The highlight of this past year was the Centenary Conference last October, marking a hundred years of the doctoral program in philosophy at U of T. The conference began at Victoria College with some remarks by John Slater on the history of the department. John is writing a complete history (156,652 words at last count) which we are planning to publish. Graeme Hunter followed with some reflections on the "Toronto" approach to the history of philosophy which appear in this edition of TPN. In the afternoon we moved to St. Michael’s College for the first of five sessions chaired by Ph.D. alumni currently on our faculty. These sessions consisted of eleven papers by Ph.D. alumni teaching at universities in Canada and the U.S. and ten commentaries by students currently in our Ph.D. program. The last three sessions were held the next day at University College. The speakers and their topics are listed inside. The Department expresses its gratitude to the School of Graduate Studies and the University of Toronto Alumni Association for their generous support of this conference.

The Department also hosted the annual conference of the Ontario Philosophical Society on October 31st and November 1st. Sessions were held in University College on the Friday and at Victoria College on Saturday. The invited address, ‘Explain Yourself,’ was given by Calvin Normore (Ph.D., U of T, 1976). As might be expected, U of T faculty, students, and alumni figured prominently among the speakers. Six of our graduate students gave papers, and seven provided commentaries. Fourteen U of T faculty members, and a total of ten U of T Ph.D.s, participated.

The Department lost two of its eminent professors emeriti this past year, Edward Synan and John Hunter. Ed Synan died in August last year and John Hunter died in March this year. Both made immense contributions to the department and will be long remembered. This edition of TPN contains personal appreciations of Ed Synan by Barry Brown and of John Hunter by David Gallop. A scholarship in John’s name has been established in the department.

Mark Thornton
Ph.D Centenary Conference

A conference to celebrate the centenary of the Ph.D. program in philosophy at U of T was held on October 24th and 25th, 1997. The speakers (with the year they received their Ph.D.) were:

Michael Krausz (1969) Department of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College:
“Is There a Reality Beyond Interpretation?”

Paul Spade (1972) Department of Philosophy, Indiana University:
“A Vow of Silence? Or, Why Don’t Medieval Logicians Ever Tell Us What They Are Doing?”

Jenefer Robinson (1975) Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati:
“Emotion and Cognition.”

James Lennox (1978) Department of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh:
“History and Philosophy of Science: A Phylogenetic Model.”

John McCumber (1978) Departments of Philosophy and German, Northwestern University:
“Hegel and Postmodernism.”

Christine Overall (1980) Department of Philosophy, Queen’s University:
“Personal History, Social Identity, and Philosophical Inquiry.”

Jan Zwicky (1981) Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria:
“Freud and the Roots of Philosophy: Dreams, Interpretation, and Intelligibility.”

Graeme Hunter (1983) Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa:
“Toronto as History.”

Olufemi Taiwo (1986) Department of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago:
“Running Aground on Native Shores: The Saga of Colonialism and Modernity.”

Marguerite Deslauriers (1987) Department of Philosophy, McGill University:
“Sex Differences and Social Roles in the History of Philosophy.”

John Russon (1990) Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University:
“The Contradictions of Moral Life: Hegel’s Critique of Kant.”

Catherine Talmage (1991) Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia:
“Literary Theory After Davidson?”
Passages

André Gombay and Henry Pietersma retire this year. Hans Herzberger and Jack Stevenson, who both took early retirement, also reach their official retirement date.

Bernard Katz completes his term as Graduate Coordinator and Associate Chair this year. After a well-deserved sabbatical leave he will assume new duties as Associate Dean, Humanities, in the School of Graduate Studies.

Elmar Kremer, Cheryl Misak, and Michael Vertin were promoted to the rank of Professor last year.

Peter Apostoli was granted tenure last year and promoted to Associate Professor.

Laura Shanner has resigned from the Department in order to take up an appointment as Associate Professor at the University of Alberta, where her husband holds an appointment.

New Faculty

This year the Department welcomed Claudia Eisen Murphy who joined us as an Assistant Professor in a tenure-stream appointment. She completed her Ph.D. thesis at Cornell last year, under the supervision of Norman Kretzmann.

Laura Purdy was appointed to the Joint Centre for Bioethics last year. She is cross-appointed to the Department as Professor and is a welcome addition to our graduate faculty.
Notes from the Graduate Department

The Martha Lile Love Teaching Award for 1996-97 was awarded to Mark MacLeod.

The Martha Lile Love Essay Award for 1996-97 was awarded jointly to Karen Detlefsen, for her essay “Diversity and the Individual in Dewey’s Philosophy of Democratic Education”, and to Jon Miller, for his essay “Elizabeth’s Influence on Descartes”.

These awards were established as a memorial to Martha Lile Love, who died in 1979 at the age of 29 while a graduate student at U of T.

SSHRC Doctoral Fellowships for 1998-99 were awarded to: Paul Bali, Martin Kramer, Karyn Freedman and Daniel Goldman. Six other students hold continuing SSHRC Doctoral Fellowships.

PH.D THESES 1997-98

CARLSON, Angela. Mindful Subjects: Classification and Cognitive Disability.
   Supervisor: I. Hacking; Advisor: K. Morgan

   Supervisor: E. Kremer; Advisor: B. Katz

   Supervisor: B. Inwood; Advisor: J. Baker

FRAMMARTINO, Anna. The Combination of Sensibility and Understanding in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
   Supervisor: G. Nagel; Advisor: F. Wilson

GORMAN, Mathew. The Nature of Negative Language.
   Supervisor: F. Wilson; Advisor: L. Ferguson

HENDERSON, Robert. Moral Sense and the Ontology of Value.
   Supervisor: J.H. Sobel; Advisor: F. Wilson

   Supervisor: A. Ripstein; Advisor: R. De Sousa

LOUGHLIN, Stephen. A Response to Five Critiques of Aquinas’ Doctrine of the Passions.
   Supervisor: B. Brown; Advisor: A. Wingell

   Supervisor: M. Thornton; Advisor: A. Ripstein

   Supervisor: M. Vertin; Advisor: J. Boyle
Toronto as History

by Graeme Hunter

(This paper was presented as part of the Centenary Conference on Friday, October 24th, 1997)

It is delightful to participate in the centennial celebrations of this distinguished philosophy department. We celebrate a historic occasion, dealing with the history of a department known far and wide for historical reflection. For that reason I have unimaginatively, though I hope appropriately, called my paper “Toronto as History”. The retrospective occasion is my excuse for being more anecdotal than scholarly.

The year I arrived in Toronto for graduate studies, 1976, was probably a more normal year in the life of the department than it seemed to me at the time. I thought there must never have been a year like it nor ever would be again. Nineteen seventy-six brought such lights as Ermanno Bencivenga, Jan Zwicky, William Seager and several others who have gone on to do important philosophical work. I was dazzled by their brilliance. The reputation of the University of Toronto had prepared me to encounter professors who would challenge me. But it was dismaying to meet so many students, even before classes began, who took my own meagre achievements for granted and easily surpassed them. Not since the playground bully beat me up on the first day of kindergarten had school so shaken my self-confidence. Only the time-honoured trick of measuring them by their achievements and myself by my dreams could keep me in the advantageous light I preferred.

The news of U of T first reached me after I had already made other plans. I had gone abroad to study and had been in the graduate program of the university of Hamburg for two years when a Toronto graduate turned up there for postgraduate work with Prof. Rainer Wiehl. She told me about the department in Toronto and I thought that it sounded perfect for the type of historical studies I wanted to do. But I also had an ulterior thought that I would not have confessed to anyone at the time. I believed that I had learned in Germany the right way to approach the history of philosophy. And I assumed that the professors at U of T, for all their uncontested brilliance, would be mired in the mud flats of analytic history from which I, by the sheer brilliance of what I had learned in Hamburg, would rescue them. This pleasant fantasy quickly began to unravel after the intellectual mugging I received from my fellow students shortly after my arrival. When I met my professors a little later the process was soon complete.

What I brought from Germany was nevertheless not an inconsiderable thing. It was, as I now see, the sublime Hegelian picture of history reduced to a day-to-day, practical method for studying the history of philosophy. In his lectures on the history of philosophy Hegel says that the sequence of systems of philosophy as they have occurred in time is the same sequence as occurs in the step by step logical deduction of what he calls the Idea. This pronouncement could mean many things and there were, are and, I hope, always will be, people around U of T who know much better than I do what Hegel meant by it. But broadly speaking in the day-to-day practice of many Continental academics it
becomes the principle that each philosopher occupies a necessary place in history. It easily reduces to the idea that individual philosophers could have written and thought differently from the way they actually wrote and thought. The study of history then becomes the attempt to anchor what the philosophers wrote in the thought of their time - to show its historical inevitability. Let us designate this familiar brand of operational Hegelianism by a familiar word - historicism. Historicism, then, was the gospel of which I arrived in Toronto as a hopeful apostle.

As an undergraduate I had, as I thought, already encountered and rejected the only possible alternative - Anglo-American analytical history of philosophy. The essence of this approach, first practised by Bertrand Russell in his Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, is to treat the actual words and thoughts of philosophers as of secondary importance. The fundamental task is rather to discern what Russell calls their 'type', by which he means the abstract logic of their position which they might well have in common with many other philosophers, including those with whom they disagree. For example, it turns out, according to Russell, that Leibniz is of the same 'type' as his archrival Spinoza. Once we know the type of a philosopher, Russell tells us, we have seized on his most important philosophical contribution. As historians of philosophy, then, we can in good conscience leave the rest of his thoughts and words to other disciplines or to oblivion.

It is this conception of the history of philosophy which justifies the use made of it by many analytic philosophers. I shall just quote one example, but probably everyone here will remember similar ones. In the introductory paragraph of his chapter called "Monads", in Individuals, Sir Peter Strawson tells us: "...when I refer to the system of Leibniz I shall not be much concerned if the views I discuss are not identical at all points with the views held by the historical philosopher of that name." Strawson does not expect to learn anything from Leibniz the man, because he has already extracted what he thinks is essential: Leibniz the type.

This was the approach to the history of philosophy that I had seen in reading Strawson, Ryle, Sellars and others as an undergraduate and which my exposure to historicism in Hamburg had taught me to reject. It was this analytical approach to history that I anticipated encountering and gloriously refuting when I came to U of T. From today's vantage-point, a score of years farther along, I can identify four of my significant misunderstandings at that time.

First, it did not occur to me until more than a decade later that the Hegelian and the analytic philosophies of history, as they were actually practised, were incongruous counterparts of one another. True, each had strengths where the other had weaknesses and weaknesses where the other had strengths. But this was because, like mirror images, they had their content in common, and differed only in, to use a new dangerous word, orientation. Hegelians believe that logic is nothing but history, while analytic philosophers believe that history is nothing but logic. If they cannot agree, it is because neither has thought through the identity statement to which each lays claim.

In the second place I had not realized in 1976 that both of these approaches not only shared one another's basic assumptions, but also one another's faults. It is not true that history is inevitably a logical development. It can only be made to seem so by imposing some arbitrary pattern upon it. Neither is it true that there is some abstract logical schema, or type, which, when abstracted from a philosopher's thought, contains all that is singular and valuable in it. Schemata, or types, of this kind are conducive to the same end. Historicism, like the doctrine of historic types, seeks to
reduce the giants of flesh and blood that populate the history of philosophy to harmless skeletons, fit for exhibition in a museum of antiquities.

Thirdly, it had not occurred to me to ask the question God asked of Ezekiel: Can these bones live? If I had thought of it, I would have realized that a third position was possible and indeed preferable to either of the options I knew. If these bones could live, then historians of philosophy did not have to be curators of a museum. Instead they might be the most privileged of men and women: the living interlocutors of the greatest thinkers that ever were.

Lastly, I had not realized, though I was shortly to learn, that something like this third outlook I have just indicated would be the dominant, though by no means the only or official, outlook of the philosophers at U of T. I never guessed that the humbling experience of meeting graduate students of diverse and great talents was only the beginning of my journey. I was about to meet a number of teachers and professors who not only had carefully considered the historian position long before my arrival, but who had rejected it in favour of something better. My mind was not only to be humbled; but in the true Platonic tradition it was also to be turned around.

The outlook on history that I say was dominant, but not official, in 1976, was never articulated to me by anyone. And I have rashly put myself in the position where I must now attempt to do so, in full knowledge of the fact that I am trying to capture the essence of minds far subtler than my own. I ask them to forgive the inevitable crudeness of the picture I offer.

At the same time what Plato says of philosophy itself in the seventh letter is also relevant: “there is no way of putting it in words, like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining”. Therefore I see that in trying to articulate the mood and mind of 1976, I am laying myself open for contradiction both from those who know better what I am trying to say and from those who do not know it at all. But before you leap to criticize be aware that my characterization does not pretend to be either exhaustive or incorrigible. To speak with Plato again, it will be at best a shadow that can call to mind your own anterior awareness of an invisible reality.

What, then, was the collective mind of this department twenty-one years ago regarding the history of philosophy? If the word 'ad hominem' had not been taken to designate a fallacy, it would be a good one to characterize the best historical thinking of the department at that time. It was directed at individual men, rather than at movements or schools. There were renowned experts on Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Russell and others. History was understood as something which these men helped to determine, rather than as a mysterious other which determined them.

If a word were needed to describe the attitude toward the history of philosophy dominant at U of T in my graduate years, the best would probably be 'respect'. But it, too, is insufficient. The best analytic historians of philosophy are also respectful toward their subject. And no one could accuse the German philosophers of a lack of respect for the past. But in each case the motive and kind of respect is different. The analytic historians respect the elegance and power of the types they discover. The historicists respect the spirit of the age as it comes to expression in different philosophical systems. But I was referring to another kind of respect that was distinctively Torontoian. Perhaps it is no accident that we find the words needed to
explain the difference in the writings of a former professor of this department (though never a happy one) George Grant. Grant says that there are many people who try to learn about the great philosophers, but only a few who try to learn from them. In 1976 the first and greatest, though unspoken, commandment of the Toronto historians would have been: Expect to learn from the great philosophers. That kind of respect set this department apart from anything I had experienced before or have experienced since.

Professor Robert McRae, who retired in 1979, and who, among others, exemplifies the cast of mind that I am trying to capture, told me about a visit that Gilbert Ryle made to Toronto years before my arrival. Ryle had said at some time in McRae’s hearing that the trouble with U of T’s philosophy department was that they treated philosophy as some kind of necrology. Let the dead bury their dead, Ryle thought, rather than constantly digging them up the way they do in Toronto.

It is easy to see how Ryle, the consummate analytical philosopher, could make that mistake. Like Russell, he believed the great philosophers to be reducible to logical types. One studied types mainly in order to exploit them in doing one’s own philosophy. The laboriously assembled skeletons on which this school of philosophy works, really are dead. And if Ryle thought, in his brief visit, that that was what the Toronto philosophers lavished their affection on, then he was really being kind in his remark. He might have gone further, and accused us not just of necrology, but of necrophilia.

But we were not concerned with the dead types of analytic philosophy any more than we were with the equally dead Geister of historicism. It was the living, not the dead, whom we met in our classrooms, in our readings, in our innumerable formal and informal discussion groups. We thought of the great philosophers as articulating permanent possibilities of thought, which would be in their main outlines as defensible today as they were when first put forward. We were taught to see how a man might be typical of his age without being merely a function of it.

One indication of the value of this attitude toward the past is that it bore good fruit. This was a department distinguished not only on academic grounds but in two additional ways that many have believed incompatible: it was one of the largest departments in the world and simultaneously one of the most harmonious. If I heard any unkind word said by one philosopher against a colleague either in public or in private throughout my time as a graduate student, it must have been insignificant, because I cannot recall any today. It was not, I think, because there were none who would have been capable of such things, but because they did not set the tone. The tone was in large part set by the department’s distinguished historians, men who looked to the likes of Aristotle, Spinoza and Kant for their standards. Their liking for one another as individuals may frequently have been strained, but it was superseded by a respect for the philosophical community, its officers and citizens.

Students were definitely included. I remember with gratitude (mixed with a little discomfort) the patient care with which even my shallowest thoughts were examined. I had declared myself a student of Leibniz and that was sufficient to entitle me to full honours as a companion of the philosophical realm...

Every department has its history; not every department has been involved in history with the intensity and distinction of this one. But when excellence is achieved it also creates standards and expectations for the future. My wish for the coming millennium is that history’s high horse will never be left riderless at U of T.
Professor Edward A. Synan died last August at the age of 79. Newspaper articles have chronicled his life, education, teaching career, writings, military service as chaplain in the US Air Force, hobby of making miniature soldiers, and his active participation in the cause of Solidarity.

I wish to offer a brief portrait of the man as a member of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, St. Michael’s College, and the Department of Philosophy. It was my good fortune to have known him as teacher, colleague, and wise counsellor. When I came to Toronto in 1962, Father Synan, as he was then known, was teaching the two-year cycle of mediaeval philosophy at PIMS: Early Mediaeval, from Augustine to Abelard, followed by the Thirteenth Century, including Aquinas and Bonaventure. At the time, these were year-long courses, which provided both extensive and detailed treatments of the “first-string” thinkers, and many of the lesser figures of the periods. Synan’s lectures were the most carefully prepared, well-organized, highly-polished presentations I have ever heard. They were laced with his urbane wit, and liberally documented with scholarly references. His students will remember frequent citations such as: “Migne, Patrologia Latina, 115, pp.644-645.” At the end of the lecture, we would all rush to the library, then at 59 Queen’s Park Crescent, to look up and copy the references.

During his career at PIMS, Msgr. Synan was also a member of the undergraduate Department of Philosophy at St. Michael’s College, up to the union with the University Department in 1974 and thereafter until his death. Here he played a fully active role, teaching various courses such as the old introduction, PHIL 150, the year-long History of Mediaeval Philosophy in the old Honours Program, and later on, the half-courses in Augustine and Aquinas. For a time, he also taught the year course in Ethics, which included figures as diverse as Aristotle and R. M. Hare. Recently, he taught one of the new Humanities 199Y sections.

Referring to beginning undergraduate students, Ed often stated that the students wanted above all not to be bored; his student course evaluations indicated that he met this goal in good measure: he was as popular with the undergraduate frosh as with senior Ph.D. students. Ed loved to tell beginners Russell’s account of the chicken.

In 1994-95, many years after his official retirement date, he gave up teaching his graduate courses. Nonetheless, he remained very active in the Graduate Department, serving on area exams, doctoral oral exams, and serving as advisor to several students, who will now miss his astute counsel. He had continued to teach for a time on a stipend. In that same year, demonstrating his deep sense of responsibility, he came to me in my capacity as Undergraduate Coordinator, and posed the following
question: "If I obtain a stipend, does this take funding away from a graduate student?" Advised that the funding all came from the same account, he resolved to "really" retire, and to devote his efforts henceforth to other areas, such as Continuing Studies.

In 1991, Ed was awarded the Aquinas medal by the American Catholic Philosophical Association. In May 1997, at the meeting of the International Medieval Society in Kalamazoo, several sessions on Aquinas were presented in his honour by his former students, under the general direction of Rollen (Ed) Houser of Houston. The papers will be published in a memorial volume, a fitting tribute to his career. He was also honoured at a dinner attended by about thirty of his students and friends. Bill Dunphy and I had the pleasure of being there for what turned out to be the final recognition during his life of his contribution to Medieval scholarship.

Msgr. Synan, erudite as he was, was also a very practical, down-to-earth person. Awarded the title Prelate of Honour, he never insisted on being addressed as "Monsignor." He loved to tell witty stories in the dining room at St. Michael's, drawing on his experience in graduate studies at Louvain, in the priesthood, the military, and the scholarly world. During his tenure in Toronto, he remained a "secular" priest of the Diocese of Newark, NJ (on leave as it were) and without the support of a religious order. On his modest salary, he had supported his aged mother for many years. He was thus no stranger to such mundane issues as salary, income tax, parental support, retirement income and other financial and practical issues that laymen must cope with. To this former student and to many others, he was a source of sound academic and personal advice. He was possessed of great common sense. In my view, he was not only a wise man; he was also a great example of Aristotle's phronimos, a man of practical wisdom, rooted in experience and good judgment in worldly matters. We shall all miss his scholarly expertise, his unfailing kindness, his sense of humour, and his commitment to the work of this department. Requiescat in pace!

John Hunter Remembered

by David Gallop

John Hunter was the colleague whom I came to know best during my early years in Toronto. We had neighbouring offices in University College from 1955 to 1961, then in Sidney Smith Hall, and later at 215 Huron Street until I moved to Trent in 1969. John was in his office every day, and his door was always open. Helped by his friendship and sage practical counsel, I gradually found my way around, and came to understand ways of doing things that had at first seemed strange to me, as a newcomer from England.

We enjoyed the eccentricities of our extraordinary Head, Fulton Anderson, whose presence in the department, though seldom visible, could somehow almost be felt. John told me that Anderson had asked him one day how his classes were going. John had answered, modestly, that he wasn’t
sure how well he was getting things across to the students. Anderson had replied: ‘Never worry about getting anything across. Just lecture the bastards’.

John and I shared a view of philosophy, not then widely prevalent in Toronto, as a way of thinking critically about problems, rather than a set of doctrines from the history of ideas. Conceptual questions (‘What does “X” mean?’, ‘What does it mean to say that p?’) had always lain at the core of philosophy for me. It was a delight to find in John a kindred spirit with whom to pursue them. We had both come under the spell of ‘ordinary language’ or ‘analytic’ philosophy, which many students viewed with suspicion as boring and irrelevant. I don’t doubt that we confirmed their worst suspicions. Marcus Long’s famously entertaining Introduction to Philosophy, fondly remembered by generations of Toronto graduates as their finest academic experience at the University, was a hard act to follow for two rookie lecturers, neither of whom felt at all sure of himself.

In the late ‘fifties, after John returned from a year of postgraduate study in Oxford, he started The Owls’ Club, an early ancestor of many later philosophy colloquia. It was, I believe, the first forum in which Toronto philosophers were able to discuss their concerns regularly with colleagues. Over several years, its meetings, usually held in members’ homes, were sociable, stimulating, and entertaining. One of its by-products was a series of weekly 30-minute radio broadcasts on CBC, in the fall term of 1962, grandly entitled ‘Dimensions of Freedom’. The series featured individual Toronto philosophers being questioned on Free Will and Determinism by an intelligent lay interviewer. Her sessions with John and me, Bill Dray, David Gauthier, and several others, were programmed on successive Wednesday evenings, and went well. But on the Wednesday after the series had ended, the CBC telephoned to ask if three of us would go down to their building on Jarvis Street, for discussion with a studio audience, to be aired live that very evening. John bravely agreed and so did I, despite horrible misgivings, as we had been given no time to prepare. The third panellist was Ronald J. Butler, then a member of the department, and editor of a recent volume called Analytical Philosophy. Unfortunately, the event coincided with the height of the October Cuban Missiles Crisis, and proved a total disaster. We philosophers debated whether ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. But the studio audience was anxious to know whether President Kennedy ‘ought’ to have ordered a blockade of Cuba, and whether he ‘could have’ acted otherwise. To those dreadful questions Analytical Philosophy had no answer. Later, the moderator wondered aloud how grown men could sit analyzing the meaning of a three-letter word while the very survival of the human race hung in the balance.

Philosophically, John was a self-made man. His approach, though strongly influenced by Oxford, and later by Wittgenstein (upon whom he became an authority), was unique. His writings are as readable as they are original, combining rigorous argument with a refreshing lack of jargon, irreverence towards authority, simple homespun examples, and humorous analogies. One could cite illustrations from any of his academic works, but I will take one from his semi-popular book on sexual ethics. In this passage he reflects upon the one of the traditional ‘causes’ for which, according to the Prayer Book, matrimony was ordained -- namely, ‘the avoidance of fornication’:

If there were no such institution as marriage, there could be no such thing as fornication, and nothing from which marriage could save us. When marriage and hence fornication both exist, it is possible to marry to avoid fornication; but it is no more possible to institute marriage as a way of avoiding
fornication than it is to institute parking rules as
a way of avoiding their violation. One can
introduce parking rules as a way of avoiding
parking chaos; but there can be no parking
violations before the introduction of any rules,
and similarly no fornication before the
instituion of marriage.

This shows John’s acumen in applying a
conceptual point to practical ethics. It also
illustrates his conviction that ethical
problems admit of rational discussion,
despite the failure of philosophers to agree
upon a theoretical basis for solving them.
He did not believe that ‘foundations’ were
necessary for ethics, and he showed in his
own way how intelligent moral deliberation
could proceed without them. In ethics, as
elsewhere in philosophy, he always
doggedly opposed intellectual defeatism.
His faith in the power of hard, intellectual
labour shines through pages of tenacious,
painstaking analysis, in which his own
labours are finally rewarded.

After I left Toronto I saw less of him,
though we kept in touch over many years.
He visited Peterborough a few times, to talk
to my students, or to attend philosophical
events at Trent. I watched him holding his
own among the heavyweights at a big,
international Wittgenstein conference in
London, Ontario. I read his scathing
reviews of books he had found mediocre or
worse, and felt increasing trepidation in
asking him to read my own drafts. I visited
his home on the Island, and envied the
magnificent, panoramic view of the Toronto
skyline, upon which he could look out while
he beavered away at his word-processor.
After his retirement, at a reception in the
department to celebrate his career, I was
moved to tears when he broke down
responding to the praises that had been
heaped upon his work.

On every occasion John remained himself:
soft-spoken, slightly rueful, slow and
diffident in manner, utterly without
affectation, and often wonderfully funny.
During his last few years, when illness had
diminished his zest for life, and increasingly
impairled his speech, I hardly saw him at all.
But one dark December afternoon, after he
had ridden a wobbly bicycle up University
Avenue, to attend a lecture in University
College, we tried to converse briefly. I
could hardly follow a word he said; and as I
watched him set out for home in driving rain
and snow, I wondered whether he could
possibly survive another winter on the
Island, or whether he might not soon fall a
victim to Toronto’s rush-hour traffic.

These memories of John have focused more
upon our times together than upon his
career. His achievements in philosophy
deserve a fuller appreciation elsewhere. I
have only tried to recapture a few moments
that stand out from a friendship of forty
years. Just as John often deplored ‘tired old
arguments’, so he would have scorned a
hackneyed phrase. But I will end with one,
because I have known no one whom it fits
more aptly than him. For me he truly was a
‘guide, philosopher, and friend’.

Faculty Notes

Julia Ching has been named the first holder of the Richard Charles and Esther Yewpick Lee
Chair in Chinese Thought and Culture. Her appointment was officially announced at a dinner at
the President’s house on April 27th. The endowment of this Chair ensures that there will be a
continuing appointment in the area of Chinese philosophy and religion after Julia’s retirement.
Wayne Sumner and Lloyd Gerson have been awarded Connaught Fellowships for 1998-99. These fellowships, which are funded by U of T’s Connaught Foundation, provide six months study leave.

Wayne Sumner received one of the 1997 Northrop Frye Awards, value $2000, which are given to faculty members for distinguished achievements in linking teaching and research. This award, which was bestowed at a ceremony last November in Hart House, is a fitting recognition of Wayne’s contribution to the University and to philosophy.

Bernard Katz has been awarded an OCUFA Teaching Award for 1997. This award is a great honour and we are proud of the number of our faculty who have received it.

SSHRC research grants for 1998 have been awarded to James Robert Brown, Arthur Ripstein, Laura Shanner, and Fred Wilson.

1998 Philosophy Book Launch

The Department’s 11th annual book launch produced another fine crop:

David Dyzenhaus
Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar

Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson
Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory Readings, Second edition, (translation)

Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfield, editors
Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero’s Academic Books

John G. Slater, editor, with the assistance of Peter Kollner
Last Philosophical Testament, 1943-68: Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 11

L. Westra and T.M. Robinson, editors
The Greeks and the Environment

Fred Wilson
Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference
On The Web

The chair’s Graduate Assistant, Kenneth Cheung, has been maintaining the Department’s website over the past year. Its URL is http://www.chass.utoronto.ca:8080/philosophy/ and it can be accessed via the U of T homepage. On our website you can find our monthly Newsletter (which includes a calendar of happenings in philosophy and other events of interest), the Department’s Graduate and Undergraduate Bulletins, our Colloquium schedule, and faculty profiles.

The U of T’s student aid campaign, which matched donations twice over, once from the University and again from the Ontario Government (through the Ontario Student Opportunity Trust Fund), showed how attractive matching of donations can be. Although donations ceased to be eligible for the OSOTF match after March last year, the University is still matching two types of donations; those for graduate fellowships and those from faculty and staff. Since OSOTF aid is available only for Ontario residents and therefore out of province graduate students are not eligible, we welcome donations for graduate fellowships. I am happy to say that we have already received substantial amounts for OSOTF aid and for graduate support. Our warmest thanks to all our alumni and others who have contributed.

Mark Thornton

Alumni

The Department is planning to set up an alumni association in time for our 150th anniversary (in 2000). We want to hear from our alumni about their activities. Please contact us by mail, or e-mail <mark.thornton@utoronto.ca> or the Chair’s secretary <margaret.robb@utoronto.ca>.

TPN is the Department’s Newsletter for alumni and other Friends of Philosophy
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