Professor Pautz’s current research project is a “consciousness-first” program in the philosophy of mind. His book, Perception: How Mind Connects to World is forthcoming from Routledge Press.
Professor Fine’s research interests include ancient philosophy, the rationalists and empiricists, epistemology, and metaphysics. She will deliver a talk on “Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4-134c3”.
Hartry Field’s current research focuses on objectivity and indeterminacy, a priori knowledge, causation, and the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. He will talk on “Epistemology from a “Naturalistic” (but not Reliabilist) Perspective.”
The 2018 Formal Epistemology Workshop will present papers in formal epistemology, broadly construed to include related areas of philosophy as well as cognate disciplines like statistics, psychology, economics, computer science, and mathematics. This year’s FEW will feature two keynote addresses, by Lara Buchak and Mike Titelbaum, as well as 10 submitted papers.
Professor Way’s areas of specialization are in ethics and epistemology, broadly construed. He is particularly interested in issues to do with reasons, rationality, value, and normativity, across practical and epistemic domains. He will talk on “The Distinctiveness of Fittingness” (co-authored with Conor McHugh).
Prof. Gertler’s research is focused on the philosophy of mind, particularly self-knowledge, mental content, consciousness, and the self. She will deliver a talk on “Rational Agency”.
Prof. DeRosset’s research is focused on metaphysics and the philosophy of language, with a particular interest in the metaphysics of modality, and the utility and limits of explanation and reduction in metaphysics. He will deliver a talk titled “Skepticism about Grounding”.
Prof. Vertin’s research interests have been in epistemology and the philosophy of religion. Prof. Vertin’s talk, “Theology in the Church”, will be followed by a reception.
In her talk, “Logical Disagreement”, Prof. Hattiangadi investigates three approaches to the semantics of normative statements and judgments in application to logical disagreement, and argues that none of these semantic theories is able to provide an adequate account of what we disagree about when we disagree about logic.
Roger White’s work considers epistemology and the philosophy of science, including perceptual justification, applications of probability to reasoning, skepticism, induction, and the role of explanatory considerations in theory assessment.