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SUMMARY:Colloquium (Ralph Wedgwood\, Southern California)
DESCRIPTION:As speaker for our Fall 2024 colloquium\, the department is delighted to welcome Ralph Wedgwood\, a professor of Philosophy and the director of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. Dr. Wedgwood works in ethics and epistemology\, more specifically\, in metaethics\, practical reason\, normative ethical theory\, and the history of ethics. Before coming to USC\, he was a professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. \nThis is an in-person event\, but those unable to come to campus may join via Zoom. \nTalk Title\nIntending the Improbable \nTalk Abstract\n\nOne reason why it can be irrational to intend a course of action is if it is clearly a bad thing to do – that is\, clearly inferior to an alternative that one has thought of and rationally regards as available. Another reason why an intention can be irrational – even if the intended course of action would be better than every alternative – is if it is highly improbable that one will take that course of action even if one intends to. How do these two dimensions of rationality relate to each other? \nSome philosophers suggest that it is rational to intend a course of action only if it is conditionally certain that one will take the course of action if one intends to. Others suggest that the “options” that must have maximal expected value if an intention is to be rational must always be “acts of will” rather than external courses of action. Neither of these views is acceptable. A different proposal is defended: these two dimensions of the rationality of intentions must simply be in a way balanced against each other. This proposal turns out to have illuminating consequences about the nature of practical rationality.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/colloquium-ralph-wedgwood-usc/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 100 (Main Floor Lecture Hall)\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Alumni,Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20241011T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20241011T150000
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CREATED:20241011T133018Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241011T133018Z
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SUMMARY:Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics\, and Mind Research Interest Group Talk (Declan Smithies\, Ohio State)
DESCRIPTION:The Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics\, and Mind Research Group welcomes Declan Smithies\, a professor in the Department of Philosophy at Ohio State University. He works primarily on issues in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His book\, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness\, was published with Oxford University Press in September\, 2019. He has also co-edited two volumes of essays: Introspection and Consciousness (Oxford\, 2012) and Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays (Oxford\, 2011). \nThis is an in-person event\, but you are also welcome to join the talk via Zoom.  \nTalk Title\nValenced Experience and the Epistemology of Value \nTalk Abstract\nWhat epistemic role does valenced experience play in justifying our beliefs about value? According to the perceptual model\, valenced experience justifies beliefs about value in much the same way that perceptual experience justifies beliefs about color\, shape\, and motion. The perceptual model generates plausible verdicts in some cases: for example\, feeling aversion to the painful condition of your foot justifies believing that this painful condition is bad for you without needing any justification itself. In other cases\, however\, the perceptual model generates implausible verdicts: feeling moral admiration towards an act of wanton cruelty cannot justify believing that the act is morally admirable when this moral feeling is unjustified. If the perceptual model is right in some cases\, then why isn’t it right in all cases? There is a puzzling asymmetry here that needs to be explained. The challenge is to explain why some valenced feelings can justify belief about value without needing any justification\, while others need to be justified in the same way as beliefs about value We cannot solve this puzzle simply by restricting the perceptual model to those cases where it delivers plausible results. This theoretically unsatisfying without some explanation of why it applies in some cases but not others. And yet the perceptual model doesn’t provide the theoretical resources to explain this in any principled way. Instead\, I explain the puzzling asymmetry by combining an alternative epistemology of value – the inferential model – with plausible assumptions in the metaphysics of value. \nAbout the Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics and Mind Research Group\nOne of six departmental research interest groups\, the Language\, Epistemology\, Metaphysics and Mind Group undertakes research in philosophy of mind\, philosophy of cognitive science\, traditional and formal epistemology\, metaphysics\, and philosophy of language.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/lemm-interest-group-talk-declan-smithies-ohio-state-2/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building 318
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20241024T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20241024T170000
DTSTAMP:20260422T035532
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SUMMARY:History of Philosophy Research Group Talk (Anik Waldow\, Sydney)
DESCRIPTION:The History of Modern Philosophy Group is pleased to welcome as its guest speaker Anik Waldow\, a professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney. She mainly works in early modern philosophy and has published articles on the moral and cognitive function of sympathy\, theories of personal identity\, the role of affect in the formation of the self\, skepticism\, and associationist theories of thought and language. She received a Leverhulm research grant (2014-2016) for the interdisciplinary project “Sympathy and its Reflections in History” and has an ARC Discovery Project on the Experimental Self (2017-19)\, which focuses on the role of experience\, sensibility\, and embodiment in the construction of selves and their place in social\, political\, and natural spheres. Dr. Waldow was an Associate Investigator of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (2013-2017) and has more recently started to investigate the role of empathy in linguistic and non-linguistic communications. She is the author of the monographs Experience Embodied: Early Modern Accounts of the Human Place in Nature (OUP\, 2020) and Hume and the Problem of Other Minds (Continuum\, 2009)\, the editor of Sensibility in the Early Modern Era: From Living Machines to Affective Morality (Routledge\, 2016). She also co-edited Philosophical Perspectives on Empathy (Routledge. 2019) and Herder: Philosophy and Anthropology (OUP\, 2017). Since 2018 she has served as the director of the Sydney Intellectual History Network. \nTalk Title\nHow to Trust Oneself? Epistemic Injustice\, Friendship and Doubt: Reflections on Montaigne’s Essays \nTalk Abstract\n\nThinking of selves relationally means accepting that self-conceptions depend in complex ways on social and institutional influences that can enhance\, but also obstruct the self’s capacity for reflective thought. This talk explores a specific aspect arising from this intermingling of selves\, individuals\, groups\, and institutions. How can the self that no longer trusts the norms inculcated by socially established customs and habits preserve its own mental sanity and self-trust? The threat ensuing here is that of ‘madness’ conceived as the loss of rationality triggered through the self’s retreat to its own inner realms. A way out of this predicament\, I argue\, requires what Montaigne describes as the melting away of the self’s original ‘form’ in its engagement with a trusted other. I propose that his process is best understood as an exploratory second-personal enactment of thought. Engaging in this enactment is essential to salvaging command of one’s own rationality and cultivating resources when experiencing situations of epistemic injustice. \n\nOne of six departmental Research Interest Groups\, the History of Philosophy Group explores topics in ancient and/or medieval philosophy\, the period from Descartes to Kant\, and Jewish philosophy from the medieval period to the 20th century.
URL:https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/history-philosophy-group-talk-anik-waldow-sydney/
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 418\, 170 St. George Street\, Toronto\, Ontario\, M5R 2M8\, Canada
CATEGORIES:Graduate,St. George,UTM,UTSC
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