Diana Raffman

• BA, Music, Yale University
• PhD, Philosophy, Yale University

For more information visit Prof. Raffman’s personal webpage.

Philosophy of Mind

Books

• Language, Music, and Mind  (MIT/Bradford 1992)
  
• Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language (OUP, 2014)

Selected articles

• “Can We Do Without Concepts?  Comments on Machery’s Doing Without Concepts.  Philosophical Studies, February 2010.
• “Demoting Higher-Order Vagueness”. In S. Moruzzi, R. Dietz, C. Wright, Cuts and Clouds, OUP, 2010.
• “Music, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science”.  Forthcoming in T. Gracyk (ed.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music.
• “From the Looks of Things”.  In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia (MIT, 2008).
• “Borderline Cases and Bivalence”, The Philosophical Review 114(1). 2005.
• “Even Zombies Can Be Surprised”, Philosophical Studies. 2005.
• “How to Understand Contextualism About Vagueness: Reply to Stanley”, Analysis. 2005.
• “Some Thoughts on Thinking About Consciousness“, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(). 2005. For a symposium on David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness. Published together with commentaries by Tim Crane and Chris Hill and a response by Papineau.
• “Is Twelve-tone Music Artistically Defective?”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 2003.
• “Review of Rosanna Keefe, Theories of Vagueness”, The Philosophical Review. 2003. (with Stewart Shapiro)
• “What Autism May Tell Us About Self-Awareness”, Mind and Language. 2000.
• “Is Perceptual Indiscriminability Nontransitive?”, Philosophical Topics. 1999.
• “Vagueness and Context-Relativity”, Philosophical Studies 81, 1996.
• “On the Persistence of Phenomenology”. In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995.
• “Vagueness Without Paradox”, Philosophical Review 103(1), 1994.