History of Philosophy Research Group Talk (Thierry Côté, Toronto)

For Hume, culture is not the process by which rational representations come to govern passions. It is, instead, a naturally induced, self-enforcing process of refinement, redirection and enlargement of natural tendencies. This talk’s purpose is to clarify and question the logic of this process, and show how it is both produced and limited by core human tendencies. It will especially focus on the two central notions of redirection and enlargement. I will first concentrate on Hume’s account of the origins of justice, and what he means when he claims reason cannot motivate, but only provide a “new direction” to natural passions (T 3.2.5.9). I will then address the role of sympathy in Hume’s theory of artificial virtues, and see how shared moral standards result from of an “intercourse of sentiments” (T 3.3.3.2). Finally, I will explore how evaluations by standards relate to motivation itself. In my view, Hume’s purpose as a skeptical moralist is not so much to make metaethical claims about reason’s inertness, but rather to account for a complex interplay between our cultivated and unpliable natures.