Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Mind Group Talk (Julia Staffel, Colorado)
Friday March 22, 2019, 1:00 pm - 3:00 pm
The Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics and Mind Research Group welcomes Julia Staffel, assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder. Professor Staffel specializes in formal epistemology and traditional epistemology, and her work also relates to issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science. Further philosophical interests include the philosophy of language and linguistics and metaethics. Her main current research project is writing her book “Unsettled Thoughts,” under contract with Oxford University Press, which develops an account of Bayesian rationality for non-ideal thinkers.
Pro Tem Rationality
Some formal epistemologists have lately adopted the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification from traditional epistemology to characterize importantly different kinds of rationality judgments. They argue that rational requirements, such as the requirement that all logical truths must be assigned a credence of 1, should be understood as requirements of propositional rationality, rather than doxastic rationality. While this explication clarifies the nature of these requirements, it also uncovers a problem that has so far gone unnoticed.
I argue that there is a large class of rationality judgments we routinely endorse that fall neither into the category of doxastic nor the category of propositional rationality. We need to introduce a new notion of rationality to capture these judgments, which I call “pro tem rationality.” I explicate this notion, and show how it can be used to enlighten debates about logical and empirical learning, peer disagreement and higher-order evidence, and the epistemology of philosophy.
About the Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Mind Research Group
One of five departmental research interest groups, the Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics and Mind Group undertakes research in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, traditional and formal epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language.