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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210305T100000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210305T120000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20201223T020419Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210305T144919Z
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SUMMARY:History of Modern Philosophy Group Talk (Mogens Lærke\, CNRS)
DESCRIPTION:The History of Philosophy Group is pleased to welcome guest speaker Mogens Lærke\, a senior researcher at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS). Dr. Lærke specializes in early modern philosophy and has published widely on early modern metaphysics\, epistemology\, philosophy of religion and political philosophy\, as well as on historiographical methodology. He is currently the secretary of the British Society of the History of Philosophy (BSHP)\, the managing editor of the BSHP New Texts in the History of Philosophy series from Oxford University Press\, and the founder and co-organizer of the annual conference Scottish Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy (SSEMP). \nJoin the meeting: \nhttps://utoronto.zoom.us/j/89735415891\n\nPasscode: 121286\nTalk Title\nSpinoza’s Common Notions (Ethics\, II\, prop. 37-40) \nTalk Abstract\nTBA \n\nAbout the History of Philosophy Group\nOne of six departmental Research Interest Groups\, the History of Philosophy Group is home to the History of Modern Philosophy Research Group\, which focuses on the period\, roughly\, from Descartes to Kant.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/history-of-modern-philosophy-mogens-laerke-cnrs/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/mogens-laerke-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210311T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210311T140000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20210226T025552Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210311T181057Z
UID:23680-1615464000-1615471200@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics\, and Mind Research Interest Group Talk (Aaron Segal\, Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
DESCRIPTION:The Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics\, and Mind Research Group welcomes Aaron Segal\, a faculty member in the Department of Philosophy at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Dr. Segal works in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of religion. \nJoin the meeting: \nhttps://utoronto.zoom.us/j/81547581491\n\n\nTalk Title\nAn Analytic Vindication of Idealism \nTalk Abstract\nOne of the hallmarks of nineteenth-century idealism\, which distinguished it sharply from analytic philosophy through much of the twentieth century\, was the insistence that metaphysics is intrinsically systematic\, and that as a methodological consequence\, we cannot properly do metaphysics in a piecemeal fashion. \nAfter making the notion of intrinsic systematicity much more precise\, I argue that at least in this regard the idealists have at long last been vindicated.  The trajectory of analytic metaphysics over the past half century\, together with very plausible meta-metaphysical reflections on that trajectory\, strongly suggest that the idealists were right after all. \nThe practical upshot for contemporary analytic metaphysicians is this: if metaphysics can be properly done at all\, it can’t be properly done in the way most everyone has been doing it. \nAbout the Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics and Mind Research Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics and Mind Group undertakes research in philosophy of mind\, philosophy of cognitive science\, traditional and formal epistemology\, metaphysics\, and philosophy of language.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/lemm-interest-group-talk-aaron-segal-hebrew-university-of-jerusalem/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Aaron-Segal-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210311T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210311T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20200207T204024Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210210T183015Z
UID:19363-1615474800-1615482000@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Logic and Philosophy of Science Group Talk (Nina Emery\, Mount Holyoke)
DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Philosophy of Science Group is pleased to welcome guest speaker Nina Emery\, an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at Mount Holyoke College. Dr. Emery’s research focuses on the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. She has a particular interest in the question of how and to what extent our best scientific theories\, especially quantum mechanics and relativity theory\, should inform our understanding of time\, probability\, and the laws of nature. She also works on the question of how and to what extent standard scientific practice relies on appeals to extra-empirical theoretical virtues such as simplicity and explanatory power. Her other interests include the philosophy of language\, the philosophy of religion\, epistemology\, and applied ethics. \nJoin Zoom meeting: \nhttps://utoronto.zoom.us/j/89147592627 \nTalk Title\nThe Governing Conception of the Wavefunction \nTalk Abstract\nThe central question of quantum ontology is: What does the wavefunction represent? In this paper I argue that the wavefunction plays two important explanatory roles with respect to the behavior of quantum systems\, and that this fact places significant constraints on any plausible account of what the wavefunction represents. NB: This talk will be non-technical\, and no prior experience with quantum physics is required. \nAbout the Logic and Philosophy of Science Group\nOne of six departmental Research Interest Groups\, the Logic and Philosophy of Science Group hosts talks on logic\, general philosophy of science\, and philosophy of the particular sciences\, as well as talks in allied areas such as formal epistemology\, decision theory\, and the metaphysics of science.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/logic-science-talk-nina-emery-mount-holyoke/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/nina-emery-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210312T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210312T150000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20210113T214117Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210113T214220Z
UID:23469-1615554000-1615561200@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:History of Modern Philosophy Group Talk (Michaela Manson\, Toronto)
DESCRIPTION:The History of Philosophy Group is pleased to welcome as speaker Michaela Manson\, a graduate student in philosophy at the University of Toronto. Her philosophical interests centre around the early modern period\, with a particular concern for questions about mind\, cognition\, perception\, desire\, and judgment. She is also interested in feminist philosophy and the philosophies of mind and language. In 2018 Michaela won the Jan Wojcik Memorial Prize for graduate students in the history of philosophy for her research about Mary Astell (1666-1731)\, about whom has also written a blog post for Project Vox. \nJoin the Meeting: TK \nTalk Title\nError and the Cartesian Mind \nAn abstract for this talk will be posted here closer to the date of the event. \n\nAbout the History of Philosophy Group\nOne of six departmental Research Interest Groups\, the History of Philosophy Group is home to the History of Modern Philosophy Research Group\, which focuses on the period\, roughly\, from Descartes to Kant.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/history-of-modern-philosophy-michaela-manson-toronto-2/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/michaela-manson-utoronto-philosophy-1.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210312T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210312T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20200805T212429Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210305T015316Z
UID:22076-1615561200-1615568400@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Ethics and Political Philosophy Group Talk (Meena Krishnamurthy\, Queens)
DESCRIPTION:The Ethics and Political Philosophy Research Interest Group welcomes Meena Krishnamurthy\, an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at Queen’s University. Dr. Krishnamurthy works on a variety of topics in political philosophy. She is currently writing a book (The Emotions of Nonviolence) and a series of related papers on the political philosophy of Martin Luther King Jr\, focusing on King’s views about “political emotions” in motivating the desire to end racial injustice. Her work explores how he used the various tactics of the civil rights movement (protest\, images\, letters\, and oratory) to engage these emotions and overcome some of the barriers to political action. Krishnamurthy is also writing on Indian political thinkers such as B. R. Ambedkar who concern themselves with the nature of caste. She is especially interested in how thinking about caste can inform thinking about race and racism in the United States. \nJoin the meeting: \nhttps://utoronto.zoom.us/j/81235912517\n\nMeeting ID: 812 3591 2517\nPasscode: 698975\nTalk Title\nAmbedkar and Du Bois’s Meliorist Approach to the Caste Problem \nTalk Abstract\nCaste is an all but ignored topic in mainstream (western) political philosophy. This is unfortunate because the caste problem was – and still is – an urgent global problem. As we know\, it exists not only in India but also among the South Asian diaspora of the United States\, the United Kingdom\, Australia\, and Canada. Moreover\, as Du Bois\, Jyotirao Phule\, and later Martin Luther King Jr. argue\, the caste problem and the race problem may very well be one and the same. Michele Alexander argues\, in The New Jim Crow\, that the incarceration of poor people of color in the United States is tantamount to a new caste system. This is why the caste question\, its genesis and evolution\, is of utmost importance for those of us who study race and racism. After explaining Du Bois and Ambedkar’s views on the origin and evolution of the caste problem in the United States and in India\, I argue that both Du Bois and Ambedkar take a pragmatist approach to caste that emphasizes amelioration. The meliorative approach is instructive because it helps us begin to identify a realistic path forward. \nAbout the Ethics and Political Philosophy Group\nThe Ethics and Political Philosophy Group meets periodically throughout the year to discuss topics in value theory and related fields\, including meta-ethics\, normative ethics\, applied ethics\, social and political philosophy\, philosophy of law\, moral psychology\, practical reason\, agency\, and identity.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/ethics-and-political-philosophy-meena-krishna-murthy-queens/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Meena-Krishnamurthy-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210317T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210319T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20200727T162704Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210310T205702Z
UID:22030-1615993200-1616173200@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:2021 Jerome S. Simon Lectures (Holly M. Smith\, Rutgers University)
DESCRIPTION:We are pleased to announce Holly M. Smith as our esteemed speaker for the 2021 Jerome S. Simon Lectures. Dr. Smith is Distinguished Professor Emerita of Philosophy at Rutgers University. She has also held appointments at Tufts University\, the University of Pittsburgh\, the University of Michigan\, the University of Illinois-Chicago\, and the University of Arizona. Dr. Smith has published widely on topics in normative ethics\, moral decision making\, the theory of moral responsibility\, and bio-medical ethics. In Making Morality Work (OUP\, 2018)\, she explores how moral theories should accommodate the errors\, ignorance\, and misunderstandings that impede us as moral decision makers. Her current projects propose new strategies for weighing the stringency of deontological duties\, and for identifying an agent’s alternatives in the context of normative theories. \nDr. Smith will be giving three lectures\, on March 17\, March 18\, and March 19\, respectively\, from 3 PM to 5PM. \nJoin the lectures (same link for all three): \nhttps://utoronto.zoom.us/j/88293034899 \nMeeting ID: 882 9303 4899\nPasscode: 489306 \n  \nLecture 1 Title\nEven More Supererogatory I \nLecture 1 Abstract\nIn order to provide enough healthcare workers during the initial explosive outbreak of COVID-19 in New York City\, the mayor pleaded with medical students and retired physicians and nurses to join the medical staff dealing with the flood of desperately ill patients. A small army of volunteers responded. Given the difficulty and danger of this work\, and the fact that these individuals had no duty to volunteer\, these were heroic acts of supererogation. But since the elderly retired physicians and nurses were known to be more vulnerable to infection and death from the virus than the young medical students\, it’s plausible to say that the acts of the retired medical personnel were even more supererogatory than those of the medical students. But what makes an act supererogatory\, and one supererogatory act more supererogatory—morally better—than another? This lecture aims to answer these questions by first providing an account of what features make an act supererogatory\, and then an account of what makes one supererogatory act better than another. \n  \nLecture 2 Title\nEven More Supererogatory II \nLecture 2 Abstract\nThis lecture continues the investigation launched in the first lecture\, broadening the scope of acts to be assessed for their comparative supererogatoriness. It will also compare the approach I advocate with an alternative account outlined in their seminal paper\, “More Supererogatory\,” by Toronto’s Thomas Hurka and Evangeline Tsagarakis. I argue that despite the attractions of Hurka and Tsagarakis’s approach\, it is less satisfactory than the one I have outlined. \n  \nLecture 3 Title\nSuberogatory and Even More Suberogatory \nLecture 3 Abstract\nSome theorists hold that there are “suberogatory” acts—acts characterized as bad but nonetheless permissible. Other theorists deny there are any such acts. In this lecture I propose an account of what suberogatory acts are that makes it clear such acts do (or at least can) occur. However\, I reject the claim that all suberogatory acts are full-on bad. I then use my account of what makes an act suberogatory to provide an account of when one suberogatory act is more suberogatory—morally worse—than another. I explore the relationship between supererogatory and suberogatory acts\, and end by arguing that my account of the suberogatory solves one of the paradoxes of supererogation. \n  \nAbout the Simon Lectures\nOne of the department’s several endowed lecture series\, the Jerome S. Simon Lectures are a biennial series of colloquia given by a philosopher of international distinction. After a brief hiatus\, we are thrilled to reinvigorate the series in 2021. Past Simon lecturers have included David Velleman (Michigan)\, David Wiggins (Oxford University)\, Anil Gupta (Pittsburgh)\, Barbara Herman (UCLA)\, John Campbell (UC-Berkeley)\, Donald Rutherford (UC-San Diego)\, Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck\, London)\, and Samuel Scheffler (NYU).
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/2021-jerome-s-simon-lectures-holly-smith-rutgers-university/
LOCATION:Ontario
CATEGORIES:Alumni,Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Holly-Smith-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210325T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210325T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20210319T020607Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210319T182737Z
UID:23797-1616684400-1616691600@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics\, and Mind Research Interest Group Talk (Jakob Hohwy\, Monash)
DESCRIPTION:The Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics\, and Mind Research Group welcomes Jakob Hohwy\, a professor in the Department of Philosophy at Monash University. Dr. Hohwy works at the intersections of philosophy\, psychology\, and neuroscience\, engaging in interdisciplinary work. \nJoin the meeting: \nhttps://utoronto.zoom.us/j/86005161881\n\nTalk Title\nConscious Self-Evidencing \nTalk Abstract\nSelf-evidencing describes the predictive processing of all self-organising systems\, whether conscious or not. Self-evidencing in itself is therefore not sufficient for consciousness. Different systems may\, however\, be capable of self-evidencing in different\, quite specific and distinct ways. Some of these ways of self-evidencing can be matched up with\, and explain\, specific properties of consciousness. This can carve out a distinction in nature between those systems that are conscious\, as described by these properties\, and those that are not. Many of the self-evidencing accounts throw new light on the properties of consciousness\, suggesting that there may indeed be conscious self-evidencing. \nAbout the Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics and Mind Research Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics and Mind Group undertakes research in philosophy of mind\, philosophy of cognitive science\, traditional and formal epistemology\, metaphysics\, and philosophy of language.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/lemm-interest-group-talk-jakob-hohwy-monash/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Jakob-Hohwy-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210326T100000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210326T120000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20201223T053840Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210324T144834Z
UID:23426-1616752800-1616760000@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Global Philosophy Group Talk (Sonam Kachru\, Virginia)
DESCRIPTION:The  Global Philosophy Research Interest Group is delighted to welcome Sonam Kachru as a guest speaker. Dr. Kachru is an assistant professor in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia.He is especially drawn to the philosophy of mind (consciousness\, attention\, imagination)\, metaphysics\, and philosophical anthropology. Professor Kachru’s first monograph (forthcoming with Columbia University Press) is titled Other Lives: Mind\, and World in Indian Buddhism. It offers a new interpretation of the Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu and the role of Buddhist cosmology in the Buddhist philosophy of mind. \nJoin the event at: \nhttps://utoronto.zoom.us/j/86122242320\n\nMeeting ID: 861 2224 2320\nPasscode: 867193 \n  \nTalk Title\nEngaging Meta-cognitive Practices: On the Uses (and Possible Abuse) of Meditation in Philosophy \nTalk Abstract\nIt is sometimes suggested that meditation must either provide epistemic access to deeper levels of reality (pertaining either to oneself or other parts of the world) or risk not having any direct relevance to philosophy. In the absence of any such epistemic payoff\, meditation might even be antithetical to philosophy. Here’s an argument: Philosophy is in the business of using thought to get at truth; meditation\, absent some unique epistemic payoff\, involves\, at best\, the mere manipulation of thought with alethically idle mechanisms aimed at non-philosophical ends. Call that the problem of irrelevance. At worst\, it may even be thought to involve the generation of carefully contrived illusions for therapeutic ends. Call that the problem of the epistemic costliness of meditation. But are there deeper or unique realities to be discovered by meditative experience? If not\, the problems of irrelevance or costliness might suggest that meditation does or not or even should not hold any relevance to philosophy\, except perhaps as a case study of possible and possibly misleading experiences. \nThe argument has been made using contemporary as well as premodern conceptual tools and perspectives. Here\, I push against the opening disjunction on the basis of meta-philosophical perspectives from premodern India. I resist two pictures: first\, the picture on which meditation must either have an epistemological role of providing access to facts or the accumulation of beliefs or no philosophically interesting role at all; and second\, the implicit picture of philosophy on which the above dilemma rests. On the view I propose\, meditation can involve varieties of metacognitive engagement with a range of contents and cognitive experiences; these engagements are transformative in different ways and may be pursued to different ends. Depending on how one defines philosophical practice\, some uses of the above metacognitive exercises can be assessed as being relevant to philosophy\, though we get different models for relevance based on whether we look to ancient philosophy in Greece and India\, medieval Indian philosophy\, or contemporary academic Anglophone philosophy.\nAbout the Global Philosophy Group\nThe Global Philosophy Research Interest Group explores the benefits of drawing on diverse traditions of thought in approaching philosophical questions. These include novel insights into familiar problems\, new questions and research directions\, and fresh methodologies. We work to deprovincialize and decolonize all aspects of philosophy in the academy. The group currently has strengths in Sanskrit philosophy\, and Chinese philosophy\, Indian philosophy in English\, and classical Islamic philosophy.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/global-philosophy-sonam-kachru-virginia/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Sonam-Kachru-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210326T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210326T150000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20200730T210640Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210226T155130Z
UID:22049-1616763600-1616770800@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Logic and Philosophy of Science Group Talk (Jo Wolff\, Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Philosophy of Science Group is pleased to welcome guest speaker Jo Wolff. Dr. Wolff became a senior lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh in 2019. Before joining Edinburgh\, Professor Wolff was a lecturer at King’s College London and an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at Hong Kong University. In addition\, Dr. Wolff is also a Humboldt Fellow at the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) in Germany. Dr. Wolff works primarily on questions in the philosophy of science and metaphysics\, with a current research focus on the metaphysics of quantities. Their scholarship also examines structural realism\, idiosyncratic aspects of the history of quantum mechanics\, and theories of laws of nature and causation. \nJoin the meeting: https://utoronto.zoom.us/j/89632021226 \nTalk Title\nQuantities Are Structures \nTalk Abstract\nWhat makes quantitative attributes like mass\, length or temperature special? I argue that to understand the metaphysics of quantities\, we have to understand quantities as structures. In this talk\, I’ll explain what I mean when I say quantities are structures\, what sorts of structures quantities are\, and why we should think of them as structures. The resulting view is a substantival structuralism about quantities. \nAbout the Logic and Philosophy of Science Group\nOne of five departmental Research Interest Groups\, the Logic and Philosophy of Science Group hosts talks on logic\, general philosophy of science\, and philosophy of the particular sciences\, as well as talks in allied areas such as formal epistemology\, decision theory\, and the metaphysics of science.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/logic-science-talk-jo-wolff-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Jo-Wolff-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210326T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210326T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T214126
CREATED:20201223T061329Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210326T020815Z
UID:23435-1616770800-1616778000@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Logic and Philosophy of Science Group Talk (Ted Sider\, Rutgers)
DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Philosophy of Science Group is pleased to welcome guest speaker Ted Sider\, Distinguished Professor and Andrew W. Mellon Chair in the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University. Dr. Sider specializes in metaphysics (time\, identity\, mereology\, modality\, supervenience\, fundamentality). He also has research and/or teaching interests in philosophy of language\, logic\, philosophy of logic\, philosophy of mathematics\, and philosophy of physics. \nJoin the meeting: \nhttps://utoronto.zoom.us/j/89632021226 \nTalk Title\nDeterminism and the Metaphysics of Quantity \nTalk Abstract\nMetaphysical accounts of quantitative properties—properties like mass and distance—have implications for the laws of nature in which those properties figure. An otherwise attractive fundamentality-centric approach to properties has unsettling implications of this sort. These implications emerge from David Baker’s argument that a comparativist metaphysics of quantity can lead to indeterminism in otherwise deterministic theories\, but are not limited to comparativism. \nAbout the Logic and Philosophy of Science Group\nOne of six departmental Research Interest Groups\, the Logic and Philosophy of Science Group hosts talks on logic\, general philosophy of science\, and philosophy of the particular sciences\, as well as talks in allied areas such as formal epistemology\, decision theory\, and the metaphysics of science.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/logic-science-talk-ted-sider-rutgers/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Ted-Sider-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
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