It has been a fantastic year of recognition for the work of Andrew Y. Lee: the editorial board of the journal Analytic Philosophy just chose his essay “A Theory of Sense-Data” as the winning entry for the 2024 Marc Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind. The honour comes with a $5,000 cash prize and the future publication of the essay in Analytic Philosophy.
Lee has this to say about the background and meaning of the winning essay:
This paper defends one of the most unpopular, ill-reputed, and disparaged views in all of philosophy: a view called “sense-datum theory.” The theory is about the nature of perceptual experience: it says that perceptual experience is a matter of awareness of “sense-data.” The basic idea is that perceptual experience is kind of like a virtual reality simulation going on inside your head.
The origin story behind my paper starts around a decade ago, when I was a young graduate student. I was speaking to another philosopher of mind about my views on perception. The other philosopher said: “But isn’t that basically a version of sense-datum theory?” At the time, I was too embarrassed to associate myself with a view that was so ridiculed. So, I cowered, and prevaricated, and strained to explain why my view, *technically*, doesn’t count as a sense-datum theory
Over the years, I’ve thought more about that conversation. And I’ve since come to think that that philosopher was right in their accusation. Now, instead of resisting the label ’sense-datum theory’, I’ve decided it’s better to embrace and reclaim it. So, this paper is an admission of guilt—and a coming out of the closet.
The purpose of the paper is both to resurrect a theory that has long been considered dead, and to reduce the stigma associated with the term ’sense-data’. Today, the mere suggestion that a view can be classified as a version of sense-datum theory is itself taken as an objection to that view. But I think this distorts the philosophical conversation. I think those who have been quick to dismiss sense-datum theory have overlooked the best versions of the view. And I hope that my paper will show that the allure of sense-data need no longer be cause for shame and guilt.
And now, whatever someone thinks about my views on perception—even if they disagree with me—they won’t win a debate by accusing me of being a sense-datum theorist.
The Marc Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind is an annual essay competition open to scholars within 15 years of receiving a PhD, as well as students currently enrolled in a graduate program. Lee joined the Department of Philosophy at UTSC and the Graduate Department of Philosophy at St. George in 2023 following postdoctoral fellowships at Rice University (2019–2020), the University of Oslo (2020–2022), and the Australian National University (2022–2023). He earned his PhD at New York University in 2019.
This accomplishment marks Lee’s second Marc Sanders Prize of 2024. Earlier in the year, he won the competitive Marc Sanders Prize in Metaphysics with his essay “A Puzzle about Sums.
Congratulations on another success to end the year!
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