- BA, Kutztown University of Pennsylvania
- MA, Rice University
- PhD, Rice University
Michael completed his dissertation under Casey O’Callaghan, which consisted of related papers on the nature of perceptual experience and how it affords demonstrative thought. Now, under Mohan Matthen, his current project examines the commonly held view that our perceptual experiences are neural representations in the brain. Michael is interested in cases which seem to involve experience of objects not explicitly represented by our sensory systems and what they mean for this view. He is working on developing a view according to which what we experience is a mix of both what’s represented by our sensory systems and distal stimuli with which we interact through our sensory systems but which aren’t explicitly represented. This work has implications for both how our mental states relate to their underlying neural activity and for the nature of our perceptual connection to the world. For more information visit Michael’s personal website.
For publications and conference presentations, see Michael’s academia.edu page.
Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind