GRIFFIN KLEMICK

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Philosophy Department (Lubbers Hall, Room 226), Hope College
126 East 10th Street, Holland, MI 49423

AREAS:	**AOS:** Pragmatism, History of Analytic Philosophy, Epistemology
	AOC: Continental Philosophy, Metaethics, Feminist Philosophy, History of Western Philosophy

EMPLOYMENT:

Hope College   2022-24
Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy

University of Toronto   2021-22
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Teaching Stream (fixed-term)

EDUCATION:

University of Toronto   2022 (parental leave Winter 2019)
PhD, Philosophy
>   Thesis: *How to Be a Pragmatist in the End: Objectivity, Skepticism, and the Demands of Agency*
>   Committee: Cheryl Misak (supervisor), David James Barnett, Gurpreet Rattan,
>   Andrew Sepielli (internal-external), Steven Levine (external)

University of Cambridge   Winter 2015
Visiting Student, Philosophy Faculty

Northern Illinois University   2014
MA, Philosophy

Wheaton College (IL)   2012
BA, Honors in Philosophy, *Summa cum laude*

PUBLICATIONS:

"Constitution, Causation, and the Final Opinion: A Puzzle in Peirce's *Illustrations*"
>   2023. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 40/3: 237-257.

"Sellars's Core Critique of C. I. Lewis: Against the Equation of Aboutness and Givenness"
>   2022. *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*. <https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0114>.

"C. I. Lewis was a Foundationalist After All"
>   2020. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 37/1: 77-99.

"Sellars' Metaethical Quasi-Realism"
>   2020. *Synthese*, 197/5: 2215-2243.

Invited:

"Inferentialism, Modal Anti-Realism, and the Problem of Affection"
>   Forthcoming. M. Rahnee & L. C. Seiberth (eds.), *Reading Kant with Sellars* (Routledge).

"Phenomenalism, Skepticism, and Sellars's Account of Intentionality" (contribution to a
   symposium on Luz Christopher Seiberth, *Intentionality in Sellars*)
>   2022. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 30/5: 548-558.

"Prospects for an Objective Pragmatism: Frank Ramsey on Truth, Meaning, and Justification"
2017. S. Pihlström (ed.), *Pragmatism and Objectivity* (Routledge): 46-71.

Reviews: With Charles Guth III. Review, Mikel Burley (ed.), *Wittgenstein, Religion and Ethics*
2019. *Faith and Philosophy*, 36/4: 545-550.

UNDER REVIEW: "Perceptual Justification and the Demands of Effective Agency" (minor revisions, *Synthese*)

"Of Hopes and Hinges: Peirce, Epistemic Constraints on Truth, and the Normative
Foundations of Inquiry" (R&R)

"What's Loving about the 'Loving Gaze'? – Accuracy and Positive Valence in Murdoch's
Account of Attention" (R&R)

"Hannah Arendt, Human Rights, and the Priority of Community"

"Peirce's Theory of Perception: A Phenomenalist Interpretation"

"Sellars's Two Responses to Skepticism"

SELECTED   "Of Hopes and Hinges: Peirce, Epistemic Constraints on Truth, and the Normative
PRESENTATIONS: Foundations of Inquiry"
* - Invited   2023: *Charles S. Peirce Society/Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

"Hannah Arendt, Human Rights, and the Priority of Community"
2023: *Alma College
2021: APA Eastern (Main Program)
2021: Canadian Philosophical Association
   - Winner (at CPA), Congress Graduate Merit Award
2019: Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture

"Perceptual Justification and the Demands of Effective Agency"
2022: European Pragmatism Conference
2022: *Hope College

"What Makes the 'Loving Gaze' Loving?"
2022: Society of Christian Philosophers, Mountain-West Division

"Hannah Arendt on Hope: *Pro* or *Contra*?"
2022: *University of Toronto: *The Work of Hannah Arendt*

"Peirce's Early Anti-Realism about the External World"
2020: APA Central (Main Program)

"Peirce's Theory of Perception: Three Problems for the Realist Reading"
2020: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

"Levinas on the Practical Value of the Concept of Truth"
2020: North American Levinas Society

"C. I. Lewis's Two Pragmatisms: Empirical Meaning, the *A Priori*, and How They Fit Together"
2019: Douglas MacDonald Conference (Vanderbilt/Josiah Royce Society)
   - Winner, Harry Todd Costello Prize: best graduate student/recent PhD submission.

"The Problem with Picturing: Sellars's Failed Quest for Transcendental Friction"
    2019: Richard Rorty Society
    2019: Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy

"Peirce, Empiricism, and the Pragmatic Maxim"
    2019: Canadian Philosophical Association

"Levinas's Transcendental Argument for Moral Objectivity"
    2018: Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture

"C. I. Lewis, the Given, and Foundationalism: A Defense of the Traditional Interpretation"
    2018: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

"McDowell, Moral Realism, and 'Reflective Self-Scrutiny'"
    2018: Canadian Philosophical Association

"Sellars was a Quasi-Realist, not an Error Theorist"
    2017: Canadian Philosophical Association
    2017: Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy

"Representation, Pragmatism, and Speaking about God"
    2017: Society of Christian Philosophers, Midwest Session

"McDowell's Conceptualism and Nonfocal Visual Awareness"
    2016: Western Canadian Philosophical Association

Comments Given:
2019. "Ricoeur's and Henry's Phenomenological Understanding of Suffering" - Nuno Proença
2018. "Expression and the Task of Philosophy: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty" - Neal DeRoo
2018. "Suffering Is Bad, Even If It's Not Mine (Or Yours)" - Louis Gularte
2013. "A Partial Defense of the Exculpatory Power of Ignorance" - Stephen Bero
2013. "Language Games of Emotion Expression" - Trip Glazer

TEACHING:

As primary instructor:

3rd-year courses:

Feminist Philosophy (~10 students)	2023, Hope College
Early Analytic Philosophy (~35 students)	2022, University of Toronto
Literature and Philosophy (~35 students)	2022, University of Toronto
Philosophy of Emotions (~35 students)	2021, University of Toronto
Social and Cultural Theory (~35 students)	2021, University of Toronto

2nd-year courses:

Modern Philosophy (~20 students; 4 sections)   2022-24, Hope College
God, Self, World: An Introduction to the History of   2021, University of Toronto
    Metaphysics (~100 students; online)
        - Honorable Mention, 2020-21 Martha Lile Love Teaching Award

Knowledge and Reality (~60 students; online)   2021, University of Toronto
Introduction to Continental Philosophy (~60 students;   2020, University of Toronto
    online)
Introduction to Ethics (~100 students)   2018, University of Toronto

1st-year courses:

Problems in Philosophy (~30 students; 4 sections)   2023-24, Hope College
Refugees, Rights, and Building Relationships (~15   2023, Hope College
    students; interdisciplinary first-year seminar)

	"Whence Cometh Evil?": Ancient & Medieval Perspectives on Suffering and Wrongdoing (~20 students; 5 sections; interdisciplinary humanities)	2022-23, Hope College
	- 2023: Global learning/international diversity flag (4-week unit, Chinese philosophy)	
	Introduction to Philosophy (~25 students)	2014, Wheaton College (IL)

As tutorial leader and grader:

2nd-year courses:	Law and Morality (Lead TA; online)	2021, University of Toronto
	Knowledge and Reality (online)	2020, University of Toronto
	17th- and 18th-Century Philosophy (year-long)	2019-20, University of Toronto
	Ethics and Moral Philosophy	2018, University of Toronto
	Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy through History (year-long)	2016-17, University of Toronto
1st-year course:	Introduction to Philosophy (5 sections)	2015-18, University of Toronto

As grader:

3rd-year courses:	The Continental Tradition	2020, University of Toronto
	Knowledge and Justification	2013, Northern Illinois University
2nd-year course:	Philosophy of Religion	2018, University of Toronto

Additional teaching experience:

Writing Assistance:	Philosophy Department Essay Clinician	2017-18, University of Toronto
Certificate:	Teaching Fundamentals	2021, University of Toronto

RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIPS:	Cheryl Misak, *Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers* (2020) & *Cambridge Pragmatism* (2016)
	Cheryl Misak and Huw Price (eds.), *The Practical Turn* (2017)
	Michael L. Morgan (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Levinas* (2018)
	Michael L. Morgan (Library of Contemporary Jewish Philosophers) (2018)
	I provided proofreading, editing, reference formatting, and index compilation.

HONORS:	*Selected for National Endowment for the Humanities Seminar, "Philosophical Responses to Empiricism in Kant, Hegel, and Sellars" ($3300 stipend)	2019
	*Ontario Trillium Scholarship ($40,000/year)	2014-18
	- Awarded to the most promising non-Canadian doctoral students in Ontario.	
	*Lilly Graduate Fellowship (Valparaiso; $3000/year)	2014-17
	*C. Mason & Madeline Myers Award (NIU)	2014
	*Outstanding Graduate Student, Philosophy (NIU)	2013-14
	- Awarded to NIU's best philosophy MA student in a given year (by the philosophy department and the graduate school, respectively).	
	*NIU University Fellowship	2013-14
	*JoAnne Rafalson Essay Prize (NIU)	2013

SERVICE:

Referee: *European Journal of Philosophy* (2x)*, Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, *Topoi, Journal of Philosophical Research*, University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Philosophy (4x), Northern Graduate Philosophy Conference (2x)

Co-organizer: Northern Graduate Philosophy Conference

Talks for Undergraduates: Hope College (April 2023: outreach debate on the mind-body problem); U of T Scarborough, Association of Philosophy Students (April 2022); Wheaton College (IL) PHIL Dept. (April 2014: workshop on applying to graduate school in philosophy)

Debate Judging: Wheaton College (IL) (occasionally 2012-2021)

REFERENCES:

Cheryl Misak (supervisor)
University Professor of Philosophy
University of Toronto
cheryl.misak@utoronto.ca

Steven Levine
Professor of Philosophy
University of Massachusetts, Boston
steven.levine@umb.edu

David James Barnett
Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of Toronto
davidjames.barnett@utoronto.ca

James R. O'Shea
Professor of Philosophy
University College Dublin
jim.oshea@ucd.ie

Martin Pickavé (teaching)
Canada Research Chair & Dept. Chair of Philosophy
University of Toronto
martin.pickave@utoronto.ca

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT:

Pragmatists face serious difficulties in accounting for the objectivity of truth and knowledge. For they clarify our beliefs' meaning and truth by appeal to their practical success, and practical success seems relative to particular contexts, or even particular believers. Some pragmatists verge on simply accepting this consequence, but others attempt to secure objective standards of truth and justification. My dissertation interprets and evaluates this objective pragmatist tradition. I argue for three key claims. First, there are two conceptions of objectivity prominent within this tradition, which stand in serious mutual tension: an empiricist conception, on which objective constraints on belief are provided by possible experiences, and a realist-causal conception, on which they are provided by causal interaction with the mind-independent natural world. These conceptions dominate in different historical periods, marking the transition from classical pragmatism to neo-pragmatism. The classical pragmatists most concerned with objectivity, C. S. Peirce and C. I. Lewis, opt for the former conception (notwithstanding apparent realist-causal sympathies in Peirce's work that ultimately explain the emergence of the latter). Neo-pragmatists who preserve objectivity, like Wilfrid Sellars, opt for the latter. Second, neither camp effectively deploys its conception to provide an adequate account of the objectivity of epistemic norms: the former camp falls prey to phenomenalism (and so, among other problems, fails to accommodate other minds satisfactorily), while the latter fails in its effort to leverage semantic externalism into an adequate response to skepticism. Third, pragmatism's most fruitful contribution to thinking about objectivity turns out, therefore, not to lie in its treatments of meaning and truth, but in its independent epistemology: specifically, in Peirce's and Sellars's arguments that our right to accept that our perceptual beliefs are likely to be true derives from our commitment to being effective agents and, ultimately, from the value of control over our empirical circumstances.