- BA, McGill University
- PhD, University of California, Berkeley
Michael Caie’s research is primarily on issues in philosophical logic and epistemology.
Decision Theory, Epistemology, Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language
- “Vagueness and Semantic Indiscriminability”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 160, No. 3, 2012.
- “Belief and Indeterminacy”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 1, 2012. [Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, Vol. 32, Patrick Grim, Chloe Armstrong, Patrick Shirreff, Nils-Hennes Stear (eds.)].
- “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 122, No. 4, 2013. [Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, Vol. 33, Patrick Grim, Paul Boswell, Daniel Drucker, Sydney Keough (eds.)].
- “Calibration and Probabilism”, in Ergo, Vol. 1, No. 1 2014.
- “Metasemantics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy”, in Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014.
- “Credence in the Image of Chance”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 82, No. 4, 2015.
- “A Problem for Credal Consequentialism”, in Epistemic Consequentialism, Jeffrey Dunn and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Oxford University Press, (forthcoming).
- “Agreement Theorems for Self-Locating Beliefs”, in Review of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016.
- “Agreement and Updating for Self-Locating Beliefs”, in Journal of Philosophical Logic, (forthcoming).
- “Benardete’s Paradox and the Logic of Counterfactuals”, in Analysis, (forthcoming).