Nick Stang
Position:
Campus:
St. George,Email Address:
Biography:
Nick Stang joined the Department in Fall 2014. His primary research interests are metaphysics and its history (mainly in German philosophy). His first book, Kant’s Modal Metaphysics, was published by Oxford University Press in 2016. He is currently working on a book about what Kant’s critique of metaphysics has to do with contemporary analytic metaphysics; its tentative title is How is Metaphysics Possible? A Critique of Analytic Reason.
While most of Stang’s published work has been about Kant, he is increasingly interested in pre-Kantian rationalism (Leibniz, Spinoza) and in post-Kantian figures, especially Hegel and Heidegger. He also works on contemporary metaphysics and aesthetics.
Side interests include: Jewish philosophy, early analytic philosophy, philosophy of mathematics, and critical theory.
Research Interests:
19th Century Philosophy, Aesthetics, Early Modern Philosophy, Kant, Metaphysics
Publications:
Books
Kant’s Modal Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, 2016. First edition.
- Reviewed in:
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
- Kantian Review
- Critique (by Jessica Leech)
- Critique (by Andrew Stephenson)
- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Articles
- “How is Metaphysics Possible? Kant’s Great Question and his Great Answer.” What Makes a Great Philosopher Great? Ed. Stephen Hetherington. Routledge (forthcoming).
- “Transcendental Idealism Without Tears.” Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce (eds.). Oxford University Press (to appear 2018).
- “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Spring 2016.
- “Appearances and Things in Themselves: Actuality and Identity.” Kantian Review 21:2 (2016), 283-292.
- “Kant’s Argument that Existence is Not a Determination” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91:3 (2015), 583-626.
- “Who’s Afraid of Double Affection?” Philosophers’ Imprint 15:18 (2015), 1-28.
- “The Non-Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves” Noûs 48:1 (2014), 106-36.