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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20230414T130000
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DTSTAMP:20260421T014257
CREATED:20221103T180844Z
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SUMMARY:Global Philosophy Research Interest Group Talk (Joey Miller\, West Chester)
DESCRIPTION:The Global Philosophy Research Interest Group is delighted to welcome as guest speaker Joseph Len “”Joey” Miller\, an assistant professor of Philosophy at West Chester University. Dr. Miller specializes in Native American philosophy and ethics. As an enrolled member of Muscogee Nation\, his research focuses on understanding the ethical frameworks of his ancestors and how these frameworks have been adapted to address settler colonialism. His work has been published\, among other places\, in the Journal of Value Inquiry and Philosophical Studies. \nJoin Zoom meeting: https://utoronto.zoom.us/j/84240136773\nPasscode: 064862\nTalk Title\nVeganism as Indigenous Futurity: A Native American Justification for Veganism \nTalk Abstract\nPrior to colonization\, non-human animal products were a prominent component of Native American diets and food pathways. This practice seems to require little justification because such practices were done for survival (i.e.\, out of necessity). However\, there were still expectations and standards for how non-human animals were hunted and consumed that demonstrated non-human animals having “moral status.” Contemporary Native American diets\, similarly\, may justify the consumption of non-human animals by referencing survival – of both their people and their ways of life. In either case\, the consumption of non-human animals seems to require justification. Given how embedded the consumption of non-human animals is within Native American cultures/values\, there seems to be a tension between adhering to Native American cultures/values and ceasing to consume non-human animal products. Natives for whom the aforementioned justifications don’t apply\, may be pressed to justify the claim that they shouldn’t consume non-human animal products. In this talk\, I’ll offer an illustration of what a justification for veganism would look within a Native American ethical framework. To do this\, I’ll be using the concept of futurity to explain how ceasing or refusing to engage in contemporary practices typically used to consume non-human animals can help exhibit and preserve Native American values. \nThe Global Philosophy Research Interest Group explores the benefits of drawing on diverse traditions of thought in approaching philosophical questions. These include novel insights into familiar problems\, new questions and research directions\, and fresh methodologies. We work to deprovincialize and decolonize all aspects of philosophy in the academy. The group currently has strengths in Sanskrit philosophy\, and Chinese philosophy\, Indian philosophy in English\, and classical Islamic philosophy.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/global-philosophy-research-interest-group-talk-joey-miller-west-chester/
LOCATION:Online
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Joey-Miller-utoronto-philosophy-guest.jpg
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DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20230421T170000
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CREATED:20230327T155356Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230328T200312Z
UID:28357-1682089200-1682096400@philosophy.utoronto.ca
SUMMARY:Ethics and Political Philosophy Group Talk (Christopher M. Howard\, McGill)
DESCRIPTION:The Ethics and Political Philosophy Research Group is pleased to welcome as guest speaker Christopher M. Howard\, an assistant professor of Philosophy at McGill University. Dr. Howard works mostly at the intersection of normative ethics and metaethics\, but he also enjoys writing and talking about issues in political philosophy\, moral psychology\, and the history of ethics. Increasingly\, he has also become interested in issues surrounding the ethics of technology\, particularly those to do with virtual and mixed reality. \nTalk Title\nGoodness Is Relative \nTalk Abstract\nIt’s widely held that goodness and betterness (simpliciter) are impartial\, agent-neutral evaluative properties. I argue that we should reject this and hold instead that they’re fundamentally agent-relative\, such that whenever something is good or better\, it’s good or better relative to some person or group. Holding that betterness is relative rather than neutral provides the best answer to a puzzle about fitting partiality. Plausibly\, it can be fitting to be partial in our valuing attitudes. For example\, even if all else is equal\, it’s fitting for me to prefer the outcome where my partner is saved over the incompatible outcome where yours is. But if betterness is agent-neutral\, the former outcome isn’t better. So if betterness is neutral\, it can be fitting for me to prefer an outcome that isn’t better. But that seems false: what’s better is what’s preferable and what’s preferable is what’s fitting to prefer. The answer is to reject that betterness is agent-neutral. The outcome where my partner is saved is better relative to me; the outcome where yours is saved is better relative to you. Hence\, it’s fitting for me to prefer the former and for you to prefer the latter. It follows that goodness is relative\, too. \nAbout the Ethics and Political Philosophy Group\nThe Ethics and Political Philosophy Group meets periodically throughout the year to discuss topics in value theory and related fields\, including meta-ethics\, normative ethics\, applied ethics\, social and political philosophy\, philosophy of law\, moral psychology\, practical reason\, agency\, and identity.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/ethics-and-political-philosophy-group-talk-chris-howard-mcgill/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George
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