MESSAGE FROM THE ACTING CHAIR

Whether the Department of Philosophy is in the eye of a storm, or is in keeping with the lofty status of our concerns, somehow protected from mundane distractions, the severe cutbacks in University funding have not prevented us from enjoying a fruitful year. André Gombay and Jim Brown report on the states of the Graduate and the Undergraduate Departments later in this Newsletter. Of the twelve or so of our recently graduated students who have been seeking academic employment, eleven have succeeded. André reports details below. Of our junior members, Margaret Morrison and Jackie Bruning have received Tenure and Promotion to the rank of Associate Professor; Peter Apostoli has received a Connaught Fellowship; Cheryl Misak and David Dyzenhaus have (as reported in the last issue of Toronto Philosophy News) received Humboldt Fellowships. We have enjoyed the work of a superb support staff, in which Suzanne Puckering (Business Officer) and Marion Prear (Reception) joined Jane Bugajski, Leila Jaigobin, Marg Robb, and Joyce Wright this year.

As to our academic staff complement, two job searches for tenure-stream positions will be taking place during the forthcoming academic year: a continuing search for a position in Medical Ethics, and a new search for a position which will be open, except for the requirement that expertise in Environmental Ethics be demonstrated to help the Department pursue teaching and research in this urgent and growing field. In addition, the Faculty has recommended to the Provost that the Philosophy Department be empowered to hire a Medieval Philosopher to come on our tenure-stream staff in 1995-96.

The Department has received a major grant from the University to renovate public space in our central offices at 215 Huron St. In addition to providing an additional seminar room, we shall restructure the 10th floor to improve the Common Room, within which many of our public talks and seminars are held and to provide for a library and graduate student study carrels.

Alas, not all news is good. It is with sadness that I report the recent death of David Savan. An obituary written by John Slater is included below.

STAFF CHANGES

André Gombay concludes his term as Associate Chair in charge of the Graduate Programme this year, to be replaced by Ronnie de Sousa. A senior scholar, Ronnie will also represent the Department in the Faculty of Arts and Science's newly embarked upon efforts to coordinate and promote major research initiatives.

Philosophers at the U. of T. are not kings, but they are not infrequently College Principals. Lynd Ferguson has completed his third year as Principal of University College this year. Joseph Boyle has just finished his first year as Principal of St. Michael's College, and Paul Thompson continues as Principal of Scarborough College. Meanwhile, also in the major extra-Department service category, Fred Wilson continues as President of the Canadian Association of University Professors and William Graham has assumed the Presidency of the University of Toronto Faculty Association.

I leave the post of Acting Chair after a year, which, notwithstanding the inevitable aggravations accompanying administrative work, I have enjoyed — not for the least reason that I have received such friendly and efficient support from our Departmental academic and non-academic administrative staff. Wayne Sumner returns to the Chair, having, among other things, devoted the past year to caring with his wife Heather Wright for their newly born child, Nicholas. The several readers of TPN who have written me letters noting spelling, grammatical, and stylistic errors will be relieved to know that future volumes of this newsletter will be overseen by Wayne.

— Frank Cunningham
Wednesday February 5, 1992.

Dear Professor Cunningham:

Congratulations, the Toronto Philosophy News is an excellent innovation, I can sense that it will appeal to many, and not only to former graduates in philosophy but to prospective candidates as well. You are linking past and future, thereby accomplishing a difficult and important task within the academic world. Difficult, yes, considering in one’s view of society and self-analysis that have come about within one generation. Important, because possibly, if not probably and unfortunately so, the moral bases for personal outlook and analysis are being pushed aside, if not away.

You mentioned in your message at the beginning of Vol. 1 No. 2 that you welcome recollections of philosophy at the U. of T. as well as reflections on how philosophy has influenced life and work after graduation. This is a most welcome suggestion.

My undergraduate years at U. of T. (class of ‘47 in Honours Philosophy and English, University College) were not only extremely happy intellectually, mentally and morally, but they had a decisive and continuing influence on my life and work. I arrived on campus immediately after having a violent argument with my father. Everything that happened to me during my four years on campus started from that argument, and flowed from it. My father, an excellent French chemist, had come to an Eastern Ontario pulp and paper town after having graduated from the prestigious École de Physique et Chimie in Paris and having performed valiantly during the First World War. He had decided to leave the old world and its petty nepotism in order to continue in chemical research in a new country—for this was his outlook. I do not think I was able to write this in the first U. of T. essay requested by dear, wonderful Professor Wallace of the English Department: Who I am and Why I came to this University. I remember writing affectionately about the mutual love that existed between my parents and myself. In the rush of that first essay I most probably gave an embarrassing vent to feelings of gratitude toward my parents for doing just the thing I so desired, letting me get away from my father’s pained and painful challenge. “Why are you choosing philosophy!” and to which I remember having given a timid yet steady reply: “Because I wish to.”

Having grown in a French home within a largely French Canadian town yet having had both French and English playmates, the Roman Catholic and later public schooling I obtained in that town being excellent, it was natural for me, while the Second World War raged on, to wish for a deeper knowledge of the world as well as of the English language. As a youngster I loved my country of adoption and enjoyed the mental excitement of being both French and English in my outlook. I owe this intellectual feeling to my teacher. However it was just as natural for my father to object strenuously and from strictly his point of view: He could not very well see mine as I silenced my deeper motive, perhaps not even knowing this at the time, namely, the desire for knowledge indeed, but knowledge with my own mind.

The intellectual welcome offered by my professors at U of T overwhelmed me. It was affectionate, sturdy and substantial. Courses with Professors F.H. Anderson, whose cheerful encouragement led to a $37.00 prize for an essay on Locke—and that was a big sum for me—notwithstanding his big cigar and his imposing stature, with Dawson, MacCallum, and Priestley, while on the periphery of my courses I attended lectures by Endicott Gilson, heard Jacques Maritain and Jean-Paul Sartre, studied music theory at the Toronto Conservatory of Music, took piano lessons from Ernst Zeit, and participated in the war effort by reading French novels to a blind pilot, all of these activities filled much of four happily productive years. Courses in political science and economics as well as night studies in typing, shorthand and journalism somewhat pacified my father, but the challenge ended only a few moments before his death, for then and only then did he offer a conciliatory question: “Who is the father of philosophy?”

My answer to you is more an explanation than a recollection, nor can I describe in detail courses taken, seminars attended and essays written forty years ago, but I can say this, while apologizing for the dramatic and personal nature of my answer: a young person’s entry into an undergraduate program is a very dramatic thing indeed, and the academic world must never forget this. Not only because of the youngster’s ethnic or religious background, not only because of tensions that may have confronted this youngster during adolescence, but because a university program in philosophy thereby about to open the young mind to the history of thought, to the process of thought itself and to the great question of morality is literally bringing on an explosion of the mind.

In my particular case, Socrates, Aristotle and Kant were the main substance of that explosion. They have stayed with me as I went on to teach French civilization, read deeper into philosophy and later, literature, write and give readings on George Sand, raise my children and communicate with my loved ones. Fairly recently, I became one of the first elderly suburban matrons to attend courses at Philosophy Hall at Columbia University. The title of my doctoral dissertation, successfully defended at Teachers College at that same university, is “Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Moral Education.” I won’t give you the subtitle of this text. Dear Professor Anderson would have said that it was too long. I am sorry that my father died before I became a “doctor” in philosophy. For that is what he would have said: “What is a doctor in philosophy?”

Yours sincerely,

Sergine (Dosne) Dixon, Ed.D.
1992 PHILOSOPHY BOOK LAUNCH

The fifth annual Philosophy Book launch, held March 9 in the Central Department’s Common Room, celebrated the 13 books published by U. of T. philosophers in the past year, namely:

James Robert Brown
THE LABORATORY OF THE MIND
Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences

David Dyzenhaus
HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS
South African Law in Jurisprudential Perspective

James A. Graff
PALESTINIAN CHILDREN AND ISRAELI STATE VIOLENCE

C.M.T. Hanly
THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH IN APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS

Brad Inwood
THE POEM OF EMPEDOCLES

Martin Kusch
FOUCAULT’S STRATA AND FIELDS

Thomas Langan
TRADITION AND AUTHENTICITY IN SEARCH OF ECUMENIC WISDOM

Graeme Nicholson
FACKENHEIM
German Philosophy and Jewish Thought

Geoffrey Payzant
EDUARD HANSLICK AND RITTER BERLIOZ IN PRAGUE
A Documentary Narrative

Thomas Robinson
HERACLITUS FRAGMENTS
A Text and Translation with a Commentary

William Seager
METAPHYSICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch
THE EMBODIED MIND
Cognitive Science and Human Experience

Fred Wilson
EMPIRICISM AND DARWIN’S SCIENCE

The launch, attended by about 40 people, gave authors a chance to discuss their work with colleagues from various disciplines, and it highlighted the continuing high level of research activity across a wide variety of areas by members of our staff. Ronald de Sousa (incoming Associate Chair in charge of the Department’s Graduate Programme) presented the books, sorting them, in his inimitable style, into the categories: Rainy on Your Parade; Antiqurian Rubbish; Misguided Innovations; Ecumenical Bromides; and Futile Advice. Readers of Toronto Philosophy News who were unable to attend the launch, may wish to amuse themselves by divining the launched books’ categories.

DUBROVNIK

Every April, several philosophers of science from the department participate in the annual conference held at Dubrovnik. For the past several years this has been the largest annual philosophy of science conference in Europe. Set on the southern Adriatic and surrounded by mountains, Dubrovnik is a spectacularly beautiful, medieval, walled city. However, Dubrovnik, which is in Croatia, has suffered much in the tragic breakup of Yugoslavia (it was shelled heavily in December) and continues to suffer. The city is under siege and visiting philosophers this year had to come and go by sea and listen to sniper fire at night— all of which, no doubt, heightens one’s philosophical acumen.

UNDERGRADUATE AFFAIRS

The revisions to the undergraduate programme that came into effect this year have been smoothly put into place, though fine-tuning will continue, no doubt, indefinitely. One place where we will be expanding a little is in Environmental Ethics. We already offer one course in this area, but we are likely to do more in the future as part of the new Division of Environmental Studies. Our undergraduate programme is in good shape today, but we are not looking forward with equanimity to next year when severe cutbacks will effect the number of courses we can offer and the amount of Teaching Assistance help that can be given to the larger ones. A slightly rocky road lies ahead.

— Jim Brown
THE GRADUATE DEPARTMENT

This was to be the year of dashed hopes and dismal prospects, of jobs remaining on the drawing boards, of careers put on hold until better times arrived. Yet somehow fate decreed differently. The generation of 1992 will have secured more jobs than any of its predecessors: next year it will be found teaching in Vancouver, in Edmonton, in London, in Hamilton, in Toronto, in Montreal, in Charlottetown, in Halifax — seemingly no corner of Canada is immune; it will also be teaching in New Hampshire and in Tennessee. Almost a miracle year.

— André Gombay

PHILOSOPHY AND NON-EUROPEAN CULTURES

On February 29 the Department sponsored a day-long workshop on ways to develop anti-racist and multicultural instruction in Philosophy. Round-table sessions were held both on classroom instruction and on curriculum. The morning session, on instruction began with a presentation by Martha Ayim (a fourth-year philosophy specialist from Erindale College) which worked from her own responses as a black woman in philosophy to address the way philosophy instruction and course materials are experienced by students from non-European backgrounds. Chelva Kanaganayakam of the English Department at Toronto spoke about the complexities faced by instructors who try to confront issues of race, culture, perspective and authorial voice in humanities instruction. Jack Stevenson discussed the importance of the instructor’s leadership in the classroom and respect for student views in providing the opportunity for students from non-European backgrounds to speak and to be attended to when they wish to locate or discuss issues salient to them.

The afternoon session, on curriculum, included presentations by Julia Ching (Religious Studies), Devaki Nagarajan (Philosophy, Queen’s), Michael Marmura (Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies) and our own former graduate students, Charles Mills (Philosophy, U. of Illinois, Chicago) and Olufemi Taiwo (Philosophy, Loyola University, Chicago). Mills spoke about reasons why many people of the African diaspora consider mainstream post-Cartesian philosophical reflection to be of little value. The other participants commented on the range and value of the philosophic contributions of non-European traditions in philosophy.

In addition, Olufemi Taiwo discussed some of the practical difficulties to be met in giving instruction in philosophy a broader cultural reach.

Both sessions involved the audience in animated discussions. All agreed that measures can and should be taken to make philosophy instruction more culturally inclusive, and actively anti-racist. However, more discussion is required about how this can best be done and the means to be provided to accomplish it. Martha Ayim is already working under departmental supervision to gather material both on curriculum and instruction. These materials, a more extensive checklist of materials, and some commentary on the ways in which they can be used will be placed in the Department Library. Participants in the conference also suggested other measures: the alteration of existing courses and provision of courses on specific non-European traditions were viewed as jointly necessary to make non-European philosophic concern both noteworthy and central to undergraduate instruction in philosophy. Many present also thought that the Department should seek philosophers from visible minorities and non-European traditions when making future appointments. Responses to these initiatives are welcome. They may be sent to the Chair or to the organizers of the conference, André Gombay and Tom Mathien, in care of the department.

— Tom Mathien

TOWARDS A FEMINIST CONCEPTION OF PRACTICAL REASON

Telling Right From Wrong with Feminist Practical Dialogue

The Jerome S. Simon lectures were presented by Alison Jaggar, a distinguished philosopher currently teaching at the University of Colorado, in March on the subject of feminism and moral epistemology.

Starting with an explicit concern for feminism, Jaggar affirmed that what is wanted is a non-ideal morality, accommo-
dating many standpoints, all of which will be situated and contingent. She denied relativism, affirming that the goal of such a method in principle is world-wide agreement, even though moral propositions are not universal in the sense of “true in all times and places”. “Collective reassessment” was a phrase used for a process that is continually open, and not committed to any particular metaphysics or ontology.

Jaggar introduced the lectures by setting out ten items that feminists want in a moral epistemology. As a non-ideal morality, it should, for example, produce guidance in an imperfect world, generate practical recommendations for action, cover a range of concerns from domestic to global, and take seriously (but not uncritically) women’s experience in practical decision making. She argued that the ten conditions are not met by what she called “the 4 C’s” – contractualism, communitarianism, communicative ethics, and the ethics of care.

Despite their inadequacies, however, Jaggar finds something of use in each of these approaches. Noting that contractualism has been little used by feminist philosophers because of its strong association with male-informed liberal individualism, she nevertheless also noted that free and informed consent as a condition of morality is intuitively acceptable to most practical reasoners, and that her own position – “feminist practical dialogue” – will preserve the enlightenment values of free and equal interaction.

Communitarianism and the ethics of care are the approaches that have been most used by feminist ethicists, and generally considered compatible with each other. In a manner consistent with postmodern attacks on grand theory, communitarians, and some feminists, insist that values are culturally embedded, and that there is no moral standing independent of shared ethos. Communitarianism also attacks the abstract notion of the self in terms similar to feminism. According to Jaggar, the “unencumbered self” without community or care for particular others, has no basis for moral choice. However, a reliance on local tradition and shared understandings is supposed of being conservative and inappropriate to feminism. Although communitarianism need not be conservative, there is little agreement on how it can be used critically. The fact that it is an approach shared by both left and right critics of liberal individualism creates some philosophical and political uneasiness.

In constructing the method “feminist practical dialogue”, Jaggar brought to bear some interesting documents from grass roots women’s movement: – from the Boston Women’s Health Collective (1969), a guidebook for feminist consensus decision making of the anti-militarist women’s encampment at Seneca Army Depot, N.Y. (1983), and a document circulated in the battered women’s movement (1980). All of these documents value dialogue and presume it is an essential aspect of moral development. In this dialogue it is understood that the particularities of experiences are a vital moral resource, and that our experiences differ. Although earlier models of feminist dialogue were naive about the role of privilege, she argued the privileged do not automatically enjoy advantages in her model. While feminist dialogue requires a supportive and nurturant environment, it must not be a requirement that there be no challenge. It is presumed in feminist practical dialogue that emotions are integral to moral understanding, but also that some emotions are more appropriate reactions to things than others (for example, anger rather than shame at sexual assault.) Emotional change may occur through dialogue, so that emotion is at once precondition, product, and resource.

Feminist practical dialogue differs from communicative ethics in that it is much less ideal. It addresses not only external but internal constraints, suggesting that a sort of dialogical affirmative action is often needed. It is more interactive, but less adversarial. It pays attention to embodiment and emotion. Feminist practical dialogue has a non-individualist view of autonomy as positively, rather than oppositionally, related to social immersion. Autonomy admits of degrees and is a learned process that positively requires dialogical interaction with others. It is therefore not simply a precondition for feminist practical dialogue, but a result of it. We are neither Kantian “solitary moral pioneers”, nor simply “repositories of convention”. In the process, we respect the moral capacities of ordinary women, and assume that everyone is fallible and corrigeble.

Jaggar claimed a certain optimism based on the belief that women ultimately have “deep” interests in common, and that maybe, everyone has at least considerable interests in common. She said that the method of cooperation is another source of optimism. Some limitations of the method are that it may not be useful for large groups because it depends on face to face contact, and that it is a culturally specific product. Although it is open to abuse, it was noted that all hopes for consensus are, and that the approach is considered ultimately to be only a valuable heuristic device.

The lectures were work-in-progress for a book, Telling Right From Wrong: Feminism and Moral Epistemology. We look forward to its publication.

— Lynda Lange

AN INTERVIEW WITH CHERYL MISAK

by R. De Sousa


Toronto Philosophy News: How did you get into philosophy?

Cheryl Misak: By accident. I took my first philosophy course because it fit in with my timetable. I wanted Tuesday-to-Thursday courses so that I could have four day week-ends, and philosophy was the only course I could cram into that schedule. I thought it had something to do vaguely with
psychology or theology — I was completely clueless — and I got hooked in that first course.

TPN: And now? If you had to do it all over again?

CM: Oh yes, I’d do it all over again.

TPN: But why?

CM: I like it. I don’t know why. And none of the usually proffered explanations grab me at all: such as you get to the bottom of things...

TPN: Mine is that it’s an excuse to be a dilettante.

CM: That doesn’t grab me either: I’m not really a dilettante.

TPN: How does philosophy relate to your life?

CM: When I’m thinking about philosophy, I’m working. After work, I never think about it. I’m not one of those people who want to talk philosophy late into the night. I love it, but within certain boundaries. When I’m not working I don’t find philosophical insights in snippets of the newspaper, I don’t make philosophical jokes. I’m not obsessed by it in a pervasive way.

TPN: Yet you’re very disciplined and committed to your work. What’s more, you like it. But it doesn’t pervade your life and your thoughts. This reminds me of something that our own Francis Sparshott said. He’s a brilliant philosopher who claims to do philosophy only because it’s his job. He admits he does it well, but clearly his every thought, it seems to me, is pervaded by the influence of philosophy. Yet on the day of his retirement, he sold his books.

CM: But I’d never sell my books! They’re too much a part of me. Put it this way: maybe the reason I don’t find philosophy impinging on every bit of my life is that I’m not good at quick philosophical repartee.

TPN: I think, rather, that it’s because of your great talent for concentration. You know how to keep different things in compartments as water-right as you find expedient.

But let me ask a couple of questions about philosophy: What’s the most important philosophical idea of all time?

CM: C.S. Peirce’s idea that philosophy must be connected to practice. This may seem inconsistent with my previous answer! But it’s more abstract than “applying philosophy to life.” It has to do with giving up the idea that truth is some sort of representation of reality. If you want to talk about truth and knowledge, you had better link them up to inquiry, and to finding the best belief that can be found. And though not all that many philosophers think it’s a worthwhile idea, it’s an idea that no one had thought of in the history of philosophy until the nineteenth century.

TPN: How does this idea apply in the case of the most abstract branches of knowledge, such as mathematics?

CM: Maths too is a branch of inquiry....

TPN: What if someone says: the bearing of mathematics on practice is accidental. It’s just a pure quest for truth.

CM: But you shouldn’t think of “practice” as just building bridges. Mathematics is itself a practice. So a philosopher’s account of truth shouldn’t make it impossible for a mathematician to aim for the truth. What a mathematician is doing, when she is looking for the truth, is trying to get the best possible belief — a belief that wouldn’t be overturned by recalcitrant experience or argument.

TPN: So is it all like a game? It is something like Wittgenstein’s thought — as some interpret it — that when we talk, we are as if we were playing a game by certain rules?

CM: Not really, unless you want to say life is a game.

TPN: That’s ok with me.

CM: I wouldn’t put it that way. But the point is that truth is essentially anthropocentric. What’s true is what’s true for us. This isn’t to say that truth is different for different cultures, or different individuals. But truth is somehow truth for people. A mathematician who thinks she is exploring a transcendent world, existing independently of any animal or person, is just suffering from an illusion. But look, you’ve got me talking philosophy after dinner!

TPN: All right then, let’s move on to a simple question. What’s the most interesting idea of the 20th century?

CM: See above.

TPN: If you had to write your own obituary, or intellectual autobiography, what would you describe as your best idea?

CM: I’m too young to have had my best idea. At least I hope I am. Give me a few years!

TPN: And how will you tell? What about an idea makes it a good idea? You answered unhesitatingly that Peirce’s was the most important, but what makes it that?

CM: I can only answer in the same terms again: what makes a philosophical idea good is that it has a beneficial impact on people’s lives or on some practice. But that’s just repeating Peirce’s idea: And what makes it right? We can’t really avoid running around in a circle. An idea is good, if it just sparks fruitful discussion. But then to say what counts as fruitful, one just embarks on the same circle again.

TPN: There’s certainly something attractive about this pragmatist idea, but at some levels it seems hard to get hold of.

CM: Sure, but all big philosophical ideas are like that. I guess that’s how I’ll know my own big idea: it will be immensely attractive and not quite intelligible.

TPN: Tell me a little about how you work.
CM: Until very recently, before I had a child, I had to start first thing in the morning, without having even a conversation. And I drink coffee and eat constantly while I work. I work for about three hours, and then pack it in for that kind of work. I go into the department and do other things.

TPN: Is that work mostly reading, with intensive note-taking?

CM: No, it’s mostly writing. I tend not to count reading as part of what I call real work. I separate reading and writing pretty sharply, unless the reading is particularly hard and crucial to what I have to write. In the afternoon, after my stint in the morning, I find time to read; at that time I make rough notes, but I save the serious working out till the morning. Until recently I thought I couldn’t think properly except first thing in the morning. Since Alexander arrived on the scene, I can’t really work in the morning. I have to wait till the babysitter comes, and often don’t get to work until two or three in the afternoon. I find I can do it after all.

TPN: What about the rest of what most of us count as work?

CM: Preparing classes, grading papers? It all comes after that first work binge. Nowadays, I am actually on maternity leave, so I’m not teaching, but I have a babysitter who comes in for a few hours a day so I still get my two or three hours a day of what I think of as real work.

TPN: Which do you enjoy more: reading or writing?

CM: I don’t really enjoy writing, it’s too hard. It’s a bit like running, which I used to do regularly while hating every minute of it. Actually I enjoy writing more, but it’s still something that I have to brace myself for. The way I write is that I toss utter garbage into the computer, and then print it up and revise the hard copy, and I do that again a hundred or two hundred times. So I always have a hard copy that I’m working on.

TPN: Since when have you been working with a computer?

CM: Since I was an undergraduate.

TPN: Are you messy or disciplined?

CM: Both. I’m very disciplined about getting a certain number of hours a day done, but my desk is a mess. But that just happens: I’d rather be tidy. It gets messy by itself.

TPN: Tell me a bit how you feel about teaching? Is there anything that you’ve read about or thought of in the last couple of years that you’d really like to convey to students?

CM: The way I teach best, is to be teaching things that I’m working on. It doesn’t have to be a great idea for me to get excited about it. And I never feel that some idea is the be-all and end-all, and if I don’t get it across to my students at once their lives will be the worse for it. I can get excited about just about anything in the classroom.

TPN: Are you missing teaching right now?

CM: Yes, I’m missing it very much. I’m almost regretting having a full research term next term. I’m off to Germany next year and so I’ll be away from teaching for far too long.

TPN: Oh yes. You’re going to spend some time working with Jürgen Habermas, aren’t you?

CM: Yes, I’ll be writing a book on Pragmatism and Morality and he’s the most famous pragmatist writing on social and political issues.

TPN: Let’s close with one last question. What question do you wish I had asked you?

CM: Why don’t you just add a question?

TPN: I did, that was it.

CM: No, I mean one with substance.

TPN: Well, I guess you just answered it.

DAVID SAVAN (1916-1992)

Everyone who knew him will be shocked to learn of the sudden death of David Savan on 13 May 1992. On Monday evening, 11 May, while entertaining friends in his home, he suffered a massive heart attack. Paramedics succeeded in restoring his heartbeat and attached him to a respirator, but he remained comatose. The period after the attack, when the heart stopped beating, had deprived his brain of blood, causing irreversible damage. After a day and a half, the respirator was disconnected and death followed within hours.

David was a bright and steady light in this Department for nearly half a century. During the Second World War, he was hired by G.S. Brett to teach courses in the history of philosophy. When war broke out, he was teaching in the United States, where he had been born and educated. Because he had been born with a club foot, he was ineligible for military service. Brett’s offer of a regular teaching position, after so many years of economic uncertainty, was gratefully accepted. It was to prove one of the best appointments Brett made.

David was born on 27 March 1916 in Manchester, New Hampshire, where he received all of his pre-University education. A brilliant student, he was admitted to Harvard at the age of sixteen. In 1936, shortly after his twentieth birthday, he was graduated from Harvard summa cum laude, having majored in philosophy. He stayed on at Harvard as a graduate student, receiving an M.A. in philosophy in 1938, and completing all of the requirements for the Ph.D. except the dissertation. He sometimes confessed to embarrassment concerning this failure to complete the degree, especially when he was Graduate Secretary in this Department and had the task of encouraging others to get on with their work, but once one got to know him it was obvious why the dissertation was never written. Philosophical problems were too important to David to be treated as exercises; he continued to develop as a philosopher throughout his life. Indeed much of his very best philosophical writing was produced after he retired in 1981. In the early years it was not possible for him to feel satisfied with anything he had written on a philosophical topic; he could see clearly the ways in which it required improvement. In later years, although he could still see the need for revision, he was less reluctant to see his writings be published, largely, as he told me, because he saw that what he had to say was of more worth than what was being published on the same topic by others.
Even though he did not produce a large amount of written work during his teaching career, what he did produce was both first-rate and influential. Spinoza and Peirce were his special interests and he contributed substantially to the study of both. In Peirce studies, he was one of the pioneers, along with his colleague and friend, Thomas A. Goudge. In 1969-70 he served as President of the C.S. Peirce Society. He also had a steady influence on both undergraduate and graduate students through his teaching. Students who took a seminar from him recognized that they were being taught by someone special. Not many in this profession develop a reputation for wisdom, but David Savan is one who did. He had a way of taking a point, however small it may have seemed initially, and saying something about it that was both interesting and important. His knowledge was encyclopedic; he seemed to remember everything he had ever read. But, unlike some with this sort of memory, his was never a burden to him. He could select from what he remembered about a topic just those points which helped illuminate the point under discussion. And his sense of values was exquisite; he always seemed able to find just the right degree of worth to attach to a judgment. If he had a fault it was that he was sometimes too generous, too kind, in his assessments of others and of their opinions. Meanness was anathema to him. If there were a class of secular saints, he would surely be a member.

What is perhaps most extraordinary about David's career is its latest phase. After his retirement he found himself in great demand for all sorts of philosophical projects. Peirce studies were flourishing and David was invited to address international conferences on his philosophy and to contribute articles to various printed symposia. His own Peirce contributions were subject to study by younger scholars, and David was invited to reply to their criticisms. Two international conferences on Spinoza also invited him to address them. Last, but far from least, the new subject of semiotics engaged much of his time and intellectual energy. His initial interest in this subject grew out of his study of Peirce's semiotic. But after he joined the Toronto Semiotic Circle his interest expanded to encompass the latest ideas, some of them very radical, which were coming from the Continent during those years. David brought to them the same intelligent, careful, analytical thinking that he applied to every problem. He was never too old to take an interest in what was moving the young. David was very fortunate in his marriage to Kathleen. She was a British Quaker and had served as an ambulance driver in China during the Second World War. After they met, through mutual friends, when she was on a visit to Toronto, a romance developed and they were married. It was an ideal marriage; Kathleen was the same sort of gentle, kind person as David was, and both were committed to the same good causes. Both had radiant personalities which made newcomers feel immediately at ease with them. They had two children, a daughter and a son, Beth and Jon. One of the tragedies of David's life was Kathleen's death soon after he retired. She was knocked down by a car, seemed to recover, but then suffered a haemorrhage in the brain, from which she died. Her memorial service in the Quaker meeting house, on a very cold February night, was extremely moving, as one after another of the people assembled arose and testified to the way in which she had affected their lives, always for the better.

David Savan will be sorely missed by those of us who remain. It was always such a pleasure to encounter him on his visits to the Department. His greeting made one feel very special, and even a brief conversation with him left one better informed than before and also just a little bit wiser. We are, of course, happy for him that he did not suffer at the end, but that only alleviates our own pain a little. But the pain of his loss is also made more bearable when one reflects just how very privileged we were to have had him in our midst for so long. For this we are all truly grateful.

— J.G. Slater