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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240401
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240403
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240213T230446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240319T145917Z
UID:30385-1711929600-1712102399@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Modern Philosophical Readings of the Book of Job
DESCRIPTION:Join us for an international conference on modern philosophical readings of the Book of Job. \nSchedule\nMonday\, April 1\n(Jackman Humanities Building\, 318)\n10:00-10:15 Opening remarks:  Michael Rosenthal (Toronto) and Ynon Wygoda (Toronto) \n10:15-11:30 José María Sánchez de León Serrano (Barcelona) \nThe God of Imagination: Spinoza’s Remarks on Job \n11:30-11:45 Break \n11:45-13:00 Willi Goetschel (Toronto) \nMargarete Susman and the Figure of Job  \n13:00-14:30 Lunch \n14:30-15:45 Thomas Schmidt (Frankfurt) \nThe Moralization of the Sacred: Jürgen Habermas’s Interpretation of the Book of Job \n15:45-16:00 Break \n16:00-17:30 Marci Shore (Yale) – ATCJS Talk (Jackman Humanities Building\, 100) \nHegel or Job: Reading Lev Shestov in Wartime Kyiv \n18:30 Conference Dinner for Participants \n  \nTuesday\, April 2\n(Jackman Humanities Building\, 318)\n9:30-10:45 Leora Batnitzky (Princeton) \nJustice and Creation: Thinking about Job in Light of Genesis and Ecclesiastes \n10:45-11:00 Break \n11:00-12:15 Ynon Wygoda (Toronto) \nMartin Buber and the Challenge of Translating Job’s Suffering \n12:15-13:30 Lunch \n13:30-14:45 Shira Billet (JTS) \nSuffering\, Moral Luck\, and Virtue in Hermann Cohen’s Reading of Job \n14:45-15:00 Break \n15:00-16:15 Nicolas de Warren (Penn State) \nMade a Fool Because of Job: Levinas\, Grossman\, and the Stupidity of Kindness \n16:15-16:30 Final Thoughts \n  \nThe organizers are grateful to the Grafstein Chair in Jewish Philosophy\, the Anne Tanenbaum Centre for Jewish Studies\, and the Department of Philosophy for their support of this conference.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/modern-philosophical-readings-of-the-book-of-job/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 318\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, ON\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Haim-Lifshitz-Job-Tel-Aviv-1929-courtesy-of-the-Thomas-Fisher-Rare-Book-Library-University-of-Toronto-Detail-for-Book-of-Job-Modern-Philosophical-Readings-conference.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240404T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240404T183000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240319T202112Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240322T153736Z
UID:30508-1712250000-1712255400@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Philosophy Career Night - Careers in Law
DESCRIPTION:Join us at the upcoming Philosophy Career Night\, Careers in Law. This is a great opportunity to discover the different career options available to you after graduation and what you can do now to prepare. This session will also allow you to interact with alumni during a moderated Q&A session. We also have an admission officer from U of T’s Faculty of Law available to answer your questions about the admissions process. \nPanelists\nRobin Basu\, General Counsel\, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General \nHelena Likwornik\, Judicial Research Lawyer\, Court of Appeal for Ontario \nJerome Poon-Ting\, Senior Recruitment\, Admissions and Diversity Outreach Officer \nModerated by Prof. Arthur Ripstein\, University Professor\, Law and Philosophy \nDate: April 4\, 2024\nTime: 5:00 pm – 6:30 pm\nLocation: Jackman Humanities Building\, 170 St. George Street\, Room 100 \nTo register\, please RSVP by email to Eric Correia. \nWe look forward to seeing you there!
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/philosophy-career-panel-careers-in-law-2/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 100 (Main Floor Lecture Hall)\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,Undergraduate
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/b2B-Law-April-2024-325-x-225-px.png
ORGANIZER;CN="Eric Correia":MAILTO:eric.correia@utoronto.ca
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240405T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240405T150000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20220810T220045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240319T164019Z
UID:27044-1712322000-1712329200@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics\, and Mind Research Interest Group Talk (Snow Xueyin Zhang\, Berkeley)
DESCRIPTION:The Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics\, and Mind Research Group welcomes Snow Xueyin Zhang\, an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at Berkeley. Dr. Zhang works on formal epistemology (particularly Bayesian)\, philosophy of probability\, and the philosophy of statistics. She is also interested in Chinese philosophy\, philosophy of mathematics\, and philosophy of cognitive science. \nTalk Title\nDeference Done Multiple Ways \nTalk Abstract\nWe defer to experts about questions of their expertise. But how should our opinion be constrained by information about the opinion of an expert? Two received answers in the literature are Total Reflection (Van Fraassen 1989; Gaifman 1986; Christensen 2010) and New Reflection (Hall 2004; Elga 2013). Recently\, some theorists have challenged these two answers on the ground that they either preclude rational modesty or permit anti-reliability (Pettigrew & Titelbaum 2014; Dorst et al. 2021; Levinstein 2023). This talk has two goals. First\, I argue that there are many kinds of epistemic experts\, and how one should defer to a given expert E depends on the kind of expert E is. Second\, I propose one way of classifying experts based on (i) the kind of practical decision problems that it is rational for the agent to coordinate with the expert and (ii) the manner of their coordination. One upshot of this taxonomy is that it uncovers some new deference principles and open questions that have not been investigated in the literature. \nAbout the Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics and Mind Research Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics and Mind Group undertakes research in philosophy of mind\, philosophy of cognitive science\, traditional and formal epistemology\, metaphysics\, and philosophy of language.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/lemm-interest-group-talk-snow-xueyin-zhang-berkeley/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 100 (Main Floor Lecture Hall)\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Snow-Zhang-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240408
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240410
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240322T174420Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240405T022725Z
UID:30534-1712534400-1712707199@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:2024 Undergraduate Philosophy Research Conference
DESCRIPTION:It’s that time of year again! Join us for the freshest ideas in undergraduate philosophy scholarship at the 2024 Undergraduate Philosophy Research Conference. Expect two days of insight\, discussion\, and community. \nAs special guest and keynote speaker\, we are excited to welcome Kym Maclaren\, an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Toronto Metropolitan University. Dr. Maclaren’s areas of expertise include phenomenology\, existentialism\, 20th-century French philosophy (especially Merleau-Ponty)\, the philosophy of mind and embodiment\, philosophical psychology\, and social philosophy. Dr. Maclaren also founded the Transformative Justice Project (TJP) at Ryerson University (now TMU)\, in collaboration with community organizations. \nThe keynote is entitled “Finding or Losing Oneself through Belonging? The Totalizing Dangers of Community\,” and will be given 5-7 PM on Monday\, April 8\, 2024. \nSchedule\nMonday\, April 8 (JHB 100)\n9:00-10:00 \nCoffee and Pastries \n10:00-11:00 \n“Castles\, Colonies\, and Canada: On the Phenomenology of Multiculturalism” \nSalem Kakish \n11:00-12:00 \n“The Force of Experience: A Peircean Response to Radical Internal World Skepticism” \nDihan Niloy \n12:00-1:00 \n“Numbers That Matter: Counting Lives and Persons” \nJoseph Boyce \n1:00-2:00 \nLunch \n2:00-4:00 \nBreak for solar eclipse (maximum coverage: 3:19) \n4:00-5:00 \n“The Phenomenological Experience of Buddhist Meditation” \nMridula Sathyanarayanan \n5:00-7:00 \nKeynote: “Finding or Losing Oneself through Belonging? The Totalizing Dangers of Community” \nKym Mclaren (TMU) \n\nTuesday\, April 9 (JHB 418)\n9:00-10:00 \nCoffee and Pastries \n10:00-11:00 \n“Does Parmenides Save the Theory of Forms from Its Greatest Difficulty?” \nEvelyn Rose Maude \n11:00-12:00 \n“The Spontaneous Destruction of Everything: Vasubandhu on Momentariness” \nAleksi Toiviainen \n12:00-1:00 \nLunch \n1:00-2:00 \n“Fragments and Limbs: Is Unity Enough for Nietzschean Freedom?” \nLuca Bon \n2:00-3:00 \n“Can Vigilantism be a Form of Civil Disobedience? Understanding Organized Violence as a Communicative Act” \nOlivia Sun \n3:00-4:00 \n“Sexual Liberalism as Wantonism: A Frankfurtian Defense of Srinivasan’s Politics of Desire” \nLouis Chiu \n4:00-5:00 \n“Is Descartes’s Ontological Argument Circular?” \nSiwon Yoo
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/2024-undergraduate-philosophy-research-conference/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 100 & Room 418
CATEGORIES:St. George,Undergraduate,UTM,UTSC
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024-UG-Philosophy-Research-Conference-event-image.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240408T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240408T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240110T175848Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240212T162646Z
UID:29966-1712588400-1712595600@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Continental Philosophy Research Group Talk (Igor Shoikhedbrod\, St. Francis Xavier)
DESCRIPTION:The Continental Philosophy Research Group is pleased to welcome as guest speaker Igor Shoikhedbrod\, an assistant professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at St. Francis Xavier University. Prior to his appointment at St. Francis Xavier University\, Dr. Shoikhedbrod taught courses in political theory\, legal theory\, ethics\, law\, and political economy at Dalhousie University\, as well as at the University of Toronto\, where he won two awards for teaching excellence. He is the author of Revisiting Marx’s Critique of Liberalism: Rethinking Justice\, Legality and Rights (Palgrave Macmillan\, 2019)\, as well as of several scholarly articles in Contemporary Political Theory\, the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence\, Critical Analysis of Law\, Critical Horizons\, the Hegel Bulletin\, the Owl of Minerva\, and the Marx and Philosophy Review of Books. Dr Shoikhedbrod is currently at work on a second book project focusing on global financial capitalism and the crises of legal form. \nTalk Title\nJürgen Habermas: The “Last Marxist”? \nTalk Abstract\nJürgen Habermas’s recent engagement with Marx in Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie has mostly gone unnoticed by commentators. Habermas is among the few representatives of the Frankfurt School who has consistently stressed the importance of the “Marxian heritage” for a rigorous understanding of critical theory. In this talk\, I critically examine two guiding threads in Habermas’s ongoing reconstruction of historical materialism: the relationship between labor and interaction\, as well as the emancipatory potential unleashed by the democratic constitutional state. I argue that Habermas’s reconstruction of historical materialism points to several lacunae in Marx’s work\, but that it also reveals valuable insights into the latter’s oeuvre that have yet to be adequately addressed by Habermas. I conclude that it is time for Habermas to consciously reclaim the “Marxian heritage.”  \nAbout the Continental Philosophy Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Continental Philosophy Group works in the traditions of textual interpretation of human consciousness\, phenomenology\, and post-structuralist critical theory\, among other related traditions of thought.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/continental-philosophy-research-group-talk-igor-shoikhedbrod-st-francis-xavier/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/igot-shoikhedbrod-philosophy-utoronto-guest-lecturer.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240411T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240411T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240116T173729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240321T183723Z
UID:30007-1712847600-1712854800@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Continental Philosophy Research Group Talk (Sophie-Jan Arrien\, Laval)
DESCRIPTION:The Continental Philosophy Research Group is pleased to welcome as guest speaker Sophie-Jan Arrien\, a professor of Philosophy at the Université Laval. Her research focuses on phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, aesthetics\, German\, and French philosophy\, with a particular interest in the work of Martin Heidegger\, Edmund Husserl\, and Paul Ricoeur. Dr. Arrien won the Canadian Philosophical Association Book Prize in 2015 and the  Excellence in Teaching Prize for graduate supervision in November 2018. Her books include Heidegger aujourd’hui: Actualité et postérité de sa pensée de l’événement (Paris: Hermann\, 2021; with Christian Sommer) and the award-winning L’inquiétude de la pensée: L’herméneutique de la vie du jeune Heidegger (Paris: PUF\, 2014). \nDr. Arrien will give a lecture on April 11\, as well as an all-day workshop on April 12. Please contact Tarek Dika to register and for more information. \nTalk Title\nFrom Facticity to Event: The Transformation of Hermeneutics in Heidegger’s Philosophy \nTalk Abstract\nIn this paper\, I examine the transformation of the Heideggerian interpretative gesture in relation to philosophical texts. Using the concepts of hermeneutics and destruction\, I attempt to see what links Heidegger’s thinking before Being and Time to his thinking on the Event in the 1930s\, while identifying what has been philosophically lost in this evolution. I argue that it moves from being a “phenomenological destruction” (in the 1920s)\, where interpretation is linked to the experience of positive phenomena (history\, self\, faith\, existence) to a “poïetical destruction” (in the 1930s) turned towards a history “to come” and linked to an “original experience of the people” that disregards the positivity of phenomena. From then on\, Heidegger’s philosophy threatens to sink into a form of hybris (or excess) by overstepping the constitutive finitude of any hermeneutics worthy of the name. \n\nAbout the Continental Philosophy Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Continental Philosophy Group works in the traditions of textual interpretation of human consciousness\, phenomenology\, and post-structuralist critical theory\, among other related traditions of thought.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/continental-philosophy-research-group-talk-sophie-jan-arrien-laval/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/sophie-jan-arrien-philosophy-utoronto-guest-lecturer.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240412T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240412T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240116T213046Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240116T214834Z
UID:30027-1712934000-1712941200@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:History of Philosophy Research Group Talk (Antonia LoLordo\, Virginia)
DESCRIPTION:The History of Modern Philosophy Group is pleased to welcome as its guest speaker Antonia LoLordo\, George C. and Clare F. Downing Memorial Professor of Philosophy and the chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. Dr. LoLordo works on 17th- and 18th-century European philosophy\, with a special interest in figures such as Gassendi\, Locke\, and Shepherd and topics such as causation\, freedom\, rationality\, and canon formation. She co-founded and now co-edits the Journal of Modern Philosophy. \nTalk Title\n“The Power of Motion as a Sixth Sense”: Shepherd on Bodily Awareness and Knowledge of the External World \nTalk Abstract\n\nMary Shepherd argues that the power of motion acts as a sixth organ of sense and that our awareness of the motion of our bodies plays an ineliminable role in achieving knowledge of the external world.  My goal in this paper is to explain how Shepherd conceives of what we now think of as proprioception and explain how it contributes to knowledge of the external world\, against the background of predecessors like Berkeley\, Condillac\, and Reid. \n\nOne of six departmental Research Interest Groups\, the History of Philosophy Group explores topics in ancient and/or medieval philosophy\, the period from Descartes to Kant\, and Jewish philosophy from the medieval period to the 20th century.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/history-philosophy-group-talk-antonia-lolordo-virginia/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/antonia-lolordo-philosophy-utoronto-guest-lecturer.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240415T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240415T180000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240320T175654Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T194335Z
UID:30514-1713196800-1713204000@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Continental Philosophy Research Group Talk (Bara Kolenc\, Ljubljana)
DESCRIPTION:The Continental Philosophy Research Group is pleased to welcome as guest speaker Bara Kolenc\, a research associate at the Department of Philosophy of the Faculty of Arts\, University of Ljubljana. She is affiliated with the Ljubljana School of Psychoanalysis and currently serves as the president of the International Hegelian Association Aufhebung. Her works include Repetition and Enactment (DTP Analecta 2014\, in Slovenian) and the forthcoming Repetition and Subjectivity: Kierkegaard\, Freud\, Lacan. Currently\, she is at work on her new book The Spectacle of Instanternity: Voyeurism and Exhibitionism on the Internet. \nTalk Title\nThe Reciprocal Alienation of the Spectacle of Instanternity: Debord\, Lacan\, and the Internet \nTalk Abstract\nFrom the moment of the emergence of the digital\, the actual world cannot be separated from its determinate negation as the non-digital. In the digital age\, the pre-digital turns into a myth. At the same time\, in its striving to take supremacy over the actual physical existence as something that needs to be sublated (say\, with multi-sensory technologies)\, the digital virtual can only exist in relation to the non-digital actual. Only in this sense – and not in the sense of a nostalgic idealization of “real life” as some primordial harmonic relation between the individual and the world\, which has allegedly become lost forever throughout the industrial and post-industrial processes of alienation – should we understand Debord’s statement that the spectacle is a “visible negation of life.” I have coined the notion of “instanternity” to give a name to the emerging spectacle of the Internet. I will explain the choice of this name during my presentation. What I want to pursue in this lecture\, however\, are the shifts\, the minimal structural and phenomenal leaps triggered by the outspread of the digital virtual\, which\, even if they might not be immediately recognizable as the “break” with reality as it was (before digitalization)\, they nevertheless break with reality as it was. Specifically\, I will focus on the effects of digital transformation on the constitution of subjectivity within the visual realm – drawing on Lacan’s theories of the mirror stage and the scopic drive. \nAbout the Continental Philosophy Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Continental Philosophy Group works in the traditions of textual interpretation of human consciousness\, phenomenology\, and post-structuralist critical theory\, among other related traditions of thought.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/continental-philosophy-research-group-talk-bara-kolenc-ljubljana/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Bara-Kolenc-philosophy-utoronto-guest-lecturer.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240416T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240416T180000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240320T193912Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T193912Z
UID:30517-1713283200-1713290400@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Continental Philosophy Research Group Talk (Gregor Moder\, Ljubljana)
DESCRIPTION:The Continental Philosophy Research Group is pleased to welcome as guest speaker Gregor Moder\, a senior research associate at the Department of Philosophy of the Faculty of Arts\, University of Ljubljana. He co-founded Aufhebung—International Hegelian Association\, based in Ljubljana\, and served as its first president (2014–2020). His works include Hegel and Spinoza: Substance and Negativity (Northwestern UP 2017)\, an edited volume on The Object of Comedy (Palgrave Macmillan 2020)\, and most recently Antigone. An Essay on Hegel’s Political Philosophy (FDV 2023\, in Slovenian; German translation forthcoming with Turia+Kant in 2024). \nTalk Title\nHegel’s Antigone: Brothers and Sisters \nTalk Abstract\nIn her final monologue\, Sophocles’s Antigone delivers a surprising justification of the law that guided her to defy Creon’s decree and bury her brother Polyneices. She claims that she risked her life only for her brother’s body\, and that she would leave a husband’s or a child’s body to molder unburied. These words have always puzzled interpreters. In this talk\, we shall claim that Hegel’s chapter on ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read precisely as an attempt to give a metaphysical and ethical account of Antigone’s last words\, which is why the relationship between brother and sister becomes the pivotal relationship not only of Hegel’s understanding of the family\, but also of the polity and the substance of ethical life itself. This is a major difference that sets the understanding of Antigone in Phenomenology apart from the ones in Philosophy of Right and Aesthetics. Furthermore\, we shall argue that the way in which Antigone formulates her demand to bury her brother becomes the paradigmatic example of how a historical transformation of the world is possible. \nAbout the Continental Philosophy Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Continental Philosophy Group works in the traditions of textual interpretation of human consciousness\, phenomenology\, and post-structuralist critical theory\, among other related traditions of thought.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/continental-philosophy-research-group-talk-gregor-moder-ljubljana/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/gregor-moder-philosophy-utoronto-guest-lecturer.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240419T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240419T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240320T210340Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240419T134602Z
UID:30523-1713538800-1713546000@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:CANCELLED---Global Philosophy Research Interest Group Talk (Curie Virág\, Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:Please note that the talk today has had to be cancelled due to illness. It will be rescheduled at a later date. \nThe Global Philosophy Research Interest Group is delighted to welcome as guest speaker Curie Virág\, who will take her position as an associate professor in World Philosophy at the University of Warwick later this year. She is a specialist in the philosophy and intellectual history of early and middle period China\, and in the cross-cultural study of thought and learned traditions in premodern cultures. She has previously worked at the University of Toronto\, Central European University\, and the University of Edinburgh\, where she served as co-director and co-investigator of PAIXUE\, a multi-year research project funded by the European Research Council on the cross-cultural study of classicizing learning in Byzantium and China. She has published numerous articles on the conceptual history and ethics of emotions in the pre-Qin and Song periods\, particularly in relation to cognition\, practical reasoning\, moral agency and self-cultivation. She is the author of The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy (Oxford\, 2017) and co-editor\, with Douglas Cairns\, of In the Mind\, in the Body and in the World: Emotions in Early China and Ancient Greece (Oxford\, forthcoming). \nThis is an in-person event\, but you can join the livestream. \nPasscode: 777591 \nTalk Title\nCosmic and Human Agency in the Daodejing \nTalk Abstract\nIt has often been argued that the Daodejing\, with its emphasis on non-action (wuwei 無為) and spontaneity (ziran 自然)\, does not recognize agency as a normative ideal for human beings – that the human ideal is precisely one who is not an agent. But there is a significant case to be made for reading the Daodejing as not only recognizing agency as an important feature of its ideal conception of the human being\, but also as centrally concerned with the enhancement of human agency. Thus\, even if the conception and framing of human agency in the Daodejing is premised on different criteria from those that have been salient in certain canonical approaches in the modern western philosophical tradition—such as autonomy\, engagement in rational deliberation\, self-motion—we can nevertheless identify in the Daodejing a meaningful\, normative account of human agency. This paper develops an account of human agency in the Daodejing that is premised on the attributes of responsiveness\, adaptability\, and alignment with the patterns and processes of the cosmos\, highlighting the way in which the human agent is embedded in a web of relations with other beings and is interdependent with the world. Such attributes\, it will be shown\, do not eliminate the possibility of agency but represent the inescapable fact that human beings are situated in the world\, and are faced with the predicament of navigating its complex forces in a way that is favorable. Moreover\, it emphasizes that human agency in the Daodejing is not limited to the sphere of practical action but\, crucially\, extends to the realm of cognition as well\, and argues that the Daodejing offers a robust account of agency in a cognitive and evaluative sense. The text thus forwards an ideal vision of the human agent that is marked by a capacity for perspicacious understanding (ming 明) and right forms of volition. This dimension of ideal human agency is inseparable from the much-emphasized practical and prescriptive orientation of the text. \nThe Global Philosophy Research Interest Group explores the benefits of drawing on diverse traditions of thought in approaching philosophical questions. These include novel insights into familiar problems\, new questions and research directions\, and fresh methodologies. We work to deprovincialize and decolonize all aspects of philosophy in the academy. The group currently has strengths in Sanskrit philosophy\, and Chinese philosophy\, Indian philosophy in English\, and classical Islamic philosophy.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/global-philosophy-research-interest-group-talk-curie-virag-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240420
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240422
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240410T212145Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240417T230525Z
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SUMMARY:Recent Work on Aristotle's "De anima": Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Please join us for a two-day workshop considering recent work on Aristotle’s De anima. \nSchedule\nSaturday\, April 20\n9:30-11:30 \nLéa Derome\, “The Perceptual Mean of DA II 11” \nWith comments by Alexander de Guzman \nAbstract: In De anima II 11\, Aristotle develops what has been called his “theory of the perceptual mean\,” claiming that the sensory faculty is “a sort of mean” (oion mesotēs) and that “the middle is capable of discrimination” (to meson kritikon). To clarify the implications of this theory for Aristotle’s account of sensation\, this paper makes three interpretive claims. First\, it argues that by calling the sensory faculty a mesotēs\, Aristotle indicates that it functions as a regulating principle responsible for keeping the sense-organ in an intermediate state despite the agency of sensible objects. Second\, it claims that this intermediate state should not be understood on the model of an arithmetic mean\, but\, more elastically\, as falling between the relevant extremes. Lastly\, it is argued that this characterization of the sensory faculty as a mesotēs is developed to account for the particularities of the sense of touch–the only sense whose organ cannot be free from the properties it discriminates–and applies only derivatively to the other sensory modalities. \n11:45-1:15 \nMark A. Johnstone\, “Aristotle and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction” \nAbstract: In his De Anima and elsewhere\, Aristotle distinguishes between “special perceptibles” (idia aisthêta) such as colours\, flavours\, and sounds\, which can be perceived by only one sense\, and “common perceptibles” (koina aisthêta) such as shapes\, sizes\, and movements\, which can be perceived by more than one sense. In extension\, this distinction overlaps to a striking degree with the today more familiar distinction between “primary” and “secondary” qualities\, which became popular in the 17th century following the work of thinkers such as Boyle and Locke (see e.g. Nolan ed. 2011)\, and which arguably originated with Aristotle’s atomist predecessors such as Democritus (see e.g. O’Keefe 1997). Yet the two distinctions have very different bases: Aristotle’s distinction – which remained influential throughout the medieval period (see Pasnau 2011) – marks the mode of access to the qualities (via one sense or many)\, whereas the primary/secondary quality distinction\, although developed in different ways by different thinkers in the early modern period\, always rests in some way on the idea that some perceptible qualities are more ontologically fundamental features of the mind-independent world than others. What exactly is the relationship between these two distinctions\, given their similar extensions? \nIn this paper\, I argue that Aristotle’s special/common perceptibles distinction marks not only a difference in mode of access to perceptible qualities\, but also\, like the primary/secondary quality distinction\, a difference in how perceptible qualities belong to bodies. However\, I also argue\, while both distinctions track how perceptible qualities belong to bodies\, the Aristotelian distinction\, unlike the early modern primary/secondary quality distinction\, does not entail a difference in ontological fundamentality. For Aristotle\, both kinds of perceptible qualities are equally “real” and mind-independent features of bodies. To understand how this can be so\, we need to understand some basic features of Aristotle’s theory of chemistry\, especially his theory of homoiomerous (“like-parted” or “uniform”) bodies. But essentially\, I argue\, Aristotle thought special perceptibles\, unlike common perceptibles\, belong to bodies in virtue of their chemical composition. Since for him the chemical properties of compounds do not reduce to the size and shape of their component parts\, special perceptibles do not depend on common perceptibles. Nor do common perceptibles depend on special perceptibles; for the size and shape of a body needn’t depend on the kind of “stuff” from which it is composed. Hence\, both Aristotle’s special/common perceptible distinction and the primary/second quality distinction reflect differences in how qualities belong to bodies. This explains the similarity in their extension. Yet for Aristotle\, the most interesting thing about this distinction is not an ontological hierarchy of qualities in the world it undergirds\, but rather how we (and other animals) discern these different features of the world\, given the workings of perception. \n2:30-4:30 \nAshley Attwood\, “Mapping Out the Philosophical Landscape: The Task of De anima 1.2” \nWith comments by Faisal Bhabha \nAbstract: Following a series of programmatic remarks\, Aristotle conducts a thorough examination of what his predecessors said about the soul in DA 1.2-1.5. He conducts this preliminary study in two stages: in 1.2\, Aristotle catalogs the received definitions of the soul by organizing them and their proponents into groups. Then for the remainder of the review (1.3-1.5)\, Aristotle appraises a subset of the views identified in the initial inventory. Most think the significance of DA 1.2 is either pedagogical or historical\, in that it doesn’t play a significant role in Aristotle’s investigation. However\, in this paper\, I argue that Aristotle systematically classifies the accounts of soul proposed by his predecessors in order to map out the philosophical landscape according to three definitional routes\, all expressed by way of the same four-part argumentative pattern. The purpose of this preliminary exercise is to establish three argumentative tracks\, which Aristotle thinks underly roughly all of his predecessors’ theorizing about the soul. I conclude\, somewhat more speculatively\, by suggesting that in the remainder of the review of predecessors (1.3-1.5) Aristotle is in fact showing all three of these tracks to be mistaken\, ultimately for the same general reason (i.e. making the soul an element/from the elements— a material (though not necessarily corporeal) archê). \n4:45-6:15 \nJessica Gelber and Emily Kress\, “Living\, Living Well\, and Scientific Method” \nAbstract: As he does in De Anima III.12-13\, Aristotle sometimes draws a distinction between attributes of living beings\, such as vital capacities\, that are possessed by a kind “for the sake of living” (or “being”) and those that are possessed “for the sake of living well” (or “well-being”). This talk is about (1) what that distinction amounts to\, and (2) what Aristotle’s purpose in drawing it is. Our focus will largely be on (2): we suggest that the distinction is playing a particular methodological role\, one which we can see Aristotle employing elsewhere in his biological investigations. The “living”/”living well” contrast is not meant to divide a kind’s attributes according to whether they are present for one end or the other\, but rather is an application of a procedure that aims to discover what the essence of the kind is. Viewing the distinction in this way\, moreover\, will have implications for how one answers the first question\, so we will also say something about how we depart from extant views about (1). \n  \nSunday\, April 21\n10:30-12 \nNathanael Stein\, “Phantasia and the Argument of De anima III 3” \nAbstract: De Anima III 3 and its discussion of phantasia present a series of interlocking puzzles\, local and global. There are local puzzles about the text and about what the discussion is doing here; there are interpretive and philosophical questions of what phantasia actually is\, its role in Aristotle’s “cognitive economy\,” and the consistency of his claims both within the chapter and in relation to other works.  Finally\, there are puzzles about the broader philosophical context: on the one hand\, Aristotle is sometimes interpreted as changing the subject\, or introducing a different use of the term ‘phantasia’ in relation to earlier ones; on the other\, it is sometimes claimed that it is anachronistic and mistaken to read III 3 as a discussion of imagination in a sense we can recognize. If both of these are true\, Aristotle’s discussion is philosophically disconnected from both what came before and what came after\, even if there is some continuity as a matter of historical fact. This would be unfortunate\, especially since the chapter contains a series of arguments against a clearly Platonic view\, expressed in the Sophist\, that phantasia is a kind of opinion (doxa) combined with or arising from perception. If Aristotle takes himself to be arguing against a view rather than introducing a novel sense of the term\, we should at least aim to understand the argument he takes himself to be making. \nHere I start with some of the local problems\, and show the consequences of my solution for the more global ones. I first offer a reconstruction of the chapter and its argument in light of what I take to be its principle aim: effecting the transition from the discussion of perception to the discussion of thought\, in particular by blocking claims that would blunt the distinction. I argue that this aim directs and constrains the discussion of phantasia more than has been appreciated. In effect\, I wish to separate the question of why Aristotle “needs” phantasia—i.e. its role in his cognitive economy—from the reason he thinks he needs to talk about it in III 3\, and argue that this separation will both clarify the argument and his view of phantasia itself. \nAs I interpret the chapter\, phantasia comes into the picture twice\, in relation to two distinct arguments with the same overarching goal..  It first enters the discussion indirectly at 427b14 in relation to what he takes to be an ancient view that perception and thinking are essentially the same\, and then becomes the focus of a direct account starting at 427b27\, but only because “one part [of thinking] seems to be phantasia\, and the other part judgment (hupolêpsis)”—that is\, its connection to thinking needs clarification and may present an obstacle\, depending on how intimate that connection turns out to be.  \nI will take the two parts in turn\, in order to clarify what Aristotle has concluded about phantasia and its consequences for his account of it. I then turn to a more detailed examination of the arguments against the Platonic view\, in order to show how Aristotle is disagreeing with Plato and why\, which will in turn help situate Aristotelian phantasia in the broader philosophical movement from appearance to imagination. \n1:30-3:00 \nKrisanna Scheiter\, “Potential Nous in Aristotle’s De anima 3.4” \nAbstract: Aristotle says in DA 3.4 that part of the soul he calls nous is a “sort of potentiality” but in “actuality [it is] none of the things which are before it reasons” (DA 3.4 429a). If nous is not a capacity that operates through a specific bodily organ and it is in fact nothing except for the potential to reason and understand\, we have to wonder exactly what sort of capacity is nous? The common view is that reasoning involves nous being acted upon by intelligible objects\, but what does it mean for a capacity that is pure potentiality to be “acted upon” by intelligible objects. The aim of this paper is to explain Aristotle’s account of nous as a pure potentiality and understand how nous grasps its objects. To do so\, I will draw on Aristotle’s description of mathematical objects in his Metaphysics. Specifically I will focus on Aristotle’s explanation of mathematical points\, which we will see has a very special sort of existence and function that will help us understand his account of nous. Aristotle claims that points exist as pure potentialities of lines\, but are not part of lines and they do not exist separate from lines. They have a very special sort of existence\, he claims. They exist as divisions of lines. I will argue that similarly nous also acts as a kind of divider. I will argue that through the faculty of phantasia we form unified experiences by recognizing similarities in our perceptual experiences. Nous\, I claim\, is the capacity to recognize in our unified experiences the differentia that makes one unified experience essentially different from all the others. \n  \nParticipants\n\nAshley Attwood (Stanford)\nFaisal Bhabha (Toronto)\nLéa Derome (Toronto)\nJessica Gelber (Toronto)\nAlexander de Guzman (Toronto)\nMark Johnstone (McMaster)\nJoseph Karbowski (PNC)\nEmily Kress (Brown)\nKrisanna Scheiter (Union College)\nNathanael Stein (Florida State)\n\n  \nA day of lead-in sessions will precede the workshop on Friday\, April 19\, 2024. These sessions will occur in JHB 401 and JHB 418. \nLead-In Participants\n(all from the University of Toronto) \n\nDiego Bay-Cheung \nSamuel Boudreau\nCal Fried\nHikmat Jamal\nYi-Cheng Lin\nDuncan McCallum\nSooyoung Moon\nAlex Rose\nJason Singer\n\nThis event is generously supported by the Department of Philosophy and the Collaborative Specialization in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (CSAMP).
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/recent-work-on-aristotles-de-anima-workshop/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,Undergraduate
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240425T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240425T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171807
CREATED:20240116T180904Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240424T163408Z
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SUMMARY:CANCELLED---Continental Philosophy Research Group Talk (Joseph K. Schear\, Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Unfortunately\, this talk has had to be cancelled and will be rescheduled for the fall of 2024. \nThe Continental Philosophy Research Group is pleased to welcome as guest speaker Joseph K. Schear\, a regular faculty member in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. Dr. Schear is interested in post-Kantian European philosophy\, especially phenomenology (Husserl\, Heidegger\, Sartre\, Merleau-Ponty); philosophy of mind (esp. the theory of intentionality); and some issues in metaphysics. Before moving to Oxford in 2008\, he worked for two years as an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at California Polytechnic State University\, San Luis Obispo. He is currently working on a book manuscript titled “Horizons of Intentionality: From Husserl to Heidegger.” \nDr. Schear will give a lecture on April 25\, as well as an all-day workshop on April 26. Please contact Tarek Dika to register and for more information. \nTalk Title\nSartre and the Problem of Others \nTalk Abstract\nJean-Paul Sartre claims in Being and Nothingness that “‘being-seen-by-the-Other’ is the truth of ‘seeing-the-Other’.” What does this claim mean? Is Sartre’s argument for it persuasive? I address the first question by juxtaposing Sartre’s approach to the problem of the other\, centered on “the Look\,” with Edith Stein’s approach\, focusing in particular on the place of ‘reiterated empathy’ in her theory. After reconstructing Sartre’s argument\, I offer an assessment. If Sartre is right that to understand an other as other is to understand her first and foremost as a free being\, being seen by the other is plausibly understood as ‘the truth’ of seeing the other. \nAbout the Continental Philosophy Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Continental Philosophy Group works in the traditions of textual interpretation of human consciousness\, phenomenology\, and post-structuralist critical theory\, among other related traditions of thought.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/continental-philosophy-research-group-talk-joseph-schear-oxford/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
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