Ginger Schultheis, an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, specializes in epistemology, with a particular interest in belief.
Sarah Moss works primarily in epistemology and the philosophy of language, and often on questions at the intersection of these subfields. She has argued that partial beliefs can constitute knowledge in the same way that full beliefs can.
The Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics and Mind Research Group welcomes Brian Weatherson, Professor and Graduate Studies Chair in the Department of Philosophy at University of Michigan. Prof. Weatherson specializes in epistemology and philosophy of language. Talk Title Deliberation Costs Abstract Humans are informationally and computationally limited. The standard theory of decision … Read More
The Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics and Mind Research Group welcomes Declan Smithies, Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Philosophy at Ohio State University. Prof. Smithies specializes in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Talk Title Moral Knowledge By Deduction Abstract How is moral knowledge possible? This paper defends … Read More
Presented by the Centre for South Asian Civilizations at the University of Toronto Mississauga, this workshop convenes a group of scholars of analytic and Indian philosophy engaging contemporary problems in epistemology in light of debates occurring in premodern India. Our focus is Gangesa Upadhyaya (14th century CE), a philosopher who … Read More
The Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics and Mind Research Group welcomes Sinan Dogramaci, Associate Professor Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. Prof. Dogramaci’s specializes in epistemology with a main interest of mine is the practical function of epistemic evaluations. Talk Title Can Evolution Explain the Reliability of Perception Better than it … Read More
Julia Staffel specializes in formal epistemology and traditional epistemology, and her work also relates to issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science. In this talk she will argue that there is a large class of rationality judgments we routinely endorse that fall neither into the category of doxastic nor the category of propositional rationality.
This two-day workshop on new perspectives on mental state attribution is organized by Professor Jennifer Nagel and welcomes presentations by Rebecca Saxe (MIT), Neil Rabinowitz (Google DeepMind), Kristen Andrews (York), and more.
Professor Pautz’s current research project is a “consciousness-first” program in the philosophy of mind. His book, Perception: How Mind Connects to World is forthcoming from Routledge Press.
Professor Fine’s research interests include ancient philosophy, the rationalists and empiricists, epistemology, and metaphysics. She will deliver a talk on “Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4-134c3”.
Hartry Field’s current research focuses on objectivity and indeterminacy, a priori knowledge, causation, and the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. He will talk on “Epistemology from a “Naturalistic” (but not Reliabilist) Perspective.”
The 2018 Formal Epistemology Workshop will present papers in formal epistemology, broadly construed to include related areas of philosophy as well as cognate disciplines like statistics, psychology, economics, computer science, and mathematics. This year’s FEW will feature two keynote addresses, by Lara Buchak and Mike Titelbaum, as well as 10 submitted papers.