Jennifer Nagel

(she/her)

• BA, University of Toronto
• MA, University of Pittsburgh
• PhD, University of Pittsburgh

Jennifer Nagel’s research focuses on knowledge, belief, and our capacities to track these states in ourselves and others. Prof. Nagel is interested in the history of epistemology, both in the Western tradition back to Plato, and in the Classical Indian and Tibetan traditions. She also works in contemporary philosophy of mind, with special interests in metacognition and mental state attribution.

For more information visit Prof. Nagel’s personal website.

Recent, selected

• Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014).
• “The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox”, forthcoming in The Lottery Paradox, Igor Douven, ed., Cambridge University Press.
• “The Psychology of Epistemic Judgement” (with Jessica Wright), forthcoming in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology, John Symons, Paco Calvo and Sarah Robins, eds. New York: Routledge.
• “Epistemic Territory”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2019), 67-86.
• “Classical Indian Skepticism: Reforming or Rejecting Philosophy?” Comparative Philosophy 10:2 (2019), 113-118.
• “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, in Mind & Language, 2017; 32: 525–544.
• “The Psychological Context of Contextualism” (with Julia Jael Smith), for the Routledge Handbook to Contextualism, Jonathan Ichikawa, ed. 2016.
• “Knowledge and Reliability”, in Alvin Goldman and his Critics, ed. Hilary Kornblith and Brian McLaughlin. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016, 237-256.
• “The Social Value of Reasoning,” in Episteme 12 (2015), 297-308.
• “Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88 (2014), 217-39.
• “Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition (2013), 652-661.
• “Knowledge as a Mental State”, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013), 275-310.
• “Intuitions and Experiments: a Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:3 (2012), 495-527.

Visit more of Jennifer Nagel’s publications on the Philosophy Faculty Bookshelf.