interests, students have the opportunity to develop a strong cohort consciousness in their pro-seminars, with an MA pro-seminar on Platonism and Naturalism and a PhD pro-seminar on Rationality. Our MA students have as well completed their Professional Development Seminar, with sessions on a broad range of issues in the profession—from turning a term paper into a publication to freedom of speech and academic freedom in the classroom. The PhD Professional Development Seminar runs in the winter term, and will help students prepare for the transition into the job market.

We were also delighted to welcome back our returning graduate students. The students’ works in progress are supported by student-run reading groups and the Graduate Forum. Speaking of student-run activities, organization is well underway for this year’s cleverly titled graduate conference, PsyPhi: Philosophy Meets Psychology. The conference will take place May 7-8, 2018, and will feature keynote speakers Joëlle Proust (Ecole Normale Supérieure) and Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis and University of Wollongong). It should be a terrific event—see torontophilgradconf.wordpress.com for more information. Thanks to Elena Rabinoff-Derksen and Michaela Manson for their organizational work.

This year’s Graduate Research Weekend is scheduled for March 16-17, 2018, during which time prospective students will visit the department, meet with faculty and graduate students, and take part in a range of recruitment activities. A highlight of the weekend is the keynote talks given by two of our graduate alumni. Our speakers this year are Janette Dinishak (Wittgenstein, philosophy and history of psychology, disability), currently assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California at Santa Cruz, and Jacob Weinrib (legal and political philosophy), currently assistant professor in Queen’s University’s Faculty of Law.

Congratulations for several graduate students (or former graduate students) are in order. Ariel Melamedoff’s essay, “Atomistic Time and Simultaneous Causation in Hume’s Treatise” won the Martha Lile Love Essay Award. Nir Av-Gay (“Gradability in Discourse”) and Jared Riggs (“Moral Theory Without Metaphysics”) received Honourable Mentions for their papers. Benjamin Wald was the winner of the Martha Lile Love Teaching Award for his UTSC undergraduate political philosophy course. Finally, Jacob Stump and Adam Murray successfully defended their dissertations last summer. Both Jacob and Adam have taken up lecturer positions in the St. George undergraduate philosophy department.

Our entering and early-year PhD students did excellent work in preparing scholarship applications, with applications for the Vanier, Trudeau, and SSHRC doctoral awards advancing from the University competition to Ottawa for adjudication. We are extremely fortunate to have very responsible and hard-working students in the department, with every eligible student in the department taking the time and expending the energy to apply for SSHRC doctoral funding.

The students’ work in this regard is part of a department-wide commitment to maintaining and improving funding for our students, funding that now considerably outstrips University base funding. The Graduate Department is very happy to report that our students are better funded than roughly 90% of departments in the Faculty of Arts & Science. This enviable situation is made possible to a large extent by student and faculty efforts to secure external funding. The department is also very happy to report that we have raised our departmental minimum funding commitments to $18,000 for MA students and $22,500 for PhD students (University base funding is $17,000). Students also

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Every student in the Faculty of Arts & Science is enrolled as either a specialist, a double major, or a major with two minors. We are very proud of our specialist, major, and minor programs, but also always looking for ways to improve them. The year before last we got together with the Department of Mathematics to overhaul the philosophy and mathematics specialist program. This year we have overhauled the philosophy minor. The aim of the minor is to make a mini-program in philosophy available to students whose main academic homes are in other departments. We think that the new structure we have introduced, which will take effect next year, is a big improvement from the point of view of this overall aim.

In other curriculum reform news, we have introduced new 400-level seminars in Philosophy of Law and History of Analytic Philosophy, and a new 300-level class in Indian Philosophy. These add to an already very diverse and broad set of courses offered by our department.

Readers may wonder how changes of this kind are actually formulated and approved. First, someone has to notice a point where a change might be a good idea: sometimes suggestions for change come from the chair or director of undergraduate studies; sometimes they come from our administrative staff; sometimes they come from our students. The proposed change is brought to the department’s curriculum committee, which comprises academic administrators and elected student and faculty representatives. If the change passes the department’s curriculum committee, it goes to the Faculty of Arts & Science’s humanities curriculum committee—where representatives from all the humanities departments discuss one another’s proposed changes—for approval. So each change we make has a lot of thought and consultation behind it.

Our programs are very popular, as can be gathered from the high enrolment numbers. The flipside of this is that classes in the first years are often very large. The department is trying its best to create more opportunities for smaller learning environments. Our most recent initiative is the PHL1 mentorship program that we have developed together with the Philosophy Course Union, the association of philosophy undergraduate students. The purpose of the PHL1 mentorship program is to foster an interest in philosophy within a community of first-year students enrolled in PHL100Y1 or PHL101Y1.

Students in the PHL1 program meet biweekly. The meetings are led by a peer mentor and assistant peer mentor, who are senior undergraduate philosophy students. Topics and activities for these meetings will vary at the discretion of the mentors, but may include the following: workshops on reading and writing philosophy, meetings with faculty members and graduate students, field trips to a law firm or the Royal Ontario Museum, or even just a fun afternoon. We currently have more than 40 first-year students enrolled in the program and are very happy with the uptake and the level of activities. We are very grateful to Sheridan Cunningham and Ashley Khan, the two student mentors this year, and to Eric Correia, our outstanding undergraduate administrator, for getting PHL1 off the ground and running.

Though we are proud of our programs, we are even prouder of the achievements of our students. One way we recognize some of these achievements is through our annual award of prizes. We usually acknowledge the prizewinners during our annual UNESCO World Philosophy Day event in November. But let me use this occasion to again congratulate our prizewinners from the 2016-17 academic year: Carl Abrahamsen, Manula Adhihetty, Antonia Alksnis, Alaric McKenzie-Boone, Amitpal Singh, Bella Soblirova, and Usman Zahid. Well done!

We also recently hosted our Undergraduate Research Conference on April 6 and 7, 2018, which was a terrific success and featured a keynote address by Samantha Brennan (Guelph), the president of the Canadian Philosophical Association.

Last but not least, I would like to welcome our new lecturers and assistant professors (CLTA), who have joined our dedicated teaching staff this academic year: Francesco Gagliardi, Jacob Stump, Jordan Thompson, and Benjamin Wald. Without these dedicated instructors our course offerings at the undergraduate level would look much less exciting than they currently are.

Imogen Dickie
Associate Chair, Undergraduate
The tri-campus Department of Philosophy is very proud of the breadth of specialists we have in all branches of philosophy.

Henceforth, each edition of Philosophy News will feature brief reflections from a diverse range of our scholars on key issues in their particular fields.

In this issue, we focus on epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge and related concepts such as truth, belief, and justification.

Profile on Epistemology

Theoretical Rationality and Belief

Julia Smith

The question of theoretical rationality is the question of what beliefs we should have, if we are rational. There is plenty of disagreement among epistemologists about what the requirements of theoretical rationality are. Directly bearing on this disagreement is an interesting question about whether it is ever possible to be rationally mistaken about what theoretical rationality requires.

On one hand, if a rational person can never be wrong about what rationality requires her to believe, we get the odd result that one’s total evidence regarding the requirements of rationality can never be misleading. This is unusual because our everyday lives are rife with misleading evidence (for example, false testimony from a usually reliable source), so it would be strange

Can mistakes about what we ought to believe be rational? Deep exploration of this question will help shed light on the nature of rationality, a key norm in epistemology.

On the other hand, if a rational person can sometimes be wrong about what rationality requires her to believe, we get the odd result that there are cases in which agents ought to believe Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form “P, but it’s not rationally permissible for me to believe that P.” So, can mistakes about what we ought to believe be rational? Deep exploration of this question will help shed light on the nature of rationality, a key norm in epistemology.
In metaphysics, Nietzsche complains that Descartes's conclusions about the existence of a thinking self are based on grammar rather than sound logical inference. My current project is to pursue a Nietzschean-type criticism in formal epistemology. The culprit is again Cartesian, but this time it is the Cartesian coordinate system that implements a grammar misleading us to unwarranted epistemological conclusions.

Statisticians think of the set of normal distributions as manifolds—sets that behave locally like Euclidean space. Normal distributions, for example, are characterized by the mean and the standard deviation, which serve as coordinates that map normal distributions onto Euclidean space.

In modern physics, just as in epistemology, dependence on a particular representation in coordinates can become more of a liability than an asset. Modern physicists often do not want to think of space in terms of coordinates. Relativity theory especially has accelerated the transition from the vectors of the Cartesian grammar to the tensors and fibre bundles of differential geometry. The relevant relationships are now no longer between parametric representations (for example, the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution), but between derivations (generalized derivatives, thus the name differential geometry) and a metric based on an inner product defined on tangent spaces (such as the Fisher information matrix).

For the categorical distribution with a finite event space (for example, die rolls and coin tosses) the finite set of probabilities is usually considered to be the set of parameters or coordinates of the belief state—in order to characterize the probabilities 60% for heads and 40% for tails I would consider the point (0.6, 0.4) in a Cartesian coordinate system. But then highly counter-intuitive things happen!

When Foucault talks about sexuality, he uses the Cheshire Cat of Alice in Wonderland as an illustration of “smiles, happinesses, pleasures, and desires as qualities without an abiding substance to which they are said to adhere. As free-floating attributes, they suggest the possibility of a gendered experience that cannot be grasped through the substantializing and hierarchizing grammar of nouns and adjectives” (Judith Butler in Gender Trouble, page 32).

The current ambition in formal epistemology is to highlight parameter invariance as a discriminating feature between mathematical models. Following successes in physics and statistics, I am looking for ways in which the parameters can become an afterthought rather than a determining constituent of how we think about the relationships between different belief states. Let the doxastic landscape be, as Foucault expresses it in a very different context, “a world of pleasures in which grins hang about without the cat.”
The Intellect and Its Limits

Gurpreet Rattan

Thinkers have a capacity to evaluate and improve their own and others’ thinking, even at the most fundamental levels of belief and method. At these most fundamental levels, the relevant kind of evaluation involves targeting not only what one thinks, but also the conceptual and methodological resources used to think and reason at all. The intellect is the faculty of mind that underlies these capacities. Although significant attention has been paid to the cognitive bases of much of our rational belief and knowledge— including perception, memory, metacognition, introspection, communication, and inference—the intellect has been, in contemporary philosophy at least, largely overlooked.

What difference does possessing the concept of truth make for our knowledge? What is the epistemic significance of deep disagreement? And: how should the doctrine of relativism be formulated and evaluated?

In my current project, I aim to correct this oversight and to provide foundations for future work by giving an account of the intellect. On the view that I develop, the intellect is concerned with establishing a proprietary kind and quality of knowledge—knowledge that is informed by epistemic values of conceptual understanding, methodological understanding, intersubjective understanding, and objectivity. Knowledge infused by the intellect aspires to clarity of thought and method, deep understanding of conflicting perspectives, and objectivity in the evaluation of one’s own and conflicting perspectives.

This account of the intellect lands the intellect at the centre of a network of fundamental philosophical debates about truth, disagreement, and relativism. My account of the intellect is the basis for unified answers to some hard questions in these debates, like: what difference does possessing the concept of truth make for our knowledge? What is the epistemic significance of deep disagreement? And: how should the doctrine of relativism be formulated and evaluated?

Finally, my project is concerned not only with the nature of the intellect, but also its principled, necessary, limits. Ultimately, my account of the intellect is meant to cast illumination on the trenchant difficulties involved in justifying our fundamental beliefs and methods, in changing one’s framework for thinking, in persuading others with whom one is in deep disagreement, and for claiming an objective basis for one’s perspective. For the last 50 years or so, the doctrine of relativism has held out the promise of explaining some of these difficulties. The main innovation for thinking about these difficulties that I would like to introduce is to suggest a move away from relativism and towards an appreciation of the role of the problem of other minds.

Epistemology with Mind-First Logic

Benj Hellie

In my view, epistemology is about rationality in belief, which is a psychological matter, and hence one for philosophy of mind; but philosophy of mind should start with the “semantics” (theory of meaning) for mental language; and semantics is ultimately based on logic.

But what if logic isn’t about truth? Maybe logic is about endorsement, a relation to mental conditions (especially belief states).

Since the dawn of the analytic philosophical tradition, the dominant assumption, presupposed in almost all work, has been that logic is about truth, which is determinately fixed by the world, authoritatively, once and for all, setting the standard of correctness for what to believe.

But what if logic isn’t about truth? In particular (as on the “partial logic” of the 1980s), maybe logic is about endorsement, a relation to mental conditions (especially belief states). Where there is only one world, there
are many belief states: mine now and at various times in the past and future, yours now and at various times in the past and future, and so on. None of these belief states are fully determinate (we are all uncertain about the exact number of stars in the galaxy), disagreement is widespread among them (I used to think that goats eat cans, but I changed my mind), and no one’s belief state sets the standard of correctness for anyone else’s.

An endorsement-logical foundation has big ramifications through the rest of philosophy. Truth-based semantics treats a mental claim and a chemical claim alike, as “describing” the world, as encoding a condition the world has to meet in order for the claim to be true. But endorsement-based semantics can treat these claims very differently: a chemical claim still conveys information which is potentially controversial, but a mental claim merely “expresses a sentiment”—“I do not believe the galaxy has an odd number of stars” merely puts my uncertainty on display without conveying any controversial information, while “Fred believes that goats eat cans” merely puts on display my simulation (a.k.a. mindreading) for Fred.

If the conflict is faultless, philosophy is not forced to choose—and the problem vanishes.

Now, language that is “expressive” is a well-known source of “faultless disagreement”: if I express my simulation of Fred as believing that goats eat cans and you express your simulation of Fred as not believing this, neither of us has entered into controversy. And once we are in a position to allow faultless disagreement over someone’s mental condition, epistemology starts to look very different. After all, many long-standing problems (Frege puzzles, self-knowledge versus content externalism or attitude externalism, retraction of earlier belief, self-location) are framed in terms of forcing philosophy to take sides in a conflict between our take on someone’s mental condition and their own take. But if the conflict is faultless, philosophy is not forced to choose—and the problem vanishes.

Epistemic Evaluation and Responsibility

Jessica Wright

Consider two common ways in which we ethically assess other people. First, we evaluate others’ actions, calling them good or bad, altruistic or selfish, and so on. Second, we hold others responsible for their actions, blaming them when they act badly and praising them when they act as they should.

An interesting problem in epistemology is analogous to this one in ethics. It concerns how we should evaluate others’ beliefs and attitudes, and whether we can hold others responsible for them.

Unlike our actions, the content of our mental states is not always clear, even to the agent herself.

We can and do evaluate others’ explicit beliefs, calling them true or false, rational or irrational. But what about our other mental states? Unlike our actions, the content of our mental states is not always clear, even to the agent herself. This is especially urgent, as recent work in cognitive science tells us that many of our attitudes are deviant—introspectively inaccessible, associative, or outside of typical (reflective) avenues of control.

Are these attitudes the proper subjects of epistemic evaluation, or do they fall outside this normative realm altogether?

It is also unclear how we can justifiably hold others responsible for their beliefs and attitudes (even the non-deviant ones). Many theorists have argued that we can be held responsible only for what we do intentionally and voluntarily. But is this the right model to apply to the epistemic realm? If none of our beliefs are under our voluntary control, it may mean that we cannot be held responsible for any of our mental states; or it may mean that epistemic responsibility needs to be reconceived.

My own view is that epistemic evaluation and responsibility are not best founded on voluntarist assumptions, which are strongly internalist—requiring introspective awareness and control. A hybrid picture, where evaluation is external to the agent but responsibility requires some level of reflective control, is the best solution to these thorny problems.
The Puzzle of Intellectual Autonomy

David Barnett

An intellectually autonomous agent is one who thinks for herself, and doesn’t just go along with received opinion. We usually think of autonomy as a rational ideal. But autonomous agents face the charge of chauvinism. If you have no independent evidence supporting that you of all people are the one whose judgment is objectively most reliable, then trusting your own judgment can seem like objectionable chauvinism. This challenge to autonomy arises most obviously in social epistemology. Conciliationists about disagreement charge you with chauvinism unless you grant equal weight to the beliefs of peers as to your own. And anti-reductionists about testimony say it is chauvinistic not to trust others’ beliefs by default, as you allegedly must your own.

Even the most basic requirements of rationality would have us grant special authority to our own beliefs. But the charge of chauvinism can be raised against even this fundamental requirement of rationality.

But I think the local problems they identify with their opponents’ views are just symptoms of a deeper challenge. Even the most basic requirements of rationality would have us grant special authority to our own beliefs. For example, rationality requires that you see to it that your belief is consistent with your other beliefs, rather than with other people’s beliefs. But the charge of chauvinism can be raised against even this fundamental requirement of rationality. If you have no independent evidence that consistency with your beliefs is a better guide to the truth, then why aim for consistency with your beliefs rather than mine?

I think a solution to these challenges requires a better understanding of how beliefs (and other mental states figuring into rational requirements) contribute to the subjective perspective of the agent. Beliefs are transparent, in the sense that when you believe that it will rain, from your perspective it appears to be a fact about the world that it will rain. But if someone else believes that it will rain, then from your perspective this appears merely to be a fact about that person’s state of mind.

This contrast is important, because the puzzle of intellectual autonomy only arises when we consider an agent’s beliefs from a third-person perspective. Because an agent typically does not adopt this perspective on her own beliefs, exercising intellectual autonomy does not involve chauvinistically privileging her own beliefs over others’. Instead, it requires only privileging the truth over what is merely believed. When you try to see to it that your belief is consistent with the truth, you will of course end up making it consistent with what you believe to be the truth, rather than with what some other person believes. But from your perspective, this is not a matter of privileging your beliefs over another person’s, but instead simply of privileging the truth.

Epistemology and Beyond

Franz Huber

One way to engage with epistemology is as a normative discipline: to study how one should believe. For instance, we might propose the norm that one’s beliefs be consistent. This raises the question of why one’s beliefs should be consistent. That is, we need to justify this norm.

To do so requires clarifying the nature of normativity. According to one view, normativity consists in taking the means to one’s ends: a norm is a hypothetical imperative telling one what to do conditional on the assumption that one has a certain end. We justify such a hypothetical imperative by showing that obeying the norm in question really is a means to attaining the end the norm is conditional upon. In other words, we justify a norm by showing that some means-end relationship obtains.

For instance, we can justify the norm that one’s beliefs be consistent by showing that one’s beliefs are true only if they are consistent. That is, we justify the norm of consistency by showing it to be a necessary means to attaining the end of holding only true beliefs—an end one may, or may not, have.

Three features of this way of engaging with epistemology are worth being stressed.
First the bad news. Showing that a means-end relationship obtains requires carrying out a proof or argument. No sweet without sweat.

Next the sobering news. Engaging with epistemology in this way tells one which means to take in order to achieve various ends one may, or may not, have. However, it does not tell one which ends to have. To do so would be to succumb to dogmatism.

Finally, the good news. We can consider norms that go beyond epistemology and relate one’s beliefs to information about non-epistemological things. One such norm concerns degrees of belief and chances from metaphysics. It requires that one’s degrees of belief, in special circumstances, be equal to the chances if one is certain what they are. Another norm requires one’s degrees of belief to be probabilities.

Once these norms are justified by a means-end argument, one can explore their consequences. It turns out that some of these consequences—such as the thesis that chances are probabilities—are entirely metaphysical. These metaphysical consequences are necessary conditions for the satisfiability of said norms, and thus for the attainability of certain ends.

The upshot of this is that, by engaging with epistemology in this way, we can go beyond it and also make progress in metaphysics.

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### Knowledge and Mindreading

Jennifer Nagel

The word “mindreading” suggests a theatrical trick: the stage magician presses his hand to your forehead and mysteriously detects what you are thinking. But mindreading is also the standard term in social psychology for our natural capacity to attribute mental states to others. When you watch someone reaching for something, you see another person who wants something—the salt, say—and is trying to get it. On the basis of facial expression, speech, and gesture, we instinctively attribute goals, traits, desires, beliefs, and knowledge. My current project focuses on the difference between belief and knowledge, and on what we can learn about these states from studying the ways they are instinctively tracked by our everyday, non-magical social instincts.

There’s something puzzling about our instinctive tracking of knowledge and belief. If someone wants the salt, it will make no difference whether he knows or just believes that it is to his left: he will make the same motion either way. However, if you dig into big data on how we talk about other people, you see that we keep marking the distinction between believing and knowing, and that we speak more often of knowledge than belief.

You might think that knowledge would be harder to track, because the knower has to meet a higher standard. But sometimes high standards make things easier: tracking knowledge involves recognizing both its presence and absence. If your view of an event is blocked, I can tell that you don’t know what is happening, even when it’s a really open question what you might believe. Meanwhile, knowledge is in one key respect simpler than belief: while agents can believe almost anything, they can only know what is true. Young children talk about knowledge well before they can talk about belief, and non-human primates also spot knowledge and ignorance in their competitors even when they can’t keep track of any false (or accidentally true) beliefs that their competitors might have.

My own view is that the complex rules naturally used for instinctive belief attributions are a systematic expansion of a simpler set of rules used for knowledge detection. My current project aims to explain the nature of these rules, drawing on cross-linguistic work on mental state attribution, developmental and comparative psychology, and also on some very old-fashioned theoretical work in epistemology. And, although my central aim is to demystify what is going on in natural social intelligence, I have to confess that sometimes I do feel there is something almost magical about the way we are able to detect invisible states like knowledge, on our way to making sense of each other.
I am spending my Killam Fellowship working on a book developing and defending Kant’s views about the morality and law of war. Kant wrote in Germany in the late 18th century, and is best known for his works on theoretical philosophy and ethics. My 2009 book, *Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy*, showed the continuing relevance of Kant to fundamental debates in philosophy and public life, focusing on Kant’s distinctive views about the relation between the state and its citizens, as well as his account of the way in which legal institutions can create a system of equal freedom for citizens. That book contained only brief discussions at the end of each of two chapters of Kant’s important views on international relations. This book will give those parts of Kant’s view the attention they deserve.

Kant’s views about international relations and war were prominent historically, but have attracted much less attention in contemporary debates. He is sometimes dismissed as a naive moralizer with little to contribute to reducing the horrors of war; other times his views are assimilated to those of Thomas Hobbes, or situated in what is taken to be an outdated philosophy of history.

**Nations at war do things that are morally impermissible in any other circumstance, and they do them on a massive scale. Kant’s insight is that the grounds for abolishing war also provide the structure of the morality governing it.**

My book will establish Kant’s continuing relevance to thinking about war. Nations at war do things that are morally impermissible in any other circumstance, and they do them on a massive scale. Kant describes war as “barbaric” and “to be repudiated entirely,” but also argues that morality governs it. Kant’s insight is that the grounds for abolishing war also provide the structure of the morality governing it. He offers a novel perspective on each of the grounds of going to war, the conduct of war, and what happens at the end of the war.

Kant develops his arguments against the backdrop of two prominent approaches in medieval and early modern writing about war. One is the just war tradition, which received early expression in the writings of Augustine and Aquinas, and was developed further in the 16th century by Vitoria and Suárez. For this tradition, a war is legitimate if done with a good motive for a just cause. Questions about the conduct of war, and what happens after a war, are subordinated to those of just cause. Versions of the just war approach structure most contemporary moral debates about war. Recent writers in this tradition have questioned the familiar idea that combatants on both sides of the war are subject to the same moral restrictions, on the grounds that those fighting on the just side are not at fault, and so are not liable to have force used against them.

The other is sometimes called the “regular war” tradition, and is less prominent in contemporary debates. It has its origins in Roman law, and is developed (sometimes in the vocabulary of the just war view) in 17th-century writers including Grotius, Pufendorf, and
Vattel. The regular war view conceives war as a procedure for resolving disputes. Sovereigns resort to it because no court or procedure has jurisdiction over them—that is the sense in which they are sovereign. For these writers, the central question is whether a war is conducted in accordance with the procedure; questions about just cause are replaced with questions of whether the party starting the war has what lawyers call a “cause of action,” that is, whether there is a genuine dispute about the respective rights of the two states. Questions about who is in the right do not enter into the moral analysis of the war, because war is the procedure through which such disputes are supposed to be resolved.

Kant is sharply critical of what he calls the “sophistry” of the just war tradition and the “miserable comforters” of the regular war tradition.

Both of these approaches argue for a broad power to wage war. The just war tradition views a state engaged in war as each of prosecutor, judge, and executioner, competent to address both past and prospective wrongdoing. Augustine defended punitive wars; Suárez defended the Spanish conquest of the Americas on the grounds that the indigenous inhabitants were likely to resist attempts by missionaries to convert them and by settlers to colonize underutilized areas. The regular war tradition is even more permissive. Grotius argued that a sovereign may resort to war if no court is available, or if one party is not satisfied that an available court will deliver the correct verdict. Vattel explicitly compares battles to legal proceedings, and justifies Fredrick the Great’s conquest of Silesia as a way of resolving a disputed claim to an inheritance.

The irresolvable tension between force and right leads Kant to the surprising claim that peace is the central concept in the morality of war. Peace is the precondition of disputes being resolved on their merits, but it can only be achieved if everyone accepts that past disputes are fully resolved apart from their merits. Otherwise peace would have to precede itself and so would be impossible.

Kant develops this idea to show how the possibility of a future peace can govern the conduct of war. In framing the issue in this way, Kant generates important consequences for each of the moral questions about war. The only ground of war is another nation’s breach of the peace; that is, only defensive wars are acceptable. A future peace also dictates the terms on which it can be fought. The role of a future peace enables Kant to explain the relevant sense in which belligerents in a war are symmetrically situated, regardless of who started the war or who is in the right. The regular war tradition treated this symmetry as the product of an agreement to resolve the dispute through force. Recent philosophers writing about war have argued that the treatment of aggressor and defender alike is a moral mistake, and that fighting a war does not confer any novel permissions, least of all permission to kill, on an aggressor.

An aggressor that fights in conformity with the rules of war is not justified in what it does. If it violates those rules, it commits a further, distinctive type of wrong.

On this “revisionist” account, the “deep morality” of war looks nothing like the international law governing it. Some of these revisionists suggest that the law should be changed; others regard the rules as an acceptable compromise of morality, only because making the morally correct rule illegal would likely lead to abuse, and so to even more unjustified killing. Other revisionist writers have questioned the moral significance of the distinction between civilians and combatants, seeking to replace it with an account that is sensitive to the culpability of soldiers and civilians, rather than to their specifically legal status.

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Alumnus Q&A: Charles Mills

Charles Mills
(PhD, 1985) is an alumnus of U of T's Department of Philosophy, and is currently Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center, City University of New York. Before joining the Graduate Center, he taught at the University of Oklahoma, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Northwestern University.

Professor Mills specializes in social and political philosophy, particularly in oppositional political theory around issues of class, race, and gender. His first book The Racial Contract (Cornell University Press, 1997) has become a seminal text in the study of imperialism, white supremacy, critical race theory, and the critique of liberalism. His sixth book, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism, was published in 2017 by Oxford University Press.

Here, Professor Mills reflects on his time in Toronto, the present state of the discipline of philosophy, and current issues in racial politics.

**Philosophy News: Your undergraduate degree was in physics, but you switched to philosophy in graduate studies. What attracted you to philosophy?**

Charles Mills: Physics was not a free choice in the first place, but a consequence of my favorite humanities teachers leaving my high school, which severely restricted my options at the University of the West Indies. After graduation I taught natural science for two years, which only confirmed that I needed to get out of this career track sooner rather than later.

Meanwhile, dramatic things were happening. The 1970s were the high point of Jamaican, and broader Anglo-Caribbean, political radicalism. The 1968 banning of Guyanese historian Walter Rodney led to protests and riots, sparking a national debate whose overall consequence was the rebirth of radical politics (class, race). Riding on a wave of mass discontent, the opposition People’s National Party (PNP) was elected and announced a program of “democratic socialism.” Years of intense political struggle followed, locally and globally, as Prime Minister Michael Manley attempted, with other progressive Third World leaders, to lobby for a more equitable global economic order, incurring the wrath of First World conservative forces.

So it was in that context that I started looking for a subject that could provide a “big picture” overview of what was going on. With complete naivety about the field, I chose philosophy, not really knowing what I was getting into. It’s like that great exchange in Casablanca between Humphrey Bogart and Claude Rains: “I came to Casablanca for the waters.” “The waters? What waters? We’re in the desert!” “I was misinformed.”

**PN: Tell us a little bit about your time in Toronto (MA, 1973-75, and PhD, 1977-1985). Why did you choose Toronto and how did your time here shape your career? Did anything in particular make a significant impact on you?**

CM: I had won a Commonwealth Fellowship and could go to Britain, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. I chose Canada, as the closest to home, and the University of Toronto as the best university in the country, and thus presumably home to the best philosophy department. But I thought it was safer to do an MA first to get a sense of what philosophy was like before I decided to embark on the doctorate. (And here I would like to thank John Slater, who—as he later told me at my 1985 graduation—pushed for me to be admitted, despite my almost complete lack of background in the subject.)

My crucial formative experiences were really extra-academic: the radicalization of the Anglo-Caribbean in the 1970s, and the challenge to the postcolonial/neocolonial social order. Given Toronto’s large Anglo-
Caribbean population, this resurgence of the left manifested itself in a ferment of activity: the formation of support groups, and constant forums, rallies, and talks by visiting Caribbean speakers. So I became part of that scene [of] progressive campus, city, and Caribbean solidarity politics.

Academically, I came to regard Marxism as most congenial to my interests. So I worked with Frank Cunningham and Danny Goldstick, the department’s Marxists, on an “analytical Marxist” dissertation on the concept of ideology. Frank and Danny were both key figures for my philosophical education, and though I no longer focus on Marxism in my writing, key left themes have continued to inform my work: materialism; skepticism about “ideal theory”; getting the actual history right; highlighting social oppression and exploitation, group dynamics and group interests; recognizing structural causation and the importance of locating the ideational in a sociopolitical matrix.

My current project of developing a “black radical liberalism” to tackle racial injustice can be seen as the attempt to bring such commitments into a (transformed) liberal framework.

PN: You’ve explored themes around the “epistemology of ignorance,” and white ignorance in particular, in which dominant groups subscribe to an “inverted” epistemology built around self-deception and non-knowings. In “White Ignorance” (2007), for example, you note the relationships between collective memory and the production of ignorance, which then obscure racial injustices and the need for reparations. The last year has seen increasingly public displays of white supremacy, many of which reproduce violences and iconography often dismissed as “in the past.” Are we any better off now than a decade ago (let alone a year ago) with regard to white ignorance, and has its heightened display helped or hindered this? What steps should we be taking today to resist white ignorance and other privileged group-based ignorances?

CM: Because of the unusualness of my career path, these factors were less important for me than for someone who came to philosophy out of an acquaintance with, and love for, the subject. In my case, it was much more a matter of struggling with a discipline I found very white, very resistant to what I wanted it to do. Remember this was largely before critical philosophy of race, before the global justice literature had really gotten off the ground, before philosophy began to confront the colonial past (actually we’re still basically in that “before”). Rawlsian “ideal theory” was the way to do justice, starting with societies conceived of as “cooperative ventures for mutual advantage” and completely lifted out of the real-world history of colonialism, imperialism, expropriative white settlement, Atlantic slavery, and so forth.

So the interest I would develop in the history of European political philosophy came out of my historical formation as a Third World/Global South subject, not from being at a historically oriented department. In fact, I didn’t do a single course in the history of European political philosophy as such while I was there. That all came a decade later, when I switched to working on race, and began to systematically educate myself about the role of race in the history of Western political philosophy.

PN: Toronto is more historical in orientation than many other philosophy departments. Your most famous work, The Racial Contract, is very historically informed and yet very critical of European political philosophy. When did your critical interest in the history of philosophy begin? Do you wonder about what kind of philosopher you would be if you had completed your education in a department with a strictly contemporary focus?

CM: I think it’s one of those complicated situations where we have both progress and regression. On the one hand, as a result of the activism of the Black Lives Matter movement, and the protests around Confederate flags and statuary, there is far more discussion of these issues in the public sphere. White ignorance is simultaneously more exposed and under attack, and more militant and belligerent.

On the other hand, the very airing of these subjects has exacerbated backlash from white Americans worried about losing their historically differentially privileged status, emboldened by a president whose white nationalist sympathies are not hidden. So white ignorance is simultaneously more exposed and under attack, and more militant and belligerent.
A further complication is that the old progressive strategy—striving to overcome “epistemic injustice” with the devastating exposé of “the facts”—has been pre-empted by the Orwellian advent of “alternative facts” and “fake news.” So a struggle at two levels is necessary: continuing to expose the lies and misrepresentations disseminated by the socially privileged, but also, at the meta-level (distinctly philosophical), defending rationalism and objectivism against a wave of obscurantism and relativism.

CM: The joke I’ve been making is that however bad Donald Trump may be for the country, he’s been great for me!

I use humour not just because discussing oppression can be disheartening but because—especially for the largely white audiences of philosophy events—it disarms people, and gets the message across more effectively than through accusation and straight polemic.

It was much harder to use terms like “white supremacy” with a black president in the White House and widespread delusions that the United States had entered a “post-racial” epoch. Now, there’s an opening for changing the dominant discourse. I use humour not just because discussing oppression can be disheartening but because—especially for the largely white audiences of philosophy events—it disarms people, and gets the message across more effectively than through accusation and straight polemic.

The key point I try to bring home is that “white supremacy” should not be limited to particular extremist ideological views, but should be taken as depicting a social system, one that privileges whites in a structural way at the expense of people of colour. In this broader, non-juridical sense, white supremacy extends far beyond American Jim Crow and South African apartheid and, indeed, characterizes the politics of Western modernity in general. And relatedly, the dominant varieties of liberalism have been racialized, rationalizing or obfuscating this system, whether (originally) through the representation of people of colour as racial inferiors (as in Kant) or (currently) through the evasion of the history of white racial domination and the need for corrective racial justice (as in Rawls).

This past term I did a seminar in “Corrective Justice,” intended to counter the misguided “ideal-theory” prioritization in mainstream philosophy of social justice as normative principles for a perfectly just society. Next term I’ll be co-teaching (with Sibyl Schwarzenbach) a seminar on “Rawls, Race, and Gender.” And together with Linda Alcoff, I co-organized a two-day interdisciplinary conference in March 2018 on “Racial Inequality.”

PN: Has your approach to the classroom changed with the increased visibility of white supremacy? How do you address current affairs in your teaching and lecturing? In many of your lectures, you employ humour. Is this a deliberate pedagogical tactic, particularly in a field like critical race theory where discussing oppression can be disheartening?

CM: The extreme whiteness of philosophy is a continuing puzzle. There’s an obvious synergy between the demographic and conceptual whiteness, [since the work of] people with no interest in the issues that differentially attract people of colour will continue to reflect this Euro-orientation, which will in turn alienate potential non-white grad students, thereby reproducing the pattern.

We need an expansion of the canon that recognizes the multicultural/multiracial nature of humanity and its correspondingly multifaceted perspectives on what it is to be human.

But why has more progress been made elsewhere in the humanities, in literature, for example? I think three major factors are: one, the fact that race is not critically thematized in most of the vast 2500-year body of literature of Western philosophy; two, the defining disciplinary abstraction, which in conjunction with the unrepresentative demography, encourages idealizing
abstractions (Onora O’Neill made this point many years ago) that abstract away from the situation of the subordinated, so that the “human” condition becomes the white male condition; and three, the corollary denial of “philosopher” status to people of colour who have reflected “philosophically” on their subordination, such as Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, and many others.

The responsibility falls more heavily on established rather than early-career white philosophers, who—especially in the current market—are vulnerable in all kinds of ways. Two obvious moves would be self-education about the growing body of philosophical work on these themes (race, ethnicity, post-coloniality, and so forth), and the incorporation of such material into one’s regular philosophy courses (e.g., on meta-

Kant offers a different analysis: the rules governing the conduct of war do not confer novel permissions; instead, they impose prohibitions distinctive to the conduct of war. They apply to both sides because both sides can violate them. He identifies two basic rules restricting the use of defensive force: the prohibition on perfidy (paradigmatically, a false surrender) and the prohibition on attacking non-combatants. These restrictions on the legitimate use of force also impose further restrictions on illegitimate aggressive uses of force. An aggressor that fights in conformity with the rules of war is not justified in what it does. If it violates those rules, it commits a further, distinctive type of wrong.

Kant developed these ideas in the context of 18th-century debates about the morality of war, but their significance continues. Kant was an early advocate of a League of Nations, through which states might resolve their disputes peacefully, “as if by a court.”

These developments are sometimes treated as compromises, the main merit of which is that they reduce carnage by being acceptable to aggressor and defender alike.

I will also develop a Kantian account of the partial steps that international law has taken towards realizing his vision of perpetual peace, including the Geneva conventions and the prohibition of aggressive war by the UN Charter. These developments are sometimes treated as compromises, the main merit of which is that they reduce carnage by being acceptable to aggressor and defender alike. Kant’s approach shows that these ideas are both more principled and older than the critics suggest. A Kantian framework can also help to explain the requirement of international authorization for military action that is not narrowly defensive.

Kant’s explicit discussion of war is focused on the conduct and aftermath of wars between states. I also plan to extend the Kantian account to include a discussion of wars of a type that were not familiar in Kant’s day, and that do not figure explicitly in his writings about war. The first category includes wars of secession and wars involving loosely organized transnational organizations. I will also extend the Kantian account to humanitarian intervention. Both of these cases raise issues about the extent to which the same rules apply to both parties in a war in a particularly pressing way. A systematic development of Kant’s account will provide me with resources to address these issues.

Arthur Ripstein is a professor of law and of philosophy at the University of Toronto. Professor Ripstein’s research and teaching interests include torts, criminal law, legal theory, and political philosophy.

He is the recipient of a Killam Research Fellowship, awarded annually by the Canada Council for the Arts to exceptional scholars in the humanities, social, natural, and health sciences, and engineering.
This year, the Collaborative Program in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (CPAMP) celebrates the 25th anniversary of its launch. To mark the occasion, the program—now officially called the Collaborative Specialization in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy—brought in Professor Peter Adamson (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München) as the 25th Anniversary Distinguished Visitor in October 2017.

Instituted in 1992, CPAMP is an interdepartmental program of doctoral study jointly administered by the Department of Philosophy, the Department of Classics, and the Centre for Medieval Studies (CMS). Students are admitted to one of these academic units, but may draw upon the resources of any unit.

The primary aim of CPAMP is today much the same as when it was first instituted: to ensure that our students receive the best possible training for scholarly research in ancient and medieval philosophy. For students, the program is formally disjunctive: they can specialize in either ancient or medieval philosophy, with requirements established accordingly. Over time, though, more and more students have taken the opportunity to explore the links, continuities, and contrasts between the two periods.

CPAMP doesn’t just train up-and-coming scholars in these fields; it also serves as a major hub for research activities, academic visitors, and talks in Canada and North America.

Ancient and medieval philosophy have long been distinctive strengths of the University of Toronto, and CPAMP has done much to facilitate ongoing excellence in these two important areas of the history of philosophy. CPAMP doesn’t just train up-and-coming scholars in these fields; it also serves as a major hub for research activities, academic visitors, and talks in Canada and North America. Its excellence in training and research in the history of philosophy is widely recognized. CPAMP has a special standing in the English-speaking world. Whereas a series of universities, especially in North America, have graduate programs in ancient

Jacques Louis David, The Death of Socrates (1787)
philosophy, CPAMP is truly unique in that it embraces both ancient and medieval philosophy. (This model has recently inspired Durham University in the UK to establish a program with similar scope.) Moreover, with nine faculty members currently—the number is expected to grow in the near future—the program provides a depth unrivaled by its competition in either ancient or medieval philosophy. The program is also unique for its strength in Arabic philosophy.

Despite Toronto’s long tradition of strength and variety in studying Greek and Roman philosophy, and also medieval philosophy in the Latin West, until the 1990s there had never been an effort to coordinate those strengths. Medieval philosophy had been concentrated in the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (PIMS) since its foundation, while ancient philosophy was strong in both the classics and philosophy departments of the University as well as in University College and the three federated colleges (St. Michael’s, Victoria, and Trinity). In the mid-1970s, the colleges integrated their programs and staff with the Faculty of Arts & Science, which enhanced the cooperation already ongoing in the School of Graduate Studies (SGS). By the mid-1990s, PIMS faculty were cross-appointed to CMS, which facilitated closer cooperation with the University.

The effect of the new program was to enhance philosophical training for students enrolled in classics and CMS and to strengthen linguistic and historical training for students in philosophy.

By the early 1990s there was a general desire to do two things: to connect researchers working in medieval philosophy with those working in ancient, especially because of Toronto’s tradition of strength in later ancient philosophy and in the continuous tradition that linked Plato and Aristotle with their medieval heirs; and to enable cooperation among faculty working in the field from the various parts of the University. The province of Ontario’s framework for Collaborative Programs provided a way to do this while respecting the independence and distinct traditions of the various units. Discussions and negotiations among the three University departments involved went on for about a year, and by 1992 all the departments, SGS, and the relevant governing bodies had approved the plan. The effect of the new program was to enhance philosophical training for students enrolled in classics and CMS and to strengthen linguistic and historical training for students in philosophy. It also facilitated research projects that did not fall neatly into either period (such as the study of logic from Theophrastus to Boethius, work on Augustine or the Platonic commentators on Aristotle, Arabic philosophy, and the transmission of Aristotelianism and Platonism to the Middle Ages).

It was important to the early success of CPAMP that the program’s requirements over and above the demands of the doctoral program in each department were modest. In fact, the earliest graduates of the program were those who had fulfilled program requirements even before the program formally existed! Since then, the collaboration and coordination of research and graduate education has intensified, strengthened by the decision to devote the resources of two Canada Research Chairs (CRC) to the needs of the program rather than to the chairholder’s department or to the individual research agendas of the chairholders. The success of the program led eventually to new faculty resources as well, beginning with the appointment of Rachel Barney to a CRC and of Jennifer Whiting to a Jackman Chair in Philosophy, both in the early years of this century.

Over its first 25 years, CPAMP has had many remarkable students. They include alumni now working in faculty and research positions at Boston College, Durham University, Emory University, Georgetown University, Haverford College, Loyola University Chicago, Ohio Northern University, Providence College Rhode Island, Queen’s University, Rollins College, Stanford University, Syracuse University, Universidad Externado de Colombia, the University of California, San Diego, the University of Cape Town, the University of Edinburgh, the University of Guelph, the University of Victoria, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Wilfrid Laurier University.

The program has also brought a series of distinguished visitors to the University of Toronto, including Peter Adamson, Jonathan Barnes, Gábor Betegh, George Boys-Stones, Sarah Broadie, Myles Burnyeat, Alan Code, Dorothea Frede, Phillip Horky, André Laks, Martha Nussbaum, Dominik Perler, Malcolm Schofield, David Sedley, Gisela Striker, Harold Tarrant, and many others.

Brad Inwood
University Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto

and Martin Pickavé
Chair, Graduate Department of Philosophy

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Brad Inwood
University Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto

and Martin Pickavé
Chair, Graduate Department of Philosophy
Alumnus Q&A: Deepak Ramachandran

Deepak Ramachandran

Deepak Ramachandran is an entrepreneur and investor in the areas of software, clean technology, and electronics. Most recently, he co-founded FundThrough, an online funding platform that helps small businesses manage their cash flow by using their invoices as collateral.

He has worked with startups and bigger companies in Canada, the US, Europe, China, and India.

Deepak obtained his BA in philosophy and chemistry at U of T (1991), where he was active in student government at the Department of Philosophy, before completing his BPhil at Oxford (1994). At U of T, he was granted a Moss Scholarship, awarded to the best all around graduating student for outstanding academic performance as well as extracurricular leadership in a Faculty of Arts & Science program, and he served on the board of Victoria College.

Below, Deepak reflects on the ways in which his time in Toronto and his philosophical studies have shaped his career and world view, and he speculates about emerging trends in technology, democracy, and global economies.

Philosophy News: Tell us about your time at U of T (1987-91). Why did you choose Toronto and how did your time here shape your career?

Deepak Ramachandran: I was looking for a big university that was great at many things. Like many kids, I didn’t know what I wanted to study or do in the future. I took courses in pre-med sciences, pre-commerce accounting, and—for fun—a couple of philosophy half-courses. Those were so much more lively than the others, philosophy quickly became my specialist.

I chose philosophy because I loved the people I met in the classes (students and professors), the questions we asked, and the way we discussed them.

From an academic point of view, the most formative part of my education was getting engaged in small, seminar-type classes in which students spent a lot of time arguing out points of view as peers. My favourite professors would turn every class into a chance for students to talk to each other. I got to test and develop my thinking in a crucible, a bit the way we all develop our tennis strokes or basketball shots by playing with people of similar skill levels and a coach.

From a career-developing point of view, the most formative part of my education was getting involved in administration. I sat as a student rep on the Victoria College Board. Looking back, my initial questions about the budget and pension-fund investments must have been irritating and amateur; but over time, I think I became a productive colleague at Vic and in the philosophy department. The Philosophy Course Union back then was very activist, led by great students (now professors at other schools) such as Rebecca Kukla (now at Georgetown) and Valerie Tiberius (now at Minnesota).

We also had an amazing department chair in Wayne Sumner; he shepherded an inspiring program to ensure seven out of 10 faculty hires in the 1990s were women—and he did it by proactively recruiting the very best female graduate students from the top PhD programs, rather than just “preferring women” among whoever happened to apply. The results really changed the department and the University, including bringing in Cheryl Misak, Jennifer Whiting, and Margaret Morrison. At Vic, I was equally inspired by Eva Kushner, Sandy Johnson, Roger Hutchinson and others. In Philosophy and at Vic, I helped out as we launched new courses and tried new experiments in the curriculum, some of which I see transmogrified into Vic One and parts of the philosophy calendar even today.

So my most inspiring role models at U of T were visionary academic administrators—they had a clear sense of the value of an education (see Northrop Frye’s Massey Lectures, The Educated Imagination [1962]); a long view of the University’s history and evo-
lution; and a strong drive to experiment, evolve, push forward, never settle. I have tried to take a similarly long view and purpose-driven approach into my work.

PN: You studied both philosophy and chemistry at U of T. How did this combination influence your work?

DR: I am just naturally curious, and these were two subjects that let me dive relatively deep, relatively quickly. At the time, there was a great organic chemistry professor who taught characterization of large-chain molecules as a kind of detective work (before crystallography evolved; now we can just “take a picture”). His courses were fascinating.

Even though I wrote and sold software to earn money in high school and during university, I didn’t take any computer science or engineering courses at U of T. Now, with universal access to very prominent thinkers like Andrew Ng and Geoffrey Hinton pushing envelopes in AI, virtual reality, quantum computing, and encryption, I’d probably be exploring those topics both academically and by tinkering. (By the way, I am in fact exploring those at work today!)

PN: As an investor and business advisor, you have specialized in technologies that reduce waste and use very few non-renewable resources. Why did you get interested in these technologies, and what do you think they have to offer?

DR: I wanted to “do well by doing good.” I asked myself how I could join the most important/inspiring cause while still using my skills and abilities. At the time I believed that our impact on the environment was our biggest issue as a species and an ecosphere. I still believe that.

I’ve learned a couple of things worth sharing. One, venture capital and angel investments in particular are much higher-risk and lower-impact on average (and in my portfolio) than I had hoped. My portfolio is actually doing better than the statistical averages financially; but it is probably similar to the average in that several investments I thought would be environmentally beneficial are probably only marginally impactful in the end. Two, participative democracy is in a crisis unlike anything since the 1930s; and without successful participative democracies, we are very unlikely to sustain any real improvement in our impact on the ecosphere. So while I continue to put some personal effort into the environment, I am shifting my focus to helping keep our democracies alive even as the world’s working-age population peaks and the (technological, economic, geopolitical, and natural) environment likely makes people hungrier and more likely to attack their neighbours.

PN: You think strategically about complex business challenges in creative and perhaps unconventional ways. How has your education in philosophy prepared you for this? What do you think the discipline of philosophy can offer emerging start-ups and businesses?

DR: My favourite part of philosophy was asking essentially unanswerable questions, and discovering that the same question can often be seen from several very different “cardinal” perspectives, each of which offers its own insights, but none of which is by itself comprehensive or definitive. (E.g., ethics of rules vs. outcomes vs. character; or, free will vs. determinism.) In the end, we get to choose which perspective to inhabit, and when; and this is a very powerful tool, to realize that the perspective I inhabit at this moment can be more or less useful, and I can choose an alternative perspective for a different purpose. So for instance, Janet Yellen as an individual presumably thinks she’s making a free choice when she chooses whether or not to buy a bigger house; but Janet Yellen as Chair of the Federal Reserve abstracts over all those free individual choices to a more deterministic/probabilistic view that rising interest rates will cause people to defer expenses.

So for me the most useful part of philosophy—for start-ups, mature businesses, government, non-profits, or anyone really—is to help us realize that our positions and preferences are somewhat arbitrary, and then to choose the perspectives and preferences that best serve our deeper values and goals at any time. It is much easier to create new things when you can simultaneously see what is relatively invariant and hard to change (the supposed “laws” of physical or human nature), and what is more readily available to choose again (our values, perspectives, preferences, goals) in any moment.
**In Memoriam**

**John (Jack) V. Canfield (1934-2017)**

On August 6, 2017 John (Jack) Vincent Canfield passed away surrounded by loving friends and family. Jack was born in Hazleton, Pennsylvania in 1934 to John P. Canfield, a coal miner of Irish descent, and Kathryn (née Bussetti), the daughter of Tyrolean immigrants. Brought up Catholic, Jack was accelerated through the local public school system, graduating at the age of 16.

As a young man, Jack worked in the Army Map Service and then at the Library of Congress before attending George Washington University and Brown University with a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship and a Fulbright Scholarship. At Brown, he met his future wife Abby, an art student from the Rhode Island School of Design. The family grew quickly, with three children under three by the time of Jack’s first teaching appointment in Colorado, and a fourth son adopted shortly after his return to the east coast. At the time of his death, Jack was living in Toronto with his wife Sharon, the mother of his youngest daughter.

In his long and esteemed career, Jack taught at Cornell University and was a Professor Emeritus at the University of Toronto, where he had a distinguished academic career from 1968 onwards. He was a well-known scholar of Wittgenstein; indeed, for many years he was acknowledged as one of the leading authorities on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Jack’s work concentrated on philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, with a focus on the nature of the self, inspired both by Wittgenstein and Jack’s Buddhist practice. His publications included *Wittgenstein: Language and World* (University of Massachusetts Press, 1981) and *The Looking Glass Self: An Examination of Self-Awareness* (Praeger, 1990).

Jack pursued a spiritual practice in the Zen tradition, and was a founding member of the Toronto Zen Centre and Springwater Center. He will be deeply missed and remembered with love by his wife Sharon, his children Betsy, Sean, Edie, Pat, and Zoe, his brothers Raymond and Daniel, his seven grandchildren, and his extended family, colleagues, and friends from all walks of life.

With files from The Toronto Star, John (Jack) Canfield’s website, and John G. Slater’s Minerva’s Aviary: Philosophy at Toronto, 1843-2003 (University of Toronto Press, 2005).

**Kenneth Schmitz (1922-2017)**

Kenneth Louis Schmitz, professor emeritus of philosophy, University of Toronto, and fellow emeritus of Trinity College, was born in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, on September 16, 1922 and died peacefully on August 25, 2017.

After graduating from high school, he joined the Royal Canadian Air Force as a navigator and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross in World War II. After the war, he earned a BA in philosophy and English at the University of Saskatchewan, followed by an MA and PhD in philosophy at the University of Toronto.

He taught at Loyola University of Los Angeles, Marquette University, Indiana University, and the Catholic University of America. At Loyola, he was chair of the Department of Philosophy for three years.

In 1971, he joined the University of Toronto with an appointment at Trinity College. An eminent and prolific scholar with particular expertise in the work of Hegel, Kenneth served as president of the Hegel Society of America, the Metaphysical Society of America, and the American Catholic Philosophical Association. He was a member of the executive committee of the Council for Philosophical Studies for four years, and for three years he was a consultant to the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches.

In 1974, he was the Thomas More Lecturer at Yale University, and in 1977 he was Visiting Professor to inaugurate the Chair in Christian Philosophy at Villanova University in Philadelphia.

He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Humane Letters (honoris causa) by Benedictine College, Kansas,
Henry Pietersma was born in the Netherlands and completed his primary and secondary education there, acquiring fluency in modern languages and a solid grounding in classical languages. Then he did his BA at Calvin College in Michigan, home and nursery of two or three generations of outstanding philosophers of Dutch descent and Calvinian convictions. He was to remain an integral member of that group. He came to the University of Toronto for his doctorate on Husserl, supervised by Emil Fackenheim. Thus it was Henry who introduced Husserl and phenomenology into Canada.

From the 1960s onwards, he shared in the work of a big department here that made an amazing array of offerings available to students at all levels. Henry offered a phenomenology graduate course that was attended by all kinds of students, not just specialists. At the undergraduate level, he taught phenomenology and existentialism, and almost every year epistemology and logic as well. He and I were members of a faculty group working on 19th and 20th century continental philosophy that met regularly to read papers and plan course offerings. Being colleagues does not always lead to friendship, but in our case it did, and my wife Linda and I were often with Henry and Anita Turcotte, his wife, in their west-end home with its beautiful gardens, and we were happy to have them visit us in Fergus, Ontario.

Henry’s earliest academic presentations and publications mainly dealt with Husserl’s thought in relation to Kant, Brentano, Frege, and the modern tradition of transcendental philosophy generally. Then, from the ‘70s through the ‘90s, he published a continuing series of papers on Husserl’s most basic and characteristic ideas, treating them with a clarity that hardly any other commentator has achieved—papers on intentionality, the evident and the true, on horizons, predications, and existence. A remarkable paper on the phenomenological reduction showed that it constituted Husserl’s bulwark against skepticism. Henry joined all the leading scholars of Husserl in the English-speaking world in contributing to textbooks and encyclopedias on Husserl and phenomenology.

In later years, he was also to write, with comparable clarity and sympathy, about the later phenomenologists Heidegger, Marcel, and Merleau-Ponty. Indeed, his deepening absorption in Merleau-Ponty led to his editing an excellent book of essays: Merleau-Ponty: Critical Essays (Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, 1989). And near the end of his career, Henry published Phenomenological Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2000); it incorporated many of the themes of his earlier articles, but went beyond them with a line of criticism that I, at least, had not detected in those articles—despite the philosophical power of all the phenomenologists, they all fell short in respect of a key requirement of the theory of knowledge: an account of the reality of the external world.

Along with these studies, Henry pursued a theology that would give adequate expression to the Christian faith. My understanding is that this ran in parallel to his work in phenomenology, not depending on it, nor, on the other hand, giving a grounding for it. Still, he did maintain that faith in God was an appropriate starting point for reasoning, no less so than faith in reason itself, or faith in science, or in human autonomy. Moreover, his own acceptance of the Christian revelation was marked by the very same philosophical realism that motivated his critique of the phenomenologists: the word of God is not the product of human genius but comes to human beings from the outside.

Graeme Nicholson
Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto.
Faculty Awards, Honours, Appointments, and Promotions

Joshua Brandt, an alumnus of our department (PhD, 2016), has been appointed assistant professor (CLTA) in applied and biomedical ethics on the UTSC campus. Joshua’s work is primarily in normative ethics.

Joseph Heath has received a six-month Jackman Humanities Institute Faculty Research Fellowship for 2018-19 for his project “The Arc of History.” Joe has also been invited to deliver the 2018 Wittgenstein Lectures at Universität Bayreuth, Germany.

Jennifer Nagel has been elected president of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division. Jennifer has also received a 12-month Jackman Humanities Institute Faculty Research Fellowship for 2018-19, with which she will pursue her project “Extracting Belief from Knowledge.”

Jordan Thomson (PhD, Cornell) has been appointed assistant professor (CLTA) on the St. George campus. He specializes in ethics as well as social and political philosophy.

Owen Ware, an alumnus of our department (PhD, 2010), has been appointed assistant professor on the UTM campus. Owen taught previously at Temple University and Simon Fraser University. He works primarily on Kant and early 19th century German philosophy.

Francesco Gagliardi has been appointed part-time assistant professor, teaching stream (CLTA) on the St. George campus. He shares his teaching between Philosophy and the Centre for Drama, Theatre, and Performance Studies.

Michael Miller joined U of T as assistant professor on the St. George campus. Michael received his PhD from the University of Pittsburgh and works primarily in the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of science, and metaphysics.

Shruta Swarup joined our faculty this year as assistant professor on the St. George campus. Shruta received her PhD from Cornell and was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Virginia before joining our department. Her work is in the field of social and political philosophy, with interests in feminist philosophy.

Joseph Heath has received a six-month Jackman Humanities Institute Faculty Research Fellowship for 2018-19 for his project “The Arc of History.” Joe has also been invited to deliver the 2018 Wittgenstein Lectures at Universität Bayreuth, Germany.

Jennifer Nagel has been elected president of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division. Jennifer has also received a 12-month Jackman Humanities Institute Faculty Research Fellowship for 2018-19, with which she will pursue her project “Extracting Belief from Knowledge.”

For more on student and faculty awards and honours see the News section of our website: www.philosophy.utoronto.ca
Andrew Franklin-Hall was awarded a Connaught New Researcher Award for his project “What We Owe to Children.”

Franz Huber has been granted tenure and promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Karolina Hübner was appointed to serve as placement officer.

Gurpreet Rattan was appointed to serve as director of graduate studies.

Andrew Sepielli has been granted tenure and promoted to the rank of associate professor. He was also the recipient of the first annual UTM Research Prize in the Humanities.

Nick Stang has been granted tenure and promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Franz Huber has been granted tenure and promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Finally, thanks to the students for their hard work and energy in their myriad roles in the department—as astute contributors to classes and seminars, as producers of original research the results of which are disseminated all over the world and across the entire spectrum of philosophical topics, and as graders, teaching assistants, and instructors crucial for the education of the University’s undergraduates.

Gurpreet Rattan
Associate Chair, Graduate

UPCOMING EVENTS

Kant and Analytic Metaphysics Conference April 21-22, 2018
History of Metaphysics Conference: Infinity May 5-6, 2018
18th Annual U of T Graduate Philosophy Conference May 7-8, 2018
Network for Sensory Research Workshop May 11-12, 2018
Spinoza: New Directions in Research Conference Sept. 15-16, 2018
University of Toronto Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy Sept. 21-22, 2018

Please check our website (www.philosophy.utoronto.ca) for a complete list of upcoming events and for more details.
Undergraduate Student Awards

Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts & Science
(St. George Campus)

- Thomas A. Goudge Scholarship in Philosophy: Manula Adhihetty
- John MacDonald Scholarship in Philosophy: Carl Abrahamsen
- George Kennedy Scholarship: Amitpal Singh
- John F.M. Hunter Memorial Scholarship: Alaric Mckenzie-Boone
- Thomas J. Lang Scholarship in Philosophy: Bella Soblirova
- Scotia Capital Markets Bursary in Philosophy: Antonia Alksnis
- Sunflower Scholarship: Usman Zahid

Undergraduate student awards were announced at the department’s World Philosophy Day lecture on Nov. 16, 2017. From left to right: Amitpal Singh, Manula Adhihetty, 2017 World Philosophy Day speaker Professor Alva Noë (UCLA), Bella Soblirova, and Antonia Alksnis. Not pictured: Carl Abrahamsen, Alaric Mckenzie-Boone, and Usman Zahid.

Graduate Student Awards

Charles Dalrymple-Fraser
has been awarded a prestigious Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship to support their work in health, ethics, epistemology, and particularly the connections between “silence,” resistance, and oppression.

Ariel Melamedoff
has won the department’s Martha Lile Love Essay Award for his outstanding paper, “Atomistic Time and Simultaneous Causation in Hume’s Treatise,” which examines Hume’s claim that the possibility of simultaneous causation would entail the “utter annihilation of time.”

Benjamin Wald
has won the department’s Martha Lile Love Teaching Award for his excellent course design and pedagogical approach in teaching PHLC93H3Y: Topics in Political Philosophy in the summer 2017 semester at UTSC.
Visiting Professors and New Postdoctoral Fellows

Catharine Diehl is a 2017-19 Banting postdoctoral fellow in our department. Her research investigates a fundamental question of metaphysics: in virtue of what is something an individual object? Catharine completed a doctorate in philosophy at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and a PhD in comparative literature at Princeton University.

Stefan Lukits is a 2017-19 SSHRC postdoctoral fellow in our department. His research is primarily in formal epistemology and the philosophy of science, with interests in the philosophy of literature as well. He received his PhD from the University of British Columbia, and has published an information theory in epistemology and Carnap’s conventionalism.

Pierre-Luc Dostie Proulx joins our department as a Fonds de recherche du Québec postdoctoral fellow. Pierre-Luc completed his PhD at the Université catholique de Louvain and will study the role played by evaluation and values in abductive reasoning, with a focus on scientific inquiries.

Laura Franklin-Hall is a visiting professor in our department from New York University, where she is associate professor in the Department of Philosophy. Laura’s research involves problems in the philosophy of biology, the general philosophy of science, and metaphysics.

Peter Adamson, professor of late ancient and Arabic philosophy at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, was this year’s distinguished visitor in the Collaborative Program in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (CPAMP). Peter is also the author and host of the popular philosophy podcast “History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps.” Peter spent a week in Toronto in October 2017, sharing some of his work at various CPAMP events.

Placements and Alumni Highlights

Rima Basu (BA, 2010 [UTM]; MA, 2011), currently a PhD candidate at the University of Southern California, won an APA Sanders Graduate Student Award for her paper “Moral Encroachment.” Rima’s research focuses on ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of race.

Kenneth Boyd (PhD, 2014) and Diana Heney (PhD, 2014) were two of four invited speakers at the Prindle Institute’s and DePauw University’s 2017 Young Philosophers Lecture Series. Diana’s presentation was entitled “Birth, Death and the Inbetween,” while Kenneth’s was “How can I convince you that you should care about other people?”

G. Anthony Bruno (PhD, 2013) joined Royal Holloway, University of London as lecturer in early 2018. Anthony’s areas of specialization are Kant, German Idealism, and 19th- and 20th-century continental philosophy. Anthony’s dissertation at U of T, “The Bounds of Life: The Role of Death in Schelling’s Internal Critique of German Idealism,” was supervised by Paul Franks.

Zachary Irving (PhD, 2015) was appointed assistant professor at the University of Virginia’s Corcoran Department of Philosophy earlier this year. Zachary’s dissertation on the philosophy of mind-wandering was supervised by Diana Raffman and Evan Thompson. He was most recently a postdoctoral fellow at UC Berkeley.

Shelley Weinberg (PhD, 2008) won the Journal of the History of Philosophy Book Prize for her book Consciousness in Locke, which grew out of her U of T dissertation, supervised by Donald Ainslie. Shelley is currently an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois.
**DR:** I suspect that artificial intelligence will likely change the world as much as or even more than the hype suggests. It’s not that we will certainly have sentient droids or Cylons living among us, though that is a non-trivial possibility in our lifetimes. [But] it’s already clear that AI will bring a new wave of automation and labour replacement. In only a handful of years, I suspect many jobs will be better done by machines than by humans—from driving trucks to micro-surgery. And while the surgeon will likely be fine, just able to treat many more people with this new tool, the truck driver and many white-collar workers will join yesterday’s assembly-line worker in an even lower-paid and less secure future.

In a way, most of us in the richer countries are already living the leisure lives of the Jetsons compared to the relatively hard physical labour of even the 1950s (or in China or India, relative even to the 1980s). However, because we’re sharing the rewards so disproportionately among so few, most people are stuck doing whatever they can to “get by,” i.e. to survive emotionally, spiritually, and economically, while a small group (including me to some degree) gets to choose what we do and works primarily for meaning or self-expression. AI will exacerbate that divide, and that divide threatens to destroy this fragile thing we call democracy.

**PN:** What is the most interesting emerging trend in start-ups today? Is there a particular industry or type of business that you think is going to have a moment, and why?

**DR:** For better or worse, I never really had a “career path” in mind, and still don’t. Studying philosophy was a very luxurious period in my life, and I’m very grateful for the opportunity to have spent time just thinking about things, surrounded by inspiring and enthralling students and professors (not to mention the great buildings, grounds, facilities!). I loved it, I cherish it, and it made me a lot of who I am today.

For my career path, I credit all those “extra-curricular” activities that were my passions before, during, and after university. For me, those were software, entrepreneurship, administration, leadership, innovation.

University is a great time to explore and to learn what makes you tick. Classes themselves for a philosophy student take ~15 hours per week. That leaves something like 100 hours per week for reading, talking, arguing, experimenting, falling in love, and all the other craziness of your age group. Budget a chunk of time to experiment with how you engage the world and make your mark. Get out there: talk, listen, volunteer with, work beside—engage people outside your age group and natural comfort zone. Find role models who seem to live the kind of life you aspire to, 20+ years ahead of you—ask them out for coffee.

Then carve your own path to your own future, inspired and informed by those who have gone before.

**PN:** What advice would you give to students studying philosophy? Do you have any advice for philosophy graduates who want to pursue a similar career path to yours?

**DR:** I credit all those “extra-curricular” activities that were my passions before, during, and after university. For me, those were software, entrepreneurship, administration, leadership, innovation.

University is a great time to explore and to learn what makes you tick. Classes themselves for a philosophy student take ~15 hours per week. That leaves something like 100 hours per week for reading, talking, arguing, experimenting, falling in love, and all the other craziness of your age group. Budget a chunk of time to experiment with how you engage the world and make your mark. Get out there: talk, listen, volunteer with, work beside—engage people outside your age group and natural comfort zone. Find role models who seem to live the kind of life you aspire to, 20+ years ahead of you—ask them out for coffee.

Then carve your own path to your own future, inspired and informed by those who have gone before.

Follow us on Twitter!

Get the latest news from our department as well as from the philosophy community around the world by following us on Twitter:

[twitter.com/uoftphilosophy](https://twitter.com/uoftphilosophy)

Our social media presence is growing!

You can now find the Department of Philosophy on Facebook at [facebook.com/UofTphilosophy](https://facebook.com/UofTphilosophy).

Connect with us!
The Aristotle Contest: A High School Philosophy Essay Contest

In collaboration with the Ontario Philosophy Teachers’ Association, U of T’s Department of Philosophy is administering the annual Aristotle Contest, awarding cash prizes for the finest philosophical work by Canadian current high school students.

The contest provides high school students interested in philosophy with an opportunity to have their work evaluated and recognized by the largest post-secondary department of philosophy in North America.

Eligibility
Anyone enrolled in a Canadian high school at or below the grade 12 level (or equivalent) may participate in the Aristotle Contest. Homeschooled students working at or below the grade 12 level may also participate.

Submissions in both English and French are welcome.

Instructions
Three questions are posted for each year’s contest; contestants must choose one. The questions for the 2018 contest are:

1. Researchers in artificial intelligence are building smarter and smarter machines. Is it possible for a machine to have genuinely human-like intelligence? If not, why not? If so, what ways of creating such a machine would be morally permissible? Would it have moral rights? Defend your answer.

2. De gustibus non est disputandum—there is no disputing about taste, as the old saying has it. Well, is it true? Are there objective truths about beauty and other aesthetic matters? Or are all such judgments merely subjective? Defend your answer.

3. Heredity and environment—our genes and the way we were brought up—play a big role in determining what kind of people we’ll be. Indeed, there are those who think that everything about us, including what actions we perform, is completely decided by heredity and environment. Are they right? And if they are, is there room for free will? Defend your answer.

Contestants will write an essay of 1200-1500 words that develops and defends a position taken in response to the question chosen.

Assessment
Essays will be judged according to several criteria, including the quality, depth, and originality of thought, organization of ideas, and clarity of expression.

Submission
Submission emails must be dated May 25, 2018 or earlier. Late entries will not be accepted.

Prizes
- First place: $500
- Second place: $400
- Third place: $300

Up to 10 submissions will receive a certificate of distinction.

For detailed information on submission guidelines, resources on writing in philosophy, the contest evaluation scheme, examples of previous winners, and FAQs please visit uoft.me/aristotle-contest
Support the Department

U of T’s Department of Philosophy is widely considered the best philosophy department in Canada and among the top 15 in the English-speaking world. Home to over 50 faculty members, the department offers an inspiring environment for academically talented and engaged students to explore the history and major tenets of philosophical thought.

We wouldn’t be able to do what we are doing if it weren’t for our friends and donors, who help us with many initiatives, especially student scholarships. Please consider supporting us so that we can continue our path towards excellence.

For donations to the Graduate and St. George departments go to: donate.utoronto.ca/give/show/48.

To support UTM Philosophy go to: donate.utoronto.ca/give/show/223.

Thank You!