

Two Ways of Being For an End
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Abstract

Five times in the extant corpus, Aristotle refers to a distinction between two ways of being a ‘that for the sake of which’ that he sometimes marks by using genitive and dative pronouns. Commentators almost universally say that this is the distinction between an aim (*hou heneka* + genitive) and beneficiary (*hou heneka* + dative). I propose that Aristotle had a quite different distinction in mind, namely: (a) that which holds between something and the aim or objective it is in the business of producing or achieving, and (b) that which holds between some instrument and the user of that instrument.

Keywords

Aristotle, teleology, cause, tools, function

1. Introduction

Five times in the extant corpus, Aristotle refers to a distinction between two ways of being an end or ‘that for the sake of which’ that he sometimes marks by using genitive and dative pronouns.¹ In no instance, however, does he explain or illustrate what these two ways of being an end are. He is also silent about which of the two ways of being an end he is speaking about in any given context, and only in one passage does he give a reason for something being an end in one way or the other: it is because god is ‘in need of nothing’ that god is an end in only one way.²

Despite there being so little said about this distinction between two ways of being an end, commentators almost universally say that it is the distinction between an aim, object or goal (*hou heneka* qualified with a genitive pronoun), and a beneficiary, i.e. that for whose good

¹ Aristotle refers to *to hou heneka* as ‘twofold’ or ‘double’ or says there is a ‘distinction’ at *Physics* 2.2, 194a35-6; *De anima* 2.4, 415b2-3 and 415b20-1; *Metaphysics* Λ.7, 1072b1-3; and *Eudemian Ethics* 8.8, 1249b15. A reference to the distinction along with the use of dative and genitive pronouns only occurs in the two passages in *DA* and the one in *Metaphysics* Λ. I quote all of these passages in full below.

² *EE* 8.8, 1249b16

something occurs or exists (*hou heneka* qualified with a dative pronoun).³ So, to give the standard example, the medical art is in one way for the sake of health, in that its objective is the production of health.⁴ In another way, the medical art is for the sake of the patient, in that it benefits the patient.⁵

Recently, moreover, it has been claimed that while the teleological relation referred to by the phrase when qualified with the genitive pronoun is a ‘technical’ or genuinely causal one, that is not so for the relation with which it is contrasted.⁶ For, while ends are final causes of whatever is aimed at or directed towards them, beneficiaries need not be implicated in the causality of that by which they accrue some benefit.⁷

It is true that aims and beneficiaries can come apart: not everything aimed at is thereby benefitted, and someone or something can be benefitted merely by chance, i.e. not in virtue of that benefit also being an aim. Moreover, in Greek there is the so-called dative of interest, which is used to specify the thing or person for whose advantage or interest something occurs or is the case. So, there is a genuine distinction between being aimed at and being benefitted, and the language used is certainly one natural way to express it.⁸

It is possible, however, that Aristotle had a quite different distinction in mind. For, in *Generation of Animals*, he discusses at length a distinction between two ‘for the sake of’

³ For some examples, see references in nn. 5, 6 and 8 below. Rosen 2014 is a recent exception, and is the only discussion of this distinction I have seen that sees the relevance of the passage in *GA* 2.6 discussed in the next section (Rosen 2014, 98-100).

⁴ Strictly speaking, the doctor does not aim at health *simpliciter* but rather at the health of a particular patient: ‘It seems, then, that the doctor does not even look to health in this way, but [health] of the man, or, rather, perhaps the health of *this* man; for he treats the particular’ (*EN* 1.6, 1097a11-13).

⁵ So says Ross 1936, 509. This example is also found in discussions of the distinction between *finis Cuius* and *finis Cui* by Scholastics such as Suárez (*Disputatio Metaphysica* XXIII.2).

⁶ Gotthelf 2012, 9 n. 13 says that the passages ‘which identify or refer to two ways in which *to hou heneka* is “said” are intended to isolate the sense of “that for the sake of which” which plays a technical role in Aristotle’s philosophy from an ordinary use, approximating “beneficiary”, and as such are neither intended to nor do shed light on that technical sense’. Menn 2015, 452 n. 7 refers to *hou heneka* + *genitive* as ‘the more usual sense’. Leunissen 2010, 56 claims that ‘there is the ‘that for the sake of which’ or the final cause properly speaking, and there is the ‘for which’ or ‘beneficiary of which,’ which plays no causal role’. See also, more recently, Charles 2015, esp. 228-9.

⁷ This claim about *hou heneka* + dative is sometimes appealed to in order to explain away remarks such as we find in *Politics* 1.8 and *Physics* 2.2 that suggest that Aristotle countenanced interspecies (and even anthropocentric) teleological relations, which the majority of critics do not think Aristotle endorsed. For examples, see Lennox 2001, 341; Kullman 1985, 173; and Charles 2015, 244.

⁸ Translations of the two references in *De anima* routinely reflect the traditional interpretation. Hamlyn translates both occurrences as ‘the purpose for which and the beneficiary for whom’. Hicks has, at 415b2-3: ‘either the purpose for which, or the person for whom a thing is done,’ and, at 415b20-1: ‘the purpose for which and the person for whom.’ J. A. Smith reads 415b2-3 as: ‘either the end to achieve which, or the being in whose interest, the act is done,’ and 415b20-1 as: ‘the end to achieve which, and the being in whose interest, anything is or is done’. Lawson-Tancred renders both occurrences slightly more neutrally as ‘that for the purpose of which and that for whose sake’.

relations.⁹ In that passage, the two relations are (a) that which holds between something and the aim or objective it is in the business of producing or achieving,¹⁰ and (b) that which holds between some instrument and the user of that instrument. Flute teachers, he says, are for the sake of flute players in one way – i.e. they are directed towards producing them; flutes are for the sake of flute players in the other way – i.e. they are for being played by them.¹¹ I will call these for the sake of relations ‘directive’ and ‘huperetic’, respectively.

It is plausible, as I will argue, that it is this contrast between directive and huperetic for the sake of relations that Aristotle is referring to in those five passages in which the distinction is mentioned. In Section 2, I will show *that* Aristotle recognizes this alternative distinction between for the sake of relations, the main evidence being his extended discussion in *GA* 2.6. In Section 3, I will argue that reading those five passages as referring to this alternative distinction furnishes the means to construct plausible interpretations of Aristotle’s purposes for mentioning it in those contexts. Taking this much to be more or less established, I will be a bit more speculative in Section 4. For, there is a case to be made that Aristotle thinks that being for the sake of an end in the way that, e.g., efficient causes are for the sake of specific ends, and being for the sake of an end in the way that bodily organs are for functions, are genuinely distinct kinds of causal relations. If so, it is thus unsurprising that a fully adequate analysis of Aristotle’s natural teleology has not been forthcoming.

2. *Generation of Animals* 2.6

In *GA* 2.6, we find evidence that Aristotle distinguishes a relation that obtains between the aim of something and what is bringing it about – the directive ‘for the sake of’ relation – from a relation that obtains between an instrument and some user – the huperetic ‘for the sake of’ relation. The key passage occurs in the course of a discussion of the order in which the parts of an embryo are formed that spans 742a16 to 742b17. There is much of interest in the passage, but particularly relevant for my purposes is the claim that ‘the for the sake of that’ (*to toutou heneka*) has ‘two differences’. One way of being for an end is to be ‘whence the change or motion’ (*hōthen hē kinsēsis*), which is Aristotle’s standard locution for what is usually called the

⁹ Johnson 2005, 68 claims that the distinction found in *Generation of Animals* is a different distinction and is not relevant to the question about what the distinction referred to in those five passages is. Johnson, however, appears to be thinking only of the distinction Aristotle draws between the end and what is for an end. That is only one of the two distinctions in that passage.

¹⁰ I borrow the expression ‘in the business of’ from Sean Kelsey, *unpublished*. This language is also found in Tuozzo 2014, esp. 27. I am using this to leave open the possibility that what something is directed towards may not obtain.

¹¹ Strictly speaking, it is the one learning to play the flute that the teacher is for the sake of, but it is clear from context that he means to be talking about the same thing – the flautist – as the end. We will look closely at this passage in the next section.

efficient cause. This way of being for the sake of something is here said to be ‘generative’ and ‘productive’ (*gennētikon* and *poiētikon*) of the *telos*, and to be ‘for the sake of another as *archē*’. For example, Aristotle says, insofar as the teacher’s activity is directed towards the production of a flute player, the flute teacher is for the sake of the one learning to play the flute in this first way. The other way of being for an end is to be that which is used (*chrētai*) by the end (*telos*, *hou heneka*). Whatever is for the sake of an end in this way is said to be instrumental (*organikon*), useful (*chrēsimon*), and to be that which the *telos* uses. The flute, Aristotle says, is for the sake of the one who plays it in this second way (742a22-8):

And the ‘for the sake of that’ also has two differences. For there is that whence the change (*hothen hē kinēsis*), and there is that which the ‘that for the sake of which’ uses (*hoi chrētai to hou heneka*). I mean, for example, both the generative [parts] and the [parts] instrumental for the thing coming to be. For, one of these must obtain prior – the productive – like the teacher (must obtain prior to) the learner, but flutes must obtain posterior to the one learning to play the flute. For it is superfluous for flutes to be present for those who do not know how to play the flute.

Aristotle employs this distinction in the present context to make a distinction among an animal’s parts, which distinction he thinks is crucial for understanding the order of embryonic development. For, the parts that are for the sake of the *telos* in the directive way are prior in generation to those that are for the sake of the *telos* in the huperetic way (742a28-b6):

Since there are three things – (1) one the end which we say is ‘that for the sake of which’; (2) second, of the ‘for the sake of that’, the moving and generative principle (for the productive and generative things, in so far as they are such, are directed towards the thing being made and generated); (3) and third, the useful and that which the end uses – it is necessary that some part in which the principle of change [exists] obtain first (for straightaway this part is one and most controlling for the end), and then after this the whole and the end, and third and last the parts instrumental (*organika*) to these¹² for some uses.

¹² It is not clear whether *toutois* in line 742a36 refers only to the ‘whole and end’, i.e. the whole animal, or also to the parts that are ‘for’ the end in being productive and generative of it, i.e. the heart and its analogue in non-blooded animals. While it is most natural to take the whole animal as the user of the instrumental parts, sometimes (e.g. in *De juv.* 4, 469b1-3) Aristotle claims that the heart is the user of the parts involved in nutrition, such as the mouth and stomach. He also makes clear in *PA* 1.5 that, in general, parts can be for the sake of other parts (645b28-646a1).

So that if there is some such thing which in fact necessarily obtains in animals, the thing having the principle of the entire nature and the end, this necessarily comes to be first – *first*, insofar as it is moving, but *at the same time* as the whole, insofar as it is part of the end.¹³

So that of the instrumental parts, as many as are by nature generative, these must always obtain earlier (for it is for the sake of something else as a principle), but as many as are for the sake of another but not such [i.e. not as a principle] obtain later.¹⁴

So, the parts generative or productive of the whole animal (and ‘for it’ in the directive way) come to be formed earlier than those that are for the animal as an instrument (and so ‘for it’ in the huperetic way). Although Aristotle here only describes parts that are for the whole animal in the directive way as being for it as a ‘source’ or ‘origin’ (*archē*), as ‘productive’ (*poiētikon*) and ‘generative’ (*gennētikon*) or ‘most controlling’ (*kuriōtaton*), he tells us later in the chapter that (at least in blooded animals) one such part is the heart (743b25-6):

As the source of sensation is in the heart, the heart is the first part of the whole animal to be formed.¹⁵

The heart occupies a very distinctive place in the life of the animal, Aristotle thinks. It is the seat of nutritive and sentient soul, and is the source not only of the development of the new organism but also of its continual self-maintaining activities and sensation.¹⁶ It is in virtue of

¹³ Cf. *De juv.* 467b18-22: ‘With respect to as many as are said to be animals and to live . . . it is necessary that there be one and the same part with respect to which it lives and with respect to which we call it an animal.’

¹⁴ Or: ‘as many as are not such [are] later than the ones that are for the sake of another.’ That might be a better construal of the Greek, but it appears to be saying that some parts are not for the sake of something. Perhaps we need to understand ‘for the sake of’ in this clause as referring only to the first way of being for the sake of something, i.e. as *pros* something as *archē*.

¹⁵ Cf.: ‘Likewise in sanguineous animals the heart is the first organ developed; this is evident from what has been observed in those cases where observation of their coming to be is possible. Hence in bloodless animals also what corresponds to the heart must develop first. We have already asserted in our treatise on the parts of animals that the heart is the source (*archē*) of the veins, and that blood is the final nutriment for blooded animals, from which the parts come to be. Hence it is clear that there is one function in nutrition which the mouth has the faculty of performing, and a different one appertaining to the stomach. But it is the heart that is most controlling (*kuriōtatē*), and set upon (*epitithēsīn*) the end (*telos*). Hence in blooded animals the source of both the sensitive and nutritive soul must be in the heart, for the functions relative to nutrition exercised by other parts are ancillary to (*charin*) the heart’s function. For the controlling part (*to kurion*) must persevere (*diatelein*) towards the end [lit: ‘the that for the sake of which’], like the doctor [perseveres] towards health, but not among those [parts] for the sake of it [viz., the controlling part]’ (*De juv.* 3, 468b28-469a10, tr. Ross, slightly modified).

¹⁶ See e.g. *PA* 3.4; *De somno* 2, 455b34-456a6, *De motu* 10, 703a14-6, *De resp.* 8, 474a25-b2.

being the locus of nutritive and sentient soul *dunameis* that the heart is for the sake of the whole animal, the *telos*, in the directive way – as *archē*.¹⁷

The other parts – the merely instrumental (*organika*) parts – are not for the sake of the animal in the same way.¹⁸ Aristotle says that the merely instrumental body parts are neither generative (*gennētikon*) of the whole animal nor for the sake of the animal as *archē*. Rather these are the tools that the whole animal uses to perform its vital functions, just as the flute is used by the flute player to produce music. Such parts are instrumental (*organikon*), Aristotle says, for certain uses (*chrēseis*). Consequently, whereas the heart must develop at the earliest stage of embryogenesis, since it is ‘for’ the whole animal in the directive way, body parts such as the lower limbs that are for the sake of the animal in the huperetic way come to be formed later.

Here in this passage we are told about two different ways that body parts contribute to the life of the organism, different ways of being for the sake of the animal.¹⁹ Of course, it is likely that some descriptions are merely reflecting Aristotle’s local concern, viz. the order of embryonic development, rather than general characterizations of these two ‘for the sake of’ relations. It would not be surprising to find out, for instance, that being ‘generative’ (*gennētikon*) is not something that holds generally of the directive way of being for the sake of something. I want to propose, however, that the core contrast to take away from this passage is that between something that is directed towards a specific end in the way that efficient causes are directed towards the ends they tend to bring about, and something that is useful or used by something as an instrument. Healing is the end of the medical art in the first, directive way, as being that which the medical art is in the business of promoting, whereas drugs and purging are

¹⁷ I think this is compatible with the heart also being for the sake of the whole animal in the huperetic way, i.e. useful as an instrument though not *qua* seat of nutritive soul but only *qua* source of heat. See next note.

¹⁸ I say ‘merely’ instrumental because although it initially seems as though Aristotle is contrasting the *organikon* and *gennētikon* parts, it appears later in the passage that the *gennētikon* is a subset of the *organikon* parts. I do not think this should worry us, since *organikon* is used by Aristotle in more and less generic ways. For example, *organikon* parts are contrasted both with perceptive (*aisthētrion*) parts (*PA* 2.1, 647a2-3), and with uniform (*homoiomeros*) parts (e.g. in *Meteorology* 4.12). Moreover, it would seem that all body parts are *organikon*, insofar as they are instruments by which soul capacities are exercised. So, even though the heart is oriented towards the whole animal in a way distinct from the way that, e.g., the eyes are, the heart is still an instrument of soul – at least considered as instrument for nutritive soul’s activities such as the concoction of food into nourishing blood, and blood into spermatocidal residues.

¹⁹ This is not a distinction between the way parts are for the *generation* of the animal. Of course, the heart *is* involved in the process of embryonic development as well as the organism’s continued maintenance. However, parts such as ‘lower limbs’ are here said to be for the sake of the whole animal, though they are not for the *generation* of the animal, not even as a tool. (There are other things that are called ‘tools’ in the process of generation, e.g. semen, *pneuma* and the *kinēseis* residing in the spermatocidal residues.)

for the sake of the healing in the second, huperetic way.²⁰ Or, to give another example, both victory and *hē politikē* are ends of generalship: victory is the end in the directive way insofar as that is what generalship is directed towards achieving, but insofar as political science ‘uses’ the other sciences (such as generalship and the domestic art), political science is the end of generalship in the huperetic way.²¹

That which a user uses might also, as a by-product of being used for some end, benefit the user in some way.²² However, aiming at some end is not being contrasted with being beneficial in this passage in *GA*. The distinction here is that between being directed towards producing or achieving something, as flute teachers produce flautists, and being a tool of something or for something’s use of it, as the flute is for the flautist. This much is clear from the examples given (flutes and teachers), and is reinforced by the language Aristotle uses to describe them: one way of being for an end is to be ‘productive’ (*poiētikon*) of it, to be ‘controlling’ (*kurion*) of the end and for the end as an *archē*, and the other is to be ‘instrumental’ (*organikon*) for and ‘used’ (*chrētai*) by the end.

Note that this distinction between ways in which the body parts are for the sake of the whole animal does not correspond to a distinction between parts that are in the essence and those that are not.²³ It also does not line up with the distinction between parts that are (conditionally) necessary or merely better. Moreover, although Aristotle does distinguish parts that are present for the sake of living from parts that are for the sake of living well, that is not

²⁰ One might think that it is far more plausible to think of the drugs as for the sake of the *doctor* in the huperetic way, rather than the healing. In that case, we get the following schema: drugs are for the sake of the medical art or doctor in the huperetic way, and the medical art is for the sake of healing in the directive way. That may be right, and I will return to this point in Section 4, but I wonder whether saying that the drugs are for the sake of the doctor and saying that they are for the sake of what a doctor does *qua* doctor (namely, healing the sick) makes little difference, in Aristotle’s view. After all, even if we are to understand the drugs as being for the doctor rather than the healing, the drugs are not for the sake of the doctor in potentiality, but for the doctor in actuality (i.e. when the doctor is engaged in healing the sick). In any event, the relation in which the drugs stand either to the healing or to what a doctor does *qua* doctor, I want to suggest, is distinct from the relation in which the medical art stands to the healing it is for the sake of. It is this last idea that I am primarily interested in pursuing here.

²¹ Similarly, bridle-making would be in the directive way for the sake of bridles, but in the huperetic way for horsemanship. Both this example and that of generalship mirror the structure of the example traditionally given to illustrate the distinction, namely, the medical art being both for the sake of health (as aim) and for the sake of the patient (and beneficiary). The example in *GA* 2.6 is of a single end (the flautist) and two things for its sake, and I intend for the example I gave above (the medical art and the drugs both being for the sake of healing) to mirror the structure of that.

²² At *EN* 1161a34-b2, Aristotle tells us that the *tools* are benefitted by being used. I do not know of any passage that claims that the reverse is the case, i.e. that tools benefit users.

²³ This distinction is orthogonal to the one between, on the one hand, ‘vital and essential’ parts, and ‘subsidiary’ parts on the other, identified by Leunissen 2010. Many of what she calls vital and essential parts, for example, would be in the huperetic, not directive, way for the sake of the whole animal. Leunissen calls ‘vital and essential parts’ those that are necessary for performing ‘functions specified in the definition of the substantial being’ (2010, 84-5).

the distinction here in *GA* 2.6 either. Rather, it is a difference between the way that the body parts are related to the animal. The heart is related to the whole animal as an origin or source (*archē*) that is directed towards an end, whereas other parts are related to the whole animal as tools (*organa*) ‘for certain uses’ (*chrēseis*). The following analogy is imperfect, but it is useful as a model to think about how a group of items can have components that are all for the same end, albeit in different ways. If one were to look at my gardening supplies, one would see packets of seed, soil amendments, pesticides and fungicides, a pitchfork and a shovel. These items are all for the sake of my garden, though not all in the same way. Seeds are there to generate and produce the garden, while the rest are there for performing the functions (e.g. repelling pests, removing weeds, loosening soil etc.) that the garden’s flourishing comprises.

Could this be the distinction Aristotle is referring to when he says that *to hou heneka* is twofold in the five passages where it is mentioned? Grammatically it is possible. The substantival expression *to hou heneka* is typically taken to be referring to the end or *telos*, i.e. to ‘the “that for the sake of which”’. As it is usually read, the qualifying pronouns *hou / tinos* and *hōi / tini* refer to that same end, and the dative is taken as a dative of advantage. The literal reading of this way of taking the pronouns is something such as ‘the “that for the sake of which” of which and for which / whom’. The traditional construal takes the whole phrase qualified with the genitive pronoun to be referring to the aim of which, and the phrase qualified with the dative pronoun to refer to the beneficiary for whom. If instead we were to take the pronouns as referring not to the end but rather what is *for* the end, and read the dative as instrumental, this could be translated very differently. Read in this way, the whole phrase would be something such as ‘the “that for the sake of which” of which and by which’.²⁴ So e.g. healing a sick body is the end of the medical art (i.e. of the *archē* that is for the sake of it) and is the end achieved by means of drugs and purging (i.e. by the tools that are for the sake of it).

Of course, it is possible that Aristotle recognizes a variety of ‘for the sake of’ relations, including both the benefitting as well as what I am calling the hyperetic ‘for the sake of’ relations. However, with only one exception,²⁵ in the passages where the distinction is mentioned, Aristotle says that there are *two* ways of being an end: He says that the ‘for the sake of which’ is *dichōs* (*Phys.* 2.2, 194a35), *ditton* (*DA* 2.4, 415b2 and *EE* 8.8, 1249b15), and *dittōs* (*DA* 2.4, 415b20). If he thought that ‘for the sake of’ were merely ambiguous, or that there were many ways something might be a ‘that for the sake of which’, one would expect him to say that

²⁴ Incidentally, it is common for Aristotle to refer to a part or organ by which some function is performed by using the instrumental dative. Certain insects clear away what falls in front of them *by their long feet* (*PA* 4.6, 683a28-9); certain creatures, such as the octopus, have nothing else except feet *by which* they can draw in food (*PA* 4.9, 685b9).

²⁵ In the passage in *Metaphysics* Λ.7, Aristotle refers simply to ‘the distinction’.

to hou heneka is (or is said) ‘in many ways (*pollakōs*)’ or ‘in various ways (*pleonachōs*)’ as he does, for example, about ‘being’ (*Phys.* 1.2, 185a21; *DA* 1.5, 410a13 and 2.1, 412b8-9), ‘one’ (*Phys.* 1.2, 185b6) and ‘cause’ (*Phys.* 2.3, 195a29). Moreover, the contrast between directive and hypereretic relations makes very good sense in the contexts where Aristotle mentions the distinction elsewhere. Let us look at these in turn.

3. The passages

(i) In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle claims that god is that for the sake of which *phronēsis* makes commands, but only in one way of being an end (*EE* 8.8, 1249b9-21, tr. Inwood and Woolf):

Since human beings too are by nature composed of a commander and a commanded, each person would also have to live with reference to his own commanding element. This has two aspects. For the art of medicine and health are commanding elements in different ways (the former are for the sake of the latter). This is how it is with regard to the contemplative. God is not a commander in the sense of giving orders but as that for the sake of which wisdom (*phronēsis*) gives orders. And ‘that for the sake of which’ is double (the distinction has been made elsewhere), since god is in need of nothing. So, whatever choice and acquisition of natural goods (either goods of the body or money or friends or other goods) will most effectively produce contemplation of god, that is the best and this is the finest limit; and whatever choice of natural goods impedes, either by deficiency or by excess, our cultivation and contemplation of god, is base.

Although many points of detail in this passage are vexed, it is typically taken as a denial that god can be a beneficiary. God is that for the sake of which *phronēsis* makes commands in being the objective or aim of those commands, but god is not the beneficiary of those orders. The explanation for why that is, as some read the passage, is given by the remark that ‘god is in need of nothing’.²⁶ However, why does god being ‘in need of nothing’ entail that god cannot be benefitted? One thought is that to benefit something is to make it better in some way. This thought is found, for instance, in the *Euthyphro*.²⁷ Given that gods need nothing, they are not lacking or deficient in any way, and so there is no way to make the gods better.

²⁶ Woods 1982, 182 claims that the ‘god has need of nothing’ supports ‘the unexpressed assertion that it is the thing for the sake of which in the sense which does *not* involve being a beneficiary’.

²⁷ ‘Now care (*therapeia*) in each case has the same effect; it aims at the good (*epi agathōi tini*) and the benefit (*ōphelia*) of the object cared for, as you can see that horses cared for by horse breeders are

That could be what Aristotle has in mind, but it is also possible that his point is that a god needs no tools for accomplishing any task. On this construal, Aristotle is denying that the orders *phronēsis* makes are for the sake of god as tools for any use god could put them to. This idea, after all, is also found in the *Euthyphro* (13e10-1):

‘Tell me then, by Zeus, what is that excellent aim that the gods achieve, using us as their servants?’

Euthyphro has suggested that our care for the gods is like a slave’s care for the master; *therapeia* of gods by us is a certain service or use (*tis hupēretikē*) we provide to the gods. The absurdity of this suggestion, Socrates points out, is that it implies that the gods have some work they are trying to accomplish (*eis tinos ergou apergasian*), for which we could be serviceable. It is possible that it is this idea – that a god does not need any tools for doing anything and so cannot be an end in the huperetic way – and not the fact that a god cannot become better, that Aristotle is expressing in this passage.²⁸

(ii) In *Metaphysics* Λ.7, Aristotle explains how the unmoved mover is the cause of the celestial moved movers’ eternal activity: the unmoved mover moves them as an object of desire and thought. It is in the course of this discussion that ‘the distinction’ is mentioned. The distinction makes clear, Aristotle says, how there can be the ‘for the sake of which’ among unchangeable things (*akinētoi*) (1072b1-4):

That the ‘for the sake of which’ is found among the unmovables is shown by the distinction. For there is *tini to hou heneka* <*kai*> *tinōs*, of which the one is and the other is not.²⁹ It moves as something loved, but the others move while being moved.³⁰

benefitted (*ōphelountai*) and become better (*beltious gignontai*). Or do you not think so?’ (13b7-11, tr. Grube)

²⁸ It is reasonable to wonder how the orders *phronēsis* makes could be for the sake of god in the directive way. There are at least two options. One might countenance objects of ‘aspiration, imitation, or approximation’ (as does, e.g., Richardson Lear 2006, 79) as ends that something can be for the sake of, and not just those goals that are attained or realized. Alternatively, one might understand god to be simply identical to the noetic activity that the commands of *phronēsis* are promoting. For this latter interpretation, see Scharle 2008, 158, who follows Lawrence 2005: 154 ff.

²⁹ The phrase ‘the one is the other is not’ could mean that one way of being for the sake of something can apply to – i.e. ‘is among’ – unmoveable things. Ross, however, translates it: ‘the one is unmoveable and the other is not.’ This makes no difference for my purposes, since on either construal Aristotle is claiming that something unmoveable can be an end in one of the ways of being an end.

³⁰ It is not clear how *kinoumena* (or: *kinoumenōi*) *de t’alla kinei* should be understood. I have taken *t’alla* as the subject of *kinei* and followed Ross’s emendation of *kinoumena* for *kinoumenōi*. Fortunately, this interpretive fray is one I need not enter into here. See Laks 2000, 220 for a discussion of the issues.

This is often interpreted as a denial that the unmoved mover could benefit from the celestial movers. While the unmoved mover can be the aim at which, it cannot be a beneficiary. It is impossible to benefit the unmoved mover, scholars say, because receiving benefit would change it,³¹ and the unmoved mover cannot be in any way otherwise than it is.

While it is true that the unmoved mover is unchangeable, and although this fact is motivating Aristotle's appeal to 'the distinction' in order to show how it could nevertheless be an end, there is nothing said by him in this passage or anywhere else about the connection between benefit and change. It is not clear that Aristotle thinks that benefitting something thereby changes it, and it is not obvious that it is true. Something such as the unmoved mover could be benefitted by remaining for perpetuity just as it is.

Regardless, even if Aristotle does think that unchangeable things cannot be benefitted, it is also going to be true that unchangeable things do not use tools. Just as in the case of god, there is no work an unmoved mover is doing such that the celestial spheres could be of any use, and thus an unmoved mover is not an end in the huperetic way. It is possible that this is the thought that Aristotle is expressing in *Lambda*, rather than addressing a worry about benefitting something and thereby changing it. The unmoved mover has no need of any tools by which it can accomplish or do anything, because the unmoved mover – like god – does not engage in any actions (*praxeis*) that such tools would be used for accomplishing.³²

(iii) In *De Anima* 2.4, Aristotle says that everything does whatever it does for the sake of partaking in the eternal and divine to the extent possible for it (415a23-b7). This is why it is the 'most natural function' of living things to make another like itself (415a25-b3, tr. Hamlyn trans):

[Nutritive soul's] functions are reproduction and the use of food; for it is the most natural function in living things, such as are perfect and not mutilated or do not have spontaneous generation, to produce another thing like themselves – an animal to produce an animal, a plant a plant – in order that they may partake of the everlasting and divine in so far as

³¹ Richardson Lear 2004, 76: 'When something is a 'for the sake of which' as a beneficiary, then it is true that it must be in principle moveable.' Johnson 2005, 71: 'The reason why an unchangeable thing cannot be a beneficiary of something is simple: benefitting it would change it.' Laks 2000, 226-7: 'One might think that a final cause could not be unchangeable, in so far as the beneficiary of a process which evolves in view of it is necessarily affected by the benefit it receives. . . The aim towards which desire tends, being non-dependent in any way on this desire, can be perfectly unchangeable in a way that the beneficiary "in view of which" a process evolves cannot.'

³² On the connection between *praxis* and change, see *Metaphysics* 3.2, 996a26-7: 'since an end or purpose is the end of some action, and all actions imply change . . .' (tr. Ross).

they can; for all desire that, and for the sake of that they do whatever they do in accordance with nature. (But that for the sake of which is twofold, *to men hou, to de hōi.*)

Scholars are in agreement that Aristotle is claiming that reproduction and whatever else living things do, such as perceive and move around, is a way of aiming or striving at sharing in what is eternal and divine. There is disagreement, however, about whether he is denying that the other way of being for the sake of something applies and, if he is denying that, what his reason for doing so would be. Those who think Aristotle is denying that eternity is a beneficiary of whatever living organisms do will sometimes say that the reason he does so is that eternity cannot be benefitted.³³ Those who think that both ways are operative, i.e. that behavior of living things has a beneficiary in addition to an aim, typically name the living thing as the beneficiary.³⁴ However, partaking in the eternal and divine, and not the living thing, is what Aristotle identifies as that for the sake of which living things do whatever they by nature do. If we think that the contrast between the two ways of being an end must be between the objective or aim (genitive) and a beneficiary or recipient of some good – something *ōphelimon* – it is not easy to see why Aristotle is bringing this up at all in this context.

If we put to the side the assumption that being the recipient of some benefit must be one of the ways of being an end, and instead view this as a reference to the distinction between directive and huperetic ends, a natural way to read this passage presents itself. Aristotle has just claimed that whatever living things do in accordance with nature (*hosa pratei kata phusin*) is for the sake of partaking in the eternal and divine. Living things are enmattered, and as such are perishable. So the particular form that partaking in the eternal and divine takes for living beings is generating another like oneself (*DA* 2.4, 415b3-7, tr. Hamlyn):

Since, then, they cannot share in the everlasting and divine by continuous existence, because no perishable thing can persist numerically one and the same, they share in them in so far as each can, some more and some less; and what persists is not the thing itself but something like itself, not one in number but one in species.

That being so, Aristotle is saying that whatever living things do in accordance with nature is for the sake of reproduction. Now, it stands to reason that non-threptic psychic activities are

³³ Johansen 2015, 126.

³⁴ Johnson 2005, 69 for instance, says that nutritive soul aims at ‘participating in the divine and eternal, which is in turn for the benefit of (*hou heneka tini*) the living animal’. See also Frey 2015, 144, who says: ‘the nutritive soul is for the sake of reproduction, its aim and purpose are participation in the divine and eternal, and its beneficiary is the living organism.’

included among the things living things do *kata phusin*. An animal's perceptual activities, for instance, would be among the things they do *kata phusin* and thus among the things done for the sake of reproduction.³⁵ However, that might seem implausible. It is easy enough to see how the functions of threptic soul, viz. generation and the use of food, are for the sake of reproduction. But how is, e.g., the use of sight for the sake of reproducing another like oneself? The capacity for sight is for *seeing*, not generating.

It is likely that in bringing up the distinction here, Aristotle is anticipating just this sort of worry. Both nutritive soul-activities as well as, e.g., perceptual activities are for the sake of generation, only not in the same way. Nutritive soul-activities (at very least generative activities, such as the production of spermatid fluids) are for the sake of generation in the directive way; that is what these activities are in the business of achieving. Other psychic activities are all for the sake of generation in the huperetic way; they are for generation as tools for achieving it, e.g. by making possible the identification of suitable mates, avoidance of predators, discovery of food and so on. On this alternative reading, Aristotle is clarifying how all living things' natural activities are for the sake of generation, and thus eternity and divinity: some are for that end in the directive way, and some are for that end in the huperetic way.

(iv) Later in the same chapter, Aristotle claims that body is for the sake of soul, and then again reminds us that the 'that for the sake of which' is *dittōs* (*DA* 2.4, 415b15-21, tr. Hamlyn, slightly modified):

And it is clear that the soul is cause also as that for the sake of which. For just as the intellect acts for the sake of something, in the same way also does nature, and this something is its end. Of this sort is the soul in animals in accordance with nature; for all natural bodies are tools for soul, and just as it is with those of the animals so it is with those of plants also, showing that they exist for the sake of soul. But that for the sake of which is double, *to te hou kai to hōi*.

Scholars are divided about how to understand this. On the traditional aim-beneficiary construal of the distinction, Aristotle is either saying that (1) the body has the soul as its aim, or that (2) the body benefits the soul.³⁶ Since it sounds odd to think that the body could have the soul as its

³⁵ I owe the idea that the point being made here is that non-threptic psychic activities are also for the sake of reproduction to conversations with Robbie Howton. He argues convincingly for this, as well as the relevance of this point for understanding what is at stake in the discussion at the end of *De anima* 3, in an unpublished paper.

³⁶ Richardson Lear 2012, 77 n. 12 says that souls are "“that for the sake of which” in both senses, *to hou heneka tinos* and *to hou heneka tini*. As forms of the living body, they are unmoving ends which the creature constantly seeks to realize. But Aristotle's comparison of the living body to a tool of the psychic

aim, commentators opting for (1) take Aristotle to mean that the body is for something such as the ‘soul’s functioning, although this is not exactly what he says.³⁷ Option (2) is not generally appealing because, as some have claimed, that would require the soul to have its own interests.³⁸ One recent discussion of this passage suggests that perhaps what Aristotle really means is that the living being *qua* ensouled benefits, not that the soul benefits.³⁹ On either reading, one is forced to substitute something close to but not precisely what Aristotle says is the end, i.e. the soul. Neither option, that is, provides a completely satisfying way to read the claim that the body is for the sake of soul without bending the text so that it means something different than what it literally says.⁴⁰

If aim and beneficiary were the only options, such interpretive moves might be warranted. Fortunately, however, even if he thinks that beneficiaries are ends, aim and beneficiary do not exhaust the ways of being an end that Aristotle recognizes. For, as I have been proposing, there is a huperetic ‘for the sake of’ relation: natural bodies are for the sake of soul in that they are tools for souls, as Aristotle explicitly says (at 415b18-20) in this very passage, and repeatedly says throughout the corpus.⁴¹ As I understand this passage in *DA* 2.4, he is making a very familiar point: natural bodies are the tools of souls that use them, and in which souls must ‘clothe’ themselves, just as an art must use its tools (*DA* 1.3, 407b25-6).⁴²

(v) Finally, in *Physics* 2.2, Aristotle claims that we humans use everything as being for the sake of us, since we are in a way (*pōs*) an end, and then refers to the distinction between two ways of being ends (194a33-6):

craftsman suggests that the soul is also its beneficiary’. See also Johnson 2005, 69 (quoted in n. 34 above).

³⁷ Johnson 2005, 75. See also Kullman 1985, 173 who says that the ‘functions of soul are the ends towards which the functions of the body are tending’. Hamlyn 1968, 96: ‘Presumably the point is that the eye, for example, functions in order that there may be perception, i.e. the end is the functioning of the organ – and so on for the other faculties. Hence the functioning of a living body is the end for which it exists, and for which nature uses it.’

³⁸ Johansen 2015, 128.

³⁹ Johansen 2015, 128-9.

⁴⁰ Hamlyn 1968, 96: ‘It cannot be said that the sense in which the soul is the end is very clear.’

⁴¹ See Menn 2002, esp. 108-13, on this point.

⁴² How, exactly, we are to understand the language of soul ‘using’ anything is difficult. I think that Aristotle uses this language when he is trying to identify the ‘user’ as the proper subject of some activity that is carried out by a subordinate intermediary, e.g. in the way that what the slave does is most properly the master’s activity, or – as I understand the embryological theory – what the physiological changes in embryonic development are doing is most properly ascribed to nutritive soul. The relevant respects in which the soul’s use of the body is analogous to the use the carpenter makes of his hammer do not include physical manipulation. I discuss this in a forthcoming paper.

Since some arts make the matter and some make it good to work with (*euergon*), also we use all things as existing there for the sake of us. (For we too are ends in a way (*pōs*). For *to hou heneka* is twofold, as was said in the *De philosophia*.)

This is usually taken to mean that we humans are not the aims of other natural beings, but merely benefit from them – we benefit from the wood we turn into lumber for houses and cows we eat for dinner or camels we domesticate for warfare.⁴³

It is also possible, and I think likely, that what Aristotle is saying here is that natural beings are for our use of them as tools. He explicitly says in this passage that we *use* (*chrōmetha*) them, but says nothing about our benefitting from them. We might, in addition, also benefit by that use of them, but that is not obviously Aristotle's point. His point may be rather to remind the audience that it is in this huperetic way, and not the directive way, that other natural beings are for the sake of us, in a way.⁴⁴

4. Users and Uses

So far, I have been arguing that there is an alternative to the traditional aim / beneficiary construal of the distinction between two ways of being an end. This alternative is the distinction described in Aristotle's discussion of the order of embryonic development in *GA* 2.6, and is illustrated in that chapter by the different relations that flute teachers and flutes stand in to flautists: a flautist is both the objective or achievement of the flute teacher, and the user of the flute. The alternative distinction, moreover, accords nicely with the passages in which the two ways of being an end are mentioned.

If it is the huperetic relation discussed in *GA* 2.6 that Aristotle means to refer to by *hou heneka* + dative in the passages where it is distinguished from *hou heneka* + genitive, this will have implications for our understanding of Aristotle's natural teleology. For it is commonly

⁴³ It is worth noting that Aristotle thinks that at least some of these things that are 'for our sake' are benefitted *by us* as well. For instance, he says in *Politics* 1.5, 1254b10-13 that domesticated animals are better off when we rule over them. So at least in some cases, the benefit is mutual: Other natural beings benefit from humans just as we are benefitted by them. What is not mutual or symmetrical in this way is that we use these natural things as instruments for our purposes.

⁴⁴ Given that I am going to suggest that the huperetic teleological relation is as much a causal relation as the directive one, a comment about the implications this would have for our understanding of interspecies teleology is in order. For commentators often say that the benefit relation can be accidental or non-causal, and there is no reason to take this claim about natural things' being for our sake as anything more than a claim about the benefit we happen to derive from them. There would be nothing accidental, on my proposal, about natural things' being our instruments. However, the occurrence of *pōs* ('in a way') and *hōs* (if translated 'as if' rather than 'on the grounds that') could be viewed as blocking that inference, if that is desired. See Judson 2005, 358-9 and Sedley 1991, 189 for a discussion of the significance of these particles.

thought that, whereas *hou heneka* with the genitive picks out a genuine causal relation, *hou heneka* with the dative does not. So, when Aristotle makes claims about one thing being for the sake of something and is manifestly intending to be making a causal claim, it is assumed that he must have the directive relation (*hou heneka* + genitive) in mind. All final causal relations, it is assumed, must be the *hou heneka* + genitive relations.

This assumption would be reasonable if *hou heneka* with the dative were the benefitting relation; there need not be any causal relation between that which benefits and that which is benefitted. However, it is less clear that we can assume that the huperetic relation is not causal. Since Aristotle says that the relation picked out by *hou heneka* + genitive is different from the one picked out by *hou heneka* + dative, it would seem that he countenances two kinds of final causal relation, and not only one.

There is a further question, however, about how often and in which cases Aristotle thinks each of these relations obtains. It will be especially common if, as I suspect, Aristotle would find it permissible to think of that relation holding not only between instruments and users, but also between instruments and the *uses* to which they are put. A user *qua* user, after all, is something that typically engages in a certain kind of activity, which is to say a certain *use*. For example, the housebuilder *qua* housebuilder is someone who engages in housebuilding, or the seer *qua* seer is something that sees. Perhaps it makes no substantive difference in this context whether we speak about the hammer being for the housebuilder or the housebuilding, or the eyes for the seer or the seeing.⁴⁵

One point in support of this idea is that Aristotle does sometimes slide between speaking about tools being for users and being for uses. For example, he identifies as the ends of body parts both the soul and the specific vital functions the soul will perform using those body parts: ‘the body too is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts are for the sake of the functions in relation to which each of them has naturally developed’ (*PA* 1.5, 645b19-20, tr. Lennox). That Aristotle would find it natural to move between speaking of users and uses is also evinced in the passage in *GA* 2.6 (742a28-36):

Since there are three things – (1) one the end which we say is ‘that for the sake of which’; (2) second, of the ‘for the sake of that’, the moving and generative principle (for the productive and generative, in so far as they are such, are directed towards (*pros*) the thing

⁴⁵ This is not to deny there are *some* contexts (such as *De anima* 2.5) in which distinguishing these is very important, e.g. in thinking about how to understand the transition from being a seer (in capacity) and something seeing (in actuality). I am only proposing that when we think about the relation that holds between some *organon* (such as an eye) and what it is huperetically for the sake of, it comes to the same to think of the user or the use (e.g. the seer or the seeing).

being made and generated); (3) and third, the useful and that which the end (*to telos*) uses – it is necessary that some part in which the principle of change [exists] obtain first (for straightaway this part is one and most controlling for the end), and then after this the whole and the end, and third and last the parts instrumental to these for some uses (*pros enias chrēseis*).

Here both the whole animal as well as the uses (*chrēseis*) the parts are for (*pros*) are identified as what the parts are for the sake of.

It is arguable, at any rate, that Aristotle thinks that it makes little difference whether we think of tools as for the sake of users or for the sake of the uses for which they are employed. And if this is so, the huperetic ‘for the sake of’ relation is going to turn out to be quite prevalent and undeniably causal. For instance, organs and functions would stand in the huperetic relation, and it is uncontroversial that organs being for the sake of functions is not an accidental or non-causal relation, for Aristotle. He does not think it is true, in general, of the things he calls *organa* that their existence and their having the structures they do is only accidentally related to the uses to which they are put. This is clearly not the case for artificial tools. He says, for example, that axes (*PA* 1.1, 642a9-11) and saws (1.5, 645b17-9) have the features they do because of the functions they are used to perform. It seems as if artificial tools are always correlative with – *pros* – some specific function, for Aristotle. Although examples he gives in the *Topics* may not represent Aristotle’s considered view, *organa* are there given as an example of things that have natural (*pephuken*) correlates: they are *pros* something in particular. He says that if someone were to define a tiara as a tool for drawing water, they would be wrong. Even though a tiara can be used for that purpose, it is not its natural function.⁴⁶

Moreover, Aristotle thinks that, in living beings, ‘nature makes the organs for the functions’ (*PA* 4.12, 694b13-4).⁴⁷ If some organism lacks a certain function, it also lacks the organ that is for that function (*De caelo* 2, 290a29 *ff.*). Also, differences in capabilities require differences in organs, for example the differences between male and female roles in animal generation is the reason why males and females have different sexual organs (*GA* 1.2, 716a23-

⁴⁶ *Topics* 145a19-27: Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον τῶν πρὸς τι ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ ὀρίζομενος. ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν [ἕκαστον τῶν πρὸς τι] μόνον ἔστι χρῆσθαι, πρὸς ἄλλο δ’ οὐδέν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον τῇ ὄψει πρὸς τὸ ἰδεῖν μόνον, τῇ δὲ στελεγγίδι κἂν ἀρύσειέ τις. ἀλλ’ ὅμως εἰ τις ὀρίσαστο τὴν στελεγγίδα ὄργανον πρὸς τὸ ἀρύειν, ἡμάρτηκεν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο πέφυκεν. ὄρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν ‘ἔφ’ ὃ ἂν χρῆσαστο ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ φρόνιμος καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον οἰκεία ἐπιστήμη’. In *De int.*, an instrument is contrasted with what is by convention, i.e. by what is not natural: a sentence ‘signifies’ by convention, not as a tool (4, 16b33-17a1); a name signifies by convention because no name is naturally a name (2, 16a26-7).

⁴⁷ E.g. lungs are the tools *pros* cooling (*De resp* 11, 476a23-5); kidneys are tools *pros* excreting residues (*PA* 3.7, 670a21-2); sexual parts are tools *pros* reproduction (*HA* 5.2, 539b20-1).

31). Throughout the treatises on animals, a body part or organ's character (e.g. how hard or soft it is), shape (flat, broad, narrow), size, position (e.g., in front or behind) and presence is routinely explained by appeal to the work or function (*ergasia*) that it is for (*pros*), its being useful (*chrēsimon*), or its being for the sake of some use or purpose (*heneka chreias*). That is, the teleological explanations almost exclusively cite the function or use for which a part is present.

If not only users but also uses or functions stand in the huperetic relation to tools, it will turn out that many cases that have been viewed as instances of that directive relation are in fact better seen as huperetic. This, of course, depends on our granting that it makes no difference whether we speak of *uses* or *users* as what the tools are for the sake of. However, someone might think that if we grant this, the huperetic relation looks like none other than the directive one. Even if the relation a *user* stands in to an instrument is obviously distinct from the relation that, say, efficient causes stand in to what they are directed towards, it may be less obviously distinct from the relation that functions stand in to the tools by which they are performed.

I suspect that the reluctance to understand the relation that tools stand in to their functions as the huperetic relation stems from the fact that the aim / beneficiary construal of the distinction has become so entrenched, and thus aims and beneficiaries have been the only options we can see for ways of being an end.⁴⁸ Consequently, forced to choose between aims and beneficiaries, aims seem like the far more plausible option: functions are the ends of tools such as body parts as their 'goal' or 'aim'.⁴⁹ Now, it is true that tools do not benefit the functions they perform, but I am proposing that in Aristotle's view, that they do not aim at them, either. That is, I am suggesting that he may see a difference between the way that efficient causes are directed towards and 'lie opposite' (*antikeimenēn*)⁵⁰ a certain *telos*, and the way that tools are for ends, that we have been failing to appreciate.

So what, exactly, is the important difference between these two relations? Although it seems clear that Aristotle thinks that being for an end in the way that flutes are for flute players

⁴⁸ Although I will not pursue this here, it is not clear to me that the ancient commentators were as univocal about this distinction as, e.g., Johnson 2005, 66-8 seems to think. Many of them simply use the pronouns (which are ambiguous between 'for which' and 'by which') and point to *organa* for illustration. Aquinas, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* 2.2 (Lec. 4, section 173), says that the end for the sake of which a house comes to be is on the one hand the dweller (genitive) and the other hand, the dwelling (dative).

⁴⁹ For example, Menn 2002, 113 says that 'Aristotle makes clear that the body is for the sake of "[participating in] the eternal and divine" as *to hou*, the to-attain-which (by securing the eternity of the species), as a thing is for the sake of its function'. Menn goes on to contrast this with the benefitting relation. See also Johnson 2005, 75: 'the various bodily organs exist for the aim of (*hou heneka-hou*) the various functions of soul (roots for nutrition, feet for locomotion, eyes for perception).'

⁵⁰ *Metaphysics* A.3, 983a31

is a different relation than, e.g., the one in which an efficient cause stands to its correlative end, I do not yet know how to offer an informative analysis that clearly and cleanly draws the distinction. My aim here is much more programmatic: It would be worthwhile to put the notion of benefit to the side, and instead focus on getting clear about what the difference between the two ways of being for an end amounts to, and why Aristotle thinks it matters.

5. Conclusion

Aristotle says, as I began by noting, that there are two ‘for the sake of’ relations. I have been arguing for a view about what he means that departs from the usual way of understanding him in two ways. First, the relation that is marked by *hou heneka* with the dative has little to do with benefit. Rather, when Aristotle claims that, for instance, body is for the sake of soul, he means that the body is for being used by soul to perform vital functions. That he thinks the body is a tool of soul is, I take it, uncontroversial. Second, the *hou heneka* + dative relation may be, for Aristotle, just as much a causal relation as *hou heneka* + genitive. It is not accidental, at any rate, that organisms develop parts that allow them to perform certain functions.

It will not be at all surprising, of course, that Aristotle thinks that an organ being for the sake of its function is a paradigm instance of a causal, teleological relation. It would be surprising to find out that the way that organs are for functions is not the same as the way that, e.g., an efficient cause is directed towards some end, and that the relation between a tool and its end is not the one picked out with *hou heneka* + genitive. It is worth our entertaining the possibility that Aristotle does not think that the relation between tools and functions is to be understood in terms of the directive or ‘aim’ relation, or as merely parasitic upon it in some way. That is, it is likely that we have been lumping together and treating as one and the same what are, for Aristotle, importantly different relations.⁵¹

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